THE ELEMENTS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM

A. C. ZENOS

~~Jesse H. Baker~~

~~San Francisco Theological~~

Central BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

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THE ELEMENTS

OF

THE HIGHER CRITICISM

BY

ANDREW C. ZENOS

Professor of Biblical Theology in McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill.

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PREFACE.

THE Higher Criticism, as a method of study, has now been applied to the Bible for a long time. Many controversies have been waged in its name. A voluminous literature has grown around it. Its rights and claims, its validity and futility, its successes and failures have been put forward and combated in many forms and under many titles. It has been lauded and extolled as if it were a new sun destined to flood the field of Biblical literature with light; and it has been suspected, maligned, and repudiated as a source of mischief and unbelief. And this chiefly because there has been all along such a difference of ideas as to what the Higher Criticism is. Those who have concerned themselves with it the most have never taken time to define and describe it except in the most general terms. Thus, for lack of better information, some assume it to be what criticism is popularly supposed to be—fault-finding—and resent its application to such a book as the Bible. Others, better informed, take it to be an estimate of the value and validity of that which is criticized. Others yet make it the equivalent of a system of results as to the origin and nature of the books of the Bible. Still others identify it with a certain attitude of mind toward

the Bible, or a certain group of philosophical and religious views or principles commonly known as rationalism.

It would appear to be high time for an effort to clear this confusion by propounding the question, What is the Higher Criticism? with a view to finding a detailed and precise answer. We shall not dare to hope that our answer should be accepted as satisfactory by everybody. But whether universally accepted as satisfactory or not, it cannot but serve at least two classes of readers. First, in the world of students who are about to approach the questions of criticism as a part of their preparation for teaching and preaching the Bible, an aid to clear notions of what criticism is cannot fail to be of some use. It is true the world of students has its competent guides into this field; but the competent teacher knows better than any one else the value of a summary, in systematic form, of such a subject in the hands of his pupils. It saves him much valuable time for advanced work in the praxis of the Higher Criticism, and furnishes him with an outline and system for explanations which otherwise might appear, and be, desultory and scattered.

In the second place, such an exposition of the methods, principles, and relations of the Higher Criticism to allied subjects is, in the present stage of Biblical learning, bound to be of some use to the intelligent layman as a guide in estimating the results presented to him in the name of the science. Is there any legitimate sphere for such a thing as the Higher Criticism? Elementary as this question may appear to the well informed, it is asked by

many earnest, intelligent, fair-minded men. As all the answers of the Higher Criticism to the same questions are not the same, how shall we distinguish between the valid and safe and the futile and unsafe? These questions an analytic exposition of the Higher Criticism will help men to answer.

This is the first effort in this direction. To the author's knowledge there is no single treatise in which a simple expository and non-controversial attempt is made to describe the science and art of the Higher Criticism. He has been compelled to go over the books of a large number of standard critics in order, by a careful observation of their methods of procedure and analysis of the principles underlying their work, to gather the data for a science. If some one else, taking the suggestion of this work, shall present to the world a completely and universally satisfactory exposition of the science and art of Higher Criticism he will feel abundantly rewarded for his labors.

A. C. Zenos.

Chicago, Ill., *September*, 1895.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

CHAPTER I.

THE NAME AND PLACE OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

CRITICISM in the broadest sense is the act of judging on the merits of any production or performance. Judgments, however, may be formed correctly or incorrectly, systematically or at random. To make them systematically and carefully, it is necessary that one should be acquainted with the safest methods and the best ideals and standards available for the purpose. And in order to impart the information, and produce the skill implied in this, an inclusive science is organized which takes the name of criticism. Thus, in the practical application of it, criticism passes from the act to the art of correctly judging of the merits of productions.

Criticism in general.

But in this general sense criticism is naturally a many-sided art and science. Every form of production, whether in the field of the useful or in that of the fine arts, in literature or in any other sphere, must have its criticism. Which of these many sides of criticism is represented by the phrase Higher

Higher and Lower Criticism.

Criticism? Naturally, in seeking for an answer to this question, one turns to the adjective in the phrase. The qualifying term "higher" implies its correlative and converse "lower." We might, therefore, undertake to reach a definition of the Higher Criticism by comparing it with the Lower. A very cursory glance, however, will convince us that, although we might ascertain the relations of Higher and Lower Criticism by such a comparison, we would not obtain a precise definition of our science or art; because the terms "higher" and "lower," as commonly applied to criticism, are purely arbitrary and conventional. And like all other terms arbitrarily fixed they presuppose a knowledge of the technical use to which they have been put; otherwise they are misleading. The relations of the two branches of criticism suggested by the primary meanings of the adjectives are not borne out by usage. These adjectives point to the precedence of the Lower and the sequence of the Higher, as if the former belonged to a more elementary and the latter to a more advanced stage in the process of investigation. Or, perhaps, the Lower might be supposed to involve a more preliminary and cruder form of work as compared with the Higher. But these suggestions are not true to the facts.

In Historical Methodology.

On the other hand any attempt to define the meaning of these terms independently of the adjectives "higher" and "lower" is extremely difficult, because usage regarding them is not uniform. The terms are not fixed in such a way as to command the assent of all those who

employ them. In purely historical methodology the distinction between the Lower and Higher Criticism comes nearest to coinciding with the etymological difference between the adjectives in the phrases. Here the Lower Criticism deals with the basal question, whether alleged sources of history are at all admissible as such; and if this question is answered affirmatively, the Higher Criticism deals with the question which then arises (but not till then), what degree of weight should be conceded to such acknowledged sources? whether, *i. e.*, they give us that which is certain, that which is probable, that which is possible, or that which is impossible. But this distinction is hardly known beyond the narrow field of pure historical investigation.

Another distinction rejected.

Another distinction between these departments of criticism is drawn on the ground of method purely and simply. The Lower Criticism is made that branch of criticism which relies mainly or wholly on external helps for a decision, and the Higher that which relies on internal phenomena. This distinction undoubtedly expresses a truth; but it does not exhaust the meaning of the phrase as prevalently used. It does not include those cases in which the Higher Criticism seeks the aid of helps outside of productions themselves individually considered, but not outside of a circle or group to which they belong.

Still another.

A still different distinction has been attempted by those who believe that the Lower Criticism should be limited to the examination of the genuineness or spuriousness of individual letters or words and the Higher to the ex-

amination in the same respects of entire sections of writings. Thus the *Century Dictionary:* "The Higher Criticism concerns writings as a whole; the Lower the integrity or other characteristics of particular parts or passages." This accords with the usage which has prevailed only on the question of genuineness; *i. e.*, the Lower Criticism examines words or passages as to their genuineness, and as far as the Higher deals with the question of genuineness of books, or large sections of books, there is a contact.

The prevalent usage can best be defined from the point of view of the objects aimed at in each branch.

True distinction: object in View.

The Lower Criticism concerns itself with the text of writings; the Higher, with their origin, form, and value. If this distinction be allowed as proper, it appears that the relations of these two branches of criticism cannot be put in the terms of precedence and sequence. The problem before the textual critic is to ascertain whether there are any deviations in a given text or copy of a work from the original document in which the work was promulgated—the autograph—and to restore the original text as nearly as possible. This the textual critic attempts to do by a careful examination of the text, word for word, and even syllable for syllable. The question he asks is, "What did the author write?" To answer this question he uses a carefully collated and tested apparatus, basing the value of the different parts of the apparatus very often on a knowledge of who the author was. So that while it is true that the ends which are sought by the Higher Criticism are furthered by the

purification of the text, *i. e.*, its restoration as nearly as possible to its original form; it is true on the other hand that the attainment of these ends does not depend altogether on the previous exercise of the textual criticism as a condition *sine qua non*. For practical purposes a reasonable certainty of a reasonably correct text is sufficient for such work. On the other hand, in order to use the Lower Criticism with the greatest precision, it is necessary to know something of the author, of his style and his surroundings; of the idiomatic uses of language during the period in which he flourished, and many other of the conditions under which he carried on his work, and the forces which influenced him in giving it the precise form which he gave it. All this information must be sought for, partly at least, through the Higher Criticism. These two branches are then independent of one another. And yet they are mutually helpful; the best and surest results from either can only be attained by a wise and correct use of the other. But one may begin with either, and prosecute his work with and call the other to his aid as he proceeds.

No difference in Importance.

Nor can the terms "higher" and "lower" be taken as equivalent to the terms "more important" and "less important." The textual criticism is just as important as the higher; for the purposes of correct interpretation it may even be of vastly greater importance. It may make very little difference sometimes as to who wrote a given passage, if we can only know that it is free from corruptions as it stands before us. It is more important under such

circumstances to test the accuracy of the text by the methods of the Lower Criticism than to find out its origin by the Higher Criticism.

Usage has been arbitrary.

It appears thus that the term "higher," in the phrase Higher Criticism, cannot be interpreted or understood either in itself or by comparison with its correlative "lower" in the phrase Lower Criticism. The meaning of the adjectives gives no clew to its meaning, and usage differs so much as to the distinction that it is impossible to determine it with precision by consulting usage. It remains only to take the word as a technical term arbitrarily fixed by a consensus of writers. As such it should not be loaded with the suggestions either of its etymology or of the correlated branch of the Lower Criticism.

Term open to objections.

This arbitrary determination of a term is, of course, not free from objections. When it is not clearly understood that the use made of it is purely conventional, a term so fixed is apt to be criticized and substitutes offered. This has been precisely the fate of the term under consideration, and if, in the course of its history, a clearer and less objectionable substitute had been offered, it might have easily displaced it. But as a matter of fact no substitute has been proposed which is not liable to equally serious objections. But as between phrases open to equally weighty objection, that one would, of course, survive which had in its favor the advantage of growingly uniform usage. This advantage the phrase Higher Criticism has had over all other proposed substitutes.

It has been suggested, for instance, that the term "literary" might take the place of the term "higher" in the phrase Higher Criticism. But it must be apparent from the outset that this would be hardly an improvement as far as clearness is concerned. The new title would not be definite enough, either in its etymological suggestions or in its history. As already shown above, the phrase "literary criticism" broadly used is inclusive of all the investigations called forth by a writing. It includes that process which concerns itself with the examination of the æsthetic qualities of literary productions as well as that which examines their credentials as sources of information. In this inclusive sense it is evidently too broad. But it is used also in narrower senses, as when it is limited to the examination of the qualities of a literary production which are calculated to please and attract; qualities that must be judged by the taste rather than by the reason; that must be pronounced possessing or lacking beauty rather than conforming or lacking in conformity to fact. In this sense literary criticism is a part of art criticism, and is exactly analogous to the criticism of paintings, music, or any other production in the fine arts. Evidently, in this sense also, it is not an acceptable substitute for the term it is proposed to displace. Finally, the phrase literary criticism is used to designate that method of research which, upon the basis of the literary phenomena only of a writing, seeks for the solution of the questions of the origin, literary form, and value of writings. In this sense it is a part of the Higher

"Literary criticism" not better.

Criticism, or an instrument to be used along with other means of kindred nature for the discovery of facts and their verification; as such it should certainly not be wrested from this altogether proper, but limited, sense to the broader use of supplanting that of which it is only a part or a tool.

"Historical criticism" not better.

It has been sometimes said that the Higher Criticism is historical criticism. The statement is perfectly true, taken in a loose or general sense. It is not true, however, in any such sense as will warrant the substitution of the apparently simpler and easier phrase of historical criticism for Higher Criticism. The infelicities of such a substitution would be still greater than those already pointed out as likely to attend the calling of the Higher simply literary criticism. Historical criticism is in its strictest sense the verification or discovery of facts, not the verification or discovery of facts regarding the literary sources of history. The historical facts which it strives to verify may not be contained or found in literary sources but in monuments, in traditions, folklore, and legends. Thus, to enter upon an investigation whose object is the ascertainment of the truth of certain alleged facts is to enter on a process of historical criticism. But to enter on the investigation of the nature of certain documents purporting to be sources of information with reference to historical facts is to undertake a research either in diplomatics (*i. e.*, the art of deciphering old documents) or in Higher Criticism.

The combination of the terms historical and literary, in the phrase historico-literary criticism,

besides resulting in a cumbersome phrase is liable to the same difficulties as all the other terms already considered, and should not be seriously entertained. While, however, we thus distinguish between literary and historical criticism on the one hand and the Higher Criticism on the other, we recognize the affinities and common ground occupied by both.

On the whole it must be evident that none of the substitutes would be improvements over the now famous name coined by Eichhorn. And the result of our inquiry into the name of this branch of investigation may be summed up in the following definition: The Higher Criticism is the discovery and verification of the facts regarding the origin, form, and value of literary productions upon the basis of their internal characteristics and contents.

Definition reached.

As thus defined the Higher Criticism is applied to the investigation of the Books of the Bible, especially the Old Testament. It then becomes almost synonymous with the branch of study commonly known as Old Testament Isagogics or Introduction; in fact it is very often spoken of as if it were simple another name for Old Testament Introduction. It is more correct to say that it is a branch of Introduction. The latter is broader and includes all that may be needed as a preparation for the study of the Scriptures. Besides the more especial questions of origin, literary form, and value, Introduction includes the consideration of the more general questions of the languages of the books, of the text with all the principles involved

"Higher Criticism" and "Introduction."

in textual criticism, of aids to and principles of interpretation. Being so much broader than mere criticism, Introduction should therefore be kept carefully distinct from it.

Higher Criticism and Biblical Criticism.

It has been hinted already in the above distinction between the Higher Criticism and Introduction that both terms are commonly applied to the investigation of biblical questions. This association of the term with the Bible as a special field of research is neither necessary nor strictly scientific. There may exist and actually exists a Higher Criticism of the classics, of the Vedas, of the patristic literature, etc. It is not always known under the same name, but always has the same ends in view, viz., the discovery of the facts regarding the origin, form, and value of the writings under examination in each case. Naturally its application has depended somewhat on the nature of the special sphere in which it has been made; and the results have differed very much, according to the amount and kind of evidence in existence in each case.

The historical ground for the appropriation of the name to the field of the Old Testament is no doubt due to the first use of it by Eichhorn in this field, and the fact that it immediately found enthusiastic advocates and equally zealous opponents who gave the name a special significance, though a meretricious one. Having been bandied about in animated debates regarding the Old Testament, beginning with the Pentateuch, it naturally became associated with this department of study. It would aid materially in the clearing of much

prejudice and confusion on the subject if it could be universally understood that the Higher Criticism is not to be limited to the investigation of Biblical subjects, far less to subjects connected with the Old Testament only.

In another direction confusion has arisen in the popular mind between the methods and the results, real or alleged, of the Higher Criticism. The phrase is often used when what is meant is the system of conclusions claimed to have been reached by a certain class of scholars who have made use of the Higher Criticism as a method of study. Thus we hear of such or such scholar being an opponent of the Higher Criticism, or such another as believing in or being a supporter of it. In reality there are no opponents of the Higher Criticism. Those who are said to be such are simply skeptical as to the validity of the use made of this method of research, and consequently of the truth of the conclusions reached by such improper use. In vindicating their opposition to results so obtained, true scholars use the very method of which, in the confusion of language, they are said to be opponents.

Not a set of results.

Sometimes the use of the phrase is even more improper and limited than this. It includes only the views which may be called for the sake of convenience "analytic," such as the theory that the Pentateuch (Hexateuch) consists of documents by different authors and written at different times, but put together later than the Mosaic period into their present shape. Such is also the view according to which the

Or analytical views.

books of Isaiah, Zechariah, and Job are partitioned into several smaller books, and these are ascribed to other times and authors than those to whom they have generally been believed to be due. Similar to this use of the phrase is another which makes it synonymous with destructive criticism. It is supposed to lead only to the unsettling of views already held, without substituting others more plausible. It is evident that, before any progress can be made in commending the work of the Higher Criticism to the public, this confusion must be cleared away. It must be insisted that the Higher Criticism does not consist in any group of views, either divisive or destructive. It is a weapon that may be used for the purpose of combining as well as of dividing, of constructing as well as of demolishing. If it were to be discovered that two books always ascribed to separate authors were in reality two parts of one book by the same author, the discovery might be made through the application of the Higher Criticism, or at any rate it would be tested by it. It has been metaphorically represented as a scalpel, but the metaphor, like all other figures of speech, is useful only when it is understood that it expresses part of the reality. It is only one of its functions to act as a scalpel. Its relation to the old and new views respectively is one of indifference. It may result in the confirmation of the old as well as in the substitution of the new for the old. It is as much fitted to enable the student to test new views, and reject them if they prove to be unfounded, as to sift old ones and lead to their setting aside. It

Destructive theories.

is no respecter of antiquity or novelty. Its aim is to discover and verify the truth; to bring facts to light, whether these validate or invalidate previously held opinions.

It is the more necessary to insist on this distinction of method and results in speaking of this subject as the confusion has not been altogether limited to the popular conception of it, but has reacted on the world of scholarship to an appreciable extent. It has made itself felt in discussions carried on by theologically educated ministers; and that not alone on one side of the controversy regarding the results, but on both.

CHAPTER II.

THE OBJECTS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

THE attempt to find the precise nature and place of the Higher Criticism, and to associate it with other kindred branches of study, has already incidentally revealed the fact that its object in general is the solution of all questions referring to the *origin*, the *form*, and the *value* of literary productions. That it is desirable to answer such questions wherever they occur no one will dispute. This is as readily conceded by conservatives as it is claimed by radicals in criticism.* It is plain that every production, in order to be fully understood, must be studied with as full a knowledge of the facts of its origin and nature as is obtainable. This knowledge is not to be despised in looking at any literary work; least of all in dealing with the Bible. A true love of and a living interest in the Scriptures will rather lead to greater diligence in securing all the information that can possibly be obtained. Moreover, both scientific regard for the truth, and the practical

Object proper and important.

* "I regard the Higher Criticism as not only legitimate but as useful, and indiscriminate condemnation of it as foolish. Genuine criticism is nothing but the search after truth; and of this there cannot be too much,"—C. M. Mead, *Christ and Criticism*, Preface. Cf., also, article in *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, October, 1892, p. 797.

importance of such information, when secured, in determining the content and meaning of the books in question, make it imperative that the questions of origin, form, and value, if they can be answered at all, should be answered correctly. This will appear the more clearly as we proceed to examine separately and more in detail the items included under the general rubric of objects of the Higher Criticism. These are:

Objects analyzed. 1. Origin.

I. ORIGIN.—The main question here is: When, where, and by whom was the product in hand composed? There are writings very loosely associated with the surroundings within which they came into existence. They lack what is generally called local and individual color or specific character. They can be imagined to have sprung into being within one of many ages and countries. They abound in that which is common to all times and places rather than in that which is the peculiar feature of one. These, it would be natural to suppose, could be used just as well without any knowledge of the circumstances of their origin as on the basis of such knowledge. But even in these cases, as soon as information even of the most vague and negative character is procured, it proves of great value in putting their contents to use. The single question, *e. g.*, "Was the age within which such a product came to light one of great literary activity or the opposite?" if answered correctly and definitely with reference to the most vague production, would give the reader a brighter conception of it and a deeper insight into it. How much our idea of the strength

or weakness of a writer, and consequently of his authority, would be affected by one or another answer to the following question : Was the author independent of his environment? Did he act as a molding influence on it, or was he a mere product of it? A remark may sound flat and unprofitable as it comes from a well-read man in a civilized land in the nineteenth century ; but it would be considered oracular in its importance if known to have proceeded from some member of a savage tribe, or from some primitive age. But what is thus shown to be of importance in examining literary documents of vague and historically colorless character is doubly important in the case of those of marked features. In these we wish to know not only how much influence the environment has had on them, but also what the meaning of many features of them may be, viewed in the light of that environment. In other words the time and place within which any writing is produced are the medium through which it must necessarily pass. It is important to know whether the medium has or has not affected it ; for, even if it have not, the knowledge of this fact must make some difference in using it ; and if it have, it is important to know to what extent and how it has modified it.

Besides the environment a knowledge of the personality of the author is of extreme importance.

Personality of the author.

Everything that tends to explain the character of the author throws light on his writings. If he is found to be possessed of one temperament we interpret his words in one way, and if of another temperament we interpret them in

another way. The same language means more in the mouth of one, and less in the mouth of another. If it is known that a given author is generally hopeful or sanguine in his views, and it is found that on a given situation he has expressed himself despairingly, the gravity of the situation becomes a matter beyond doubt. Or let us suppose that we are perusing a work with an optimistic tone; if we were informed that the author was temperamentally or habitually inclined to look on the dark aspects of things, we would naturally infer that the occasion of hopefulness must have been irresistibly strong in the things of which he writes, in order to pervade the writing of a man of such temperament.

The personal relation of the author to the subjects of which he is treating is another point on which information is always helpful. If the subjects are subjects of debate, it is important to know on which side the author stands. Whether he is influenced by partizan prejudice or not, whether he is carried away by personal feelings or is oblivious of himself; these are questions that must be answered before the reader can have an adequate conception of the full meaning of what he is reading.

Again, when an author speaks with positiveness, as if *ex cathedra*, on any given subject, it is natural to ask, What is his title to the place of an authoritative teacher? what right has he to speak with positiveness? Has he acquired his information at first hand? and if so, what are the evidences of his having done so? Has he been trained by special experiences to speak as one who knows whereof he affirms? or has he been endowed

Qualifications of the author.

by nature with genius, with a keen observation or accurate intuition? On the answers to these questions will depend in a large measure, if not altogether, the attitude of mind with which such an author is listened to. According as he proves to have or not to have the requisite qualifications, men will give him attention either as docile learners, or as courteous listeners, or finally as suspicious and watchful critics.

Occupation of the author.

The author's profession or employment, his occupation with, and therefore knowledge of, a special class of facts naturally throws much light on what he says. A great difference must exist, from the very nature of the case, between the knowledge and the opinions of an expert on the one side, and of an amateur on the other, in any department. The medical man's utterances on questions of medicine carry much more weight than those of a man of another profession; they carry much more weight than the same man's utterances on other than medical subjects. It is of importance, therefore, to know whether the utterances we deal with are those of one whose daily life has qualified him to be an expert on the subjects of which he is speaking. The attitude of mind with which his words are listened to will depend on the knowledge that he is an expert or a mere amateur.

Double bearing of occupation.

But the bearing of all such information is not as simple as it may at first appear. Great care is necessary in discriminating in each individual case. Such professional character, when established, should have a twofold effect on the way in which statements are

to be taken. First, as to statements of fact, we expect from such a person greater fulness and accuracy; but secondly, as to statements involving opinions of the profession or employment, we are led to make some allowance for professional enthusiasm. If an author, *e. g.*, be a priest, all he may say of the ritual and its details will be taken with more confidence than if he were a herdsman ; but at the same time his estimate of the importance of the details might be exaggerated, owing to the very fact of his being a priest, and unconsciously magnifying his office. In such a case, it will be readily seen, it is not only important that the general profession and character of the author should be known, but also his individual peculiarities ; even to the extent of enabling the critic to ascertain how far he would be likely to be influenced by professional pride or prejudice.

Still another element to be taken into consideration, before the critic is satisfied on the question of origin, is the nature of the source from which this information is derived. The works of many writers can be used as sources regarding their lives and times. Josephus gives us his own Autobiography, Augustine details many of his experiences in his *Confessions ;* others, both ancient and modern, let their private lives and the history of their times enter into their works. Others, however, are more sparing in their allusions to themselves. Some, as already intimated, are totally silent. They write impersonally. They let others make claims for them. These claims must be sifted and tested.

Habits of authors.

When an author distinctly reveals himself in his work, both the manner and the spirit in which he speaks of himself contribute in making an estimate of the value of the information he furnishes. His whole moral character is involved not merely in the way in which he speaks of himself, but also in the fact that he writes under his own name, under an assumed name—either real or imaginary—or, lastly, under no name whatever. In the last of these alternatives there is perhaps not any necessary moral implication.

Anonymous writings.

The reasons that may lead a writer to put forth his work anonymously may be such as do not open him to the charge of moral delinquency. The author may be indifferent to the benefits which might be expected to inure either to himself or to others, from attaching his name to his work. He may be ignorant of any such benefits. He may have some good reason of a local and temporary character for withholding his name from the public. Or having attached it he may have been deprived of the credit of the work by some accident. In none of these cases would his personal integrity and trustworthiness be impaired by reason of the fact that his name is not associated with his work.

But if from this case we pass to the other alternative: viz., the one in which the name of an author is given to the writing, it becomes a question of the utmost importance at once to ascertain whether the name is correctly given. If the result of the inquiry be that it is, then again the moral integrity of the writer is established and with it, to

Of writings falsely ascribed.

that extent, his trustworthiness. But if not, then the inquiry must be pushed further. The critic must now ask, How comes it about that the writing is ascribed to an author who did not write it?

1. One answer to this important question might be that this is done in consequence of confusion or accident. Of the products of antiquity this is not unlikely to be the case often. Methods of publishing were imperfect. It is well known that copyists often took liberties with the most important works; they appended names to works anonymously published; and these names, once attached to writings, would be perpetuated by passing into all subsequent copies. At other times again copyists confused the name of the real author with the name of some other, and substituted that of the other; and this, being thus associated with the work, came in the course of time to supplant that of the real author. In either of these cases no one could really be considered morally reprehensible, except so far as negligence or hastiness in reaching conclusions is morally reprehensible. For, by the very supposition, the real cause of the ascription of a wrong name to the writing is the mistake of the copyist; *i. e.*, an accidental result, and not the intention of any one to misrepresent.

1. By accident.

2. But a second answer to the question might be that the real author, having regard more to the acceptance of his work than a desire to gain credit to himself for its production, attached to it the name of some other person better known than himself. The weight of a great name will naturally carry a book into the

2. Intentionally.

hands of many readers who would otherwise not be inclined to give it their time and attention. The weight of a great name has always been sought after by those who would secure important ends.* Let it be assumed that an author cared more to have his views accepted than to be known as their originator, and it naturally follows that the temptation to palm his work off as that of a great writer must be met by him. In such a case, it is hardly necessary to say the work is essentially a forgery. The moral implications are also in such a case apparent.

3. But there might be a third answer to the above question before the critic, viz., that the author hides under an assumed name; and this simply from personal predilection and not with the intention of deceiving, even in order to procure a wider acceptance for his views. How frequently this is the case in modern literature it is not necessary to point out. Pseudonyms and *noms de plume* have come to be used very extensively as covers for real authors' names; there are so many of them in fact that it is necessary to compile dictionaries of great bulk to serve as guides in this large and growing field. Young and oversensitive literary men as a class are especially apt to seek concealment behind the impersonality of an assumed name. But a pseudonym is really such only as it is clearly understood to be a pseudonym. When so understood it reflects in no way on the morality of the motives of the author.

3. Pseudonyms.

* The principle here is the same as that underlying the custom in our times of securing an introduction by some eminent man to the work of a young and unknown author.

Thus far the question of authorship has been considered as one of genuineness. We have seen that when a name appears attached to a document the critic asks : Is the work really the production of the man whose name it bears ? Allied to this is the further question of authenticity. This differs from the question of genuineness not so much in degree as in kind. Put in its simplest and most general form it is : Does the work accurately represent the author ? It can occur in either of two cases :

Genuineness and Authenticity.

1. When there are various copies, recensions, or editions. One of these probably comes nearer expressing the ideal of the author than any other. He would, or perhaps did, give it the sanction of his approval; it is authentic or authenticated because it has the authority of the originator, *i. e.*, the only person who can give it authority—the author.

First form of authenticity.

Such authority is more frequently found in connection with the field of the Lower Criticism. Here the question often is, Did the author write this or that ? Whenever the text of a given production has been so far purified that it may be said to be either strictly or for practical purposes an equivalent to the autographic text, it is then either strictly or practically authentic. Whenever a recension or edition of a book, or copy of a piece of art, is sufficiently accurate to represent the production as the author would have it or did put it forth, it is authentic. It is plain that authenticity and genuineness are terms which it is very easy to confuse with one another. In fact not unfrequently they are

used interchangeably. While this use is not strictly correct, there is a region in which investigations regarding genuineness and authenticity overlap, or at least, touch one another. This is the case when the term is applied in the broader sense.

2. In the broader sense the authenticity of a writing is the authenticity of current opinion regarding it. When, for instance, an anonymous work is tacitly and universally ascribed to a given writer, without explicitly claiming to be his work within its text, or in any part presumably from the hand of the author, the question may be asked: Is the ascription authentic? *i. e.*, Does it proceed from and represent the author at this point? Or if a tradition, either uniform or varying, has represented a writing as the product of a given person, the question may be put: Is the tradition authentic? It then becomes proper to speak of the investigation as the investigation of authenticity and not of genuineness. But it is an investigation into the authenticity of a tradition regarding the work, not of the work itself.

Second form of authenticity.

The difference may be illustrated by taking two cases from the history of criticism. The first is the familiar controversy regarding the book of Isaiah as found in the Bible. The first thirty-nine chapters of the book claim to be the work of a definite person described as "Isaiah, the son of Amoz, . . . in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, kings of Judah." If it were proved that these chapters were not written by this prophet, the genuineness of that part of the book would be disproved. The last part

Illustrations: Isaiah.

of the book, however, consisting of chapters xl. to lxvi., although always found together with these and commonly ascribed to the same prophet, nowhere claims to have been uttered by Isaiah. If it were now proved that it was the work of some other individual besides the Isaiah specifically named and distinguished in Is. i. 1: the authenticity of the tradition ascribing this part of the work to Isaiah would be disproved but not its genuineness. The question of genuineness does not rise until a claim embedded in the book is suspected of being unfounded.

"Testament of Abraham."

The second case illustrating the difference between genuineness and authenticity is the case of the recently edited *Testament of Abraham.* This M. R. James, the editor, claims is identical with a work of that name known in ancient times, but lost sight of during the period that has elapsed since. Origen for example mentions and refers (*Thirty-fifth Homily* on Luke) to an apocryphal writing containing an account of the conflict of good and evil angels regarding the body of Abraham; the title of a similar work is placed by Nicephorus in a list of apocryphal books such as *Enoch, The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, etc. But while James claims the identity of the work edited by himself with these, all scholars are not satisfied that the identification has been made out. Evidently an investigation of the question is in order, and the investigation that would either prove or disprove the position of James must be one in the sphere of authenticity. This special case may also serve to indicate the twofold meaning of the

term authenticity and the twofold aspect of the question involved. The critic may ask: first, Is the work the same as that alluded to by Origen and found in the list of Nicephorus? and secondly, Is it an authentic copy or recension of that work?

It will be seen from these illustrations that the question of authenticity does not involve the moral character of the author's intention, whereas that of genuineness may. Lack of authenticity may arise by accident, or by a mistake of some other person besides the author, or even from the intention of some other besides the author to deceive; but in no case is the author responsible for the confusion or misunderstanding that may result. Lack of genuineness, unless it can be proved to be the result of carelessness or innocent neglect on the part of the author, involves the moral character of his motives and vitiates his authority, so far forth, on moral questions.

Integrity.

But besides the questions of authenticity and genuineness and kindred to them, in examining the origin of a work there is another which the critic must ask; this refers to the integrity or unity of it. This again may assume different forms and require different treatment according to its varying phases. But its general nature is that of an inquiry into the unity or multiplicity of persons involved in the production of a writing.

How impaired.

1. All literary productions are apt to be tampered with by editors. Even in modern times, notwithstanding rigid notions prevailing regarding literary propriety and the rights of the author to hold his writing as a posses-

sion with marketable value, it is not infrequently the case that writings are altered by editors or revisers. And the more a literary production is used, the greater the probability of its being corrupted in the process of reproduction. Now this corruption, viewed as a misrepresentation of the author, is investigated under the question of authenticity; viewed as a wrong which must be set right, it is investigated by the texual or Lower Criticism. The sole object of the textual criticism is to determine whether the text of a writing is found as the author first put it forth, or has been corrupted either intentionally or unintentionally; and, if corrupted, to what extent corrupted and how it may be purified. But corruptions may enter into writings in several forms. They may consist in the omission or excision of original parts, in the alteration of these, or in the addition of new elements. In the first two forms they are manifestly in the sphere of the Lower Criticism. They affect the problems of the Higher Criticism only indirectly. In the form of additions, however, they may be legitimately in either department. It would be hard to draw a sharp line between the two kinds of criticism here; but, if one should be attempted, it must be upon the basis of the recognition of the fact that both branches take cognizance of additions to writings, but that they differ in their point of view and in their methods of dealing with these additions. The Lower Criticism looks at such additions from the point of view of the text. They are corruptions, which it attempts to detect and expunge. Hence it is not concerned with their mag-

1. By Editorial Revisions.

nitude or gravity; they must be eliminated in any case. They may be simple words or letters or whole paragraphs or chapters. Of the latter the last twelve verses of the Gospel of Mark and the first eleven of the eighth of John are clear instances. The Lower Criticism insists that they shall not be considered a part of the writing of the books in which they occur. The Higher Criticism looks at additions from the point of view of their origin. Hence, if they are small and insignificant it may ignore them, as practically leaving the question of authorship of the whole work unaffected. The Lower Criticism seeks to find these additions and to eliminate them mainly by means of its own peculiar methods; *i. e.*, the collation of manuscript readings, citations, etc. The Higher Criticism attempts the same task by means of a comparison of internal characteristics of style and thought. Its problem is to answer the question: Is there more than one author discernible in the writing or not? and if that question should be answered in the affirmative, How many authors, and who were they? This constitutes the investigation of integrity and comes within the province of the Higher Criticism.

2. Thus far only one cause of the impairment of integrity has been taken into consideration. That was editorial addition. There are others. The second to be named is the accidental union of two or more writings originally put forth as distinct and separate. This may happen in one of several conceivable ways. For the sake of illustration let us imagine a case based on usages of modern times. It is quite common for

2. Accidentally.

persons engaged in some special form of literary work to collect minor contributions to the subject they are studying. These, generally in the form of pamphlets or brochures, are often bound together for the sake of convenience or economy. Each volume of such pamphlets bound together is often named after the first, most extensive, and perhaps most important of the pamphlets contained in it. Other brochures may be included in the title, but if the economy of space and the neatness aimed at in such matters rule otherwise, the whole volume is likely to have the title of the first number in it, with an "etc." appended, to indicate that it was given only in a general way. If in a case of this very common sort there should be bound together two productions, one with the author's name attached and a second anonymous, and if in the course of time, after the pamphlets have passed out of the attention of the public, a revival of interest in the subject should lead some enterprising publisher to reprint them, it would certainly be possible that he should put them together as the work on the same subject of the same author. But in such case there would no doubt be evidences of the lack of integrity, raising a question on this point for criticism to solve. But what is supposed as possible under modern conditions, when means for preserving the separateness of distinct productions are so abundant, it is hardly possible to doubt did happen under the more primitive and pliable conditions of antiquity. Two of these conditions especially bearing on this subject are worthy of mention; first, the small number of

Ancient modes of book-making.

copies made of any single book. Modern facilities for the multiplication of copies of literary productions make it possible for us to put forth editions numbering thousands; but where each copy was made by hand separately, editions often were necessarily much more limited. Secondly, the scarcity and expensiveness of materials made it necessary to utilize the same parchment for more than one book. It is very well known that so great was the desire to economize parchment that manuscripts of old books were often washed in order that new ones might be written on the same parchment. The same desire led to the inclusion of two or more documents on one roll.* It was certainly possible under such circumstances to run together different works into one. But this possibility once granted, it becomes a part of the Higher Criticism to inquire, whenever suspicions arise of such having been the case, whether they are well founded, and to unravel and separate works belonging to different authors.

3. Compilation. The combination of two or more documents in one may also be made intentionally by a compiler or editor. The simplest form of compilation is the adopting into one's work or incorporating of passages from

3. Compilation.

* Instances of such confusion of authorship are supposed to exist in great abundance in ancient documents. The well-known difficulty in Mat. xxvii: 9, is explained by many on the assumption that the books of Jeremiah and Zechariah were commonly written on the same roll and spoken of together as the "Prophet Jeremiah," at least locally by those with whom the apostle Matthew was associated, and that in ascribing an utterance of Zechariah's to Jeremiah he was not in error, but used the common designation of the book from which he quoted.

other works. An author, undertaking to write on a given subject, finds material in the writings of others, which expresses what he is aiming to put forth. He takes it into his own work, with more or less change, in order to adapt it to his purposes. If the change be considerable, if it amount, for instance, to a complete transformation and assimilation, it may pass as properly his own. If the change is slight or none at all, and he fail to give credit to the source from which he has derived his material, the impression will go forth that the work is entirely his own, but to the critic the problem of the integrity of the writing will naturally occur.

Kinds of compilation.

But the process of compilation may be resorted to for the purpose of harmonizing or reducing to simplicity an apparently multiple mass of literature bearing on any given subject. This is generally done after a period of active and original thought, and during a period of study and reproduction of the thoughts of the preceding time. Instances of such compilation are the reduction of the Gospel history into one continuous narrative of the life of Christ by Tatian in his well known *Diatessaron;* the *Historia Tripartita* of Cassiodorus, or the unification of the histories of Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret, and the numerous *Catenæ* of exegetes and the *Sentences* of the theologians of the Middle Ages.

These compilations may be made with more or less editorial work on the part of the compiler. A compiler may so far transform and assimilate the different materials he has brought together that he may be entitled to be considered practically the

author of the new production. On the other hand he may throw them into one with very little work on his part; with very little effort even to smooth over the abruptness of passing from one of his sources to another, by modifying the closing portion of the first or the opening portion of the second part, or by inserting a connecting sentence or paragraph. In such a case it is usual to call the compiler a redactor.

A compilation may be made by the use of sources coordinately from the compiler's point of view according to a principle which suits his purpose, or it may be made on the basis of one source used as primary and others as auxiliary or supplementary to that. The redactor may find one source which furnishes him with his groundwork; and using this as a main source, he may insert into it from other sources sections that add to the fulness or completeness of the account. Or he may find two or more sources which bear to one another the relation of parallels and fuse these into one. Or he may resort to a large number of sources and articulate them into one another and thus work out a mosaic. In all these cases it is important to know the exact course taken by him in order to be able to use his work rightly.*

*The investigation of this single question of integrity constitutes that large and important section of the Higher Criticism known as analysis. Emphasis has been laid on this section to such an extent that the very name of the Higher Criticism to many suggests this simple analytic process. It is a favorite department with many critics, and has been so enthusiastically worked, that the minds of even some experts have been led to see in it the almost exclusive field of criticism. Thus Professor G. F. Moore of

To sum up, the questions which may be asked, and which it is of the highest importance to ask and answer with reference to the origin of literary productions, are: 1. The question of authorship, which may be put simply and generally: Who is the author? 2. The question of genuineness: or, Is the author whose work the writing claims to be the real author? 3. The question of authenticity: or, Is it a true and accurate representation of the author? 4. The question of integrity: or, Is the whole work the production of one author's activity? Is it an original work or a compilation? Is it derived from discoverable sources, and what are its sources? Accessory to these questions, and involved in them to such an extent as not to require separate consideration here, are the further questions of 5. The time of origin, and 6. The place of the same.

Summary of questions of origin.

Every effort to answer these questions from data given within any writing, whether it be a book of the Bible, a Vedic song, or a Homeric poem, is a piece of work in the domain of the Higher Criticism.

II. Literary Form.—The second of the objects aimed at by the Higher Criticism is the determination of the precise literary form of a literary production. To any one who is acquainted only with modern literary methods

II. Form.

Andover Theological Seminary, in the Introduction to Bacon's *Genesis of Genesis*: "With these observations [certain observations of Aben Ezra's regarding post-Mosaic material in the Pentateuch, which indicate composite authorship] criticism had made a beginning," ignoring all critical work before the investigation of the question of integrity was undertaken.

this would appear to be a work of supererogation. Works of literature in modern times are so described and labeled in their very titles that it is impossible to mistake what their authors intended them to be. The class to which they belong is often given with the title. One does not need to enter upon an investigation to ascertain that one of Alphonse Daudet's popular stories is a novel. He is told that it is, on the title-page. One need not be told that Tennyson's *In Memoriam* is a poem; he sees it in the arrangement of the lines.

But these modes of publishing books are part of the system of modern civilization. In ancient times the reader of a book was left to his own resources to judge of the form of literary productions. Poetry and prose were written alike in consecutive manuscript. Standards for distinguishing between different species of literature were neither as sharp nor as commonly familiar. Not that this condition of things occasioned any difficulty to those who were accustomed to it, but simply that the matter was left to them to ascertain instead of being, as in modern days, decided and simply announced by the author and publisher. Sometimes indeed a preface by the author would indicate to the reader whether the document he was about to peruse was a parable or an allegory, a historic narrative or a collection of lyrics or proverbs. But much oftener the question did not even seem to occur to the writer whether it were proper or useful to say anything as to the kind of literature he was putting forth. Hence however easy or hard it may have been for the im-

Not always apparent.

mediate circle of readers of an ancient writing to discern its class, it is a problem for the critic to solve under the very different conditions of the modern age. And it is a problem which oftentimes requires considerable labor and delicate investigation, careful analysis and comparison of data.

It is also extremely probable, if not absolutely certain, that forms of literature used at other times may have become obsolete in our days, just as it is certain, on the other hand, that forms utterly unknown formerly have come into use in modern times. The history of literature is not an exception to the law of development, which has so much diversified and made more complex every other sphere of activity and brought to light a large number of forms, while at the same time it has caused to fall into disuse many of the cruder and more elementary ones.

Forms have changed.

To take a concrete and familiar illustration: the Song of Songs or Song of Solomon nowhere expressly claims to be a narrative of facts. Its title rather intimates that it is a work of the imagination. It has very often been spoken of as a drama. In many essential particulars it corresponds with the species of literary production known under that name. But, if we are to judge from the differences in the analyses made by different scholars, it seems to be so constructed as to baffle analysis as a drama. It differs in many respects from a drama as conceived in modern times. It is not unlikely that it constitutes a distinct form of literature, with laws of composition

Illustration.

altogether different from any now known to the literary critic.*

III. Value.—The third object aimed at by the Higher Criticism is to ascertain the value of literary productions. Value is a relative term. This is especially the case when it is applied to literary productions. A writing has value as it fulfils the purpose for which all productions of its class are put forth. The value of a work in the department of history consists in its giving an abundance of historical information, and that accurately or faithfully to the facts. It is of the greatest value when it furnishes the fullest information and is absolutely trustworthy in its every statement of fact; or, in other words, when it is absolutely without error. By as much as it departs from this absolute standard it loses value as history. It does not, however, necessarily lose value in other respects, if it happen to have any other value. It becomes altogether valueless as history when it is found that it does not furnish facts, or that it does not give them credibly. From this statement it will at once appear how intimately this question of the value of a literary production is connected with the previous questions of its origin and literary form, especially the latter.

III. Value: Adaptation to purpose.

Probably very few literary productions have been put forth simply and purely in one species of literature. In the vast majority of cases, besides the apparent object and class of a writing, there is a more remote or ultimate aim

Aim not always single.

* Cf. McDonald on "The Drama in Semitic Literature," in the *Biblical World*, January, 1895.

in view in its production. A work of fiction, *e. g.*, may be put forth as a work of fiction pure and simple; or it may be put forth as a work of fiction with the ulterior object of cultivating art; or with the other ulterior object of imparting historic information; or, still further, with the ulterior object of producing a moral impression. Evidently the critic must distinguish between the novel which is put forth as a novel only and the novel which is published with the aim of producing an artistic or a moral or other impression.

General and special value.

The general value of a literary production then must be carefully distinguished from its special value. The general value of a book may be defined as that which constitutes its usefulness for all ordinary purposes served by all books; its special value is that which constitutes its usefulness as a book of a particular class with a specific object to be attained by productions of that class.

Value of historic writings.

History has been cited as an illustration, and the value of historical writings has been found to consist in their fulness and credibility. This is true of historical writings pure and simple. It often happens that a historical narrative is given not for the purposes of history as a science, but for something ulterior, such as the philosophical or moral value of the narrative. In such a case it is evident that the value of the writing does not depend so much on the fulness and credibility of its historical material as on the selection and coordination of the historical facts according to their importance relatively to the special

object in view. Fulness and precision in details then are not indispensable. Inaccuracy is not incompatible with the greatest value. In fact a proper economy of style will require that too great fulness, and a precision such as can only be properly used by a very few technical scholars, be avoided as cumbersome. Similarly, when the primary object of a writing is to convey scientific knowledge, its value will be found in its absolute accord with nature; its representing the facts of nature with unwavering fidelity. If an author, however, undertakes to enlighten the minds of a popular audience on science; if he should attempt to express himself in the strictest scientific language, with a view to being faithful to the facts of nature, he might render his production useless, *i. e.*, he might take away from its value by such an effort. Consequently, the greatest value would be secured for his production if he should depart from the strict standard of the pure scientist and use loose or figurative language. But this might not be as minutely faithful to the facts of nature. He will seek approximate and exact accuracy. So again, if a historian has occasion to introduce scientific facts into his work, he may depart from the pure scientific modes of representing these facts without thereby impairing the value of his historical work, or the general value of it. In a work on ethics or philosophy the greatest value is attained when the conviction is produced that the views put forth are true; when they bind the reason and the conscience. In art the highest value is reached when the taste or æsthetic faculty is

Value of religious writings.

satisfied and developed, *i. e.*, led to a stage of growth whence it can appreciate, approve, and enjoy art forms of a purer and higher type. For this reason a piece of belletristics may be utterly valueless as history or as science, but excellent as a vehicle of moral ideas or æsthetic cultivation. It belongs to criticism to discriminate the specific value of each product and pronounce on the question of its worth as history, science, philosophy, ethics, politics, belles-lettres, or whatever else it may appear to be on close examination.

To these general principles it is necessary to add some specific considerations regarding the standards by which the value of the books of the Bible is to be measured. The Bible, of course, is a book of religion in general. Its ultimate object is to bring men alienated from God, their Maker and heavenly Father, back to Him. Its highest value will depend on its accomplishing this end. But, in aiming at this end, the Bible is found to make use of several species of literature; as for example history, prophecy, poetry, epistle, discourse, etc. In treating of the question of the special value of any book it will be important to determine its worth from the point of view of the standards applied to the class of literature of which it is a part. The history of the Bible is thus history not pure and simple, written for the sake of imparting historical information, but history for the sake of producing a religious impression, with a view ultimately of changing men's attitude toward God and molding their conduct among themselves. As such, the history contained in the Bible must be

Application to the Bible.

measured by standards of credibility less rigid than those applied to purely historical works. Occasional inaccuracies in it must not be esteemed blemishes or counted errors. But on the other hand, inasmuch as the impression which the statements of the Bible are intended to make is to be made through trustworthy ideas, so far as the validity of those ideas depends on the truthfulness of the history on which they are based, that history must be substantially credible. Thoughts built on facts, and deducible from facts, necessarily depend on those facts and their reality for their value. The religious value of thoughts purporting to be derived from actual facts is impaired if it be discovered that the facts themselves are not true. This is not true, of course, of thoughts, which have no such connection with or are dependent on facts. Thoughts may be illustrated and enforced by figments of the imagination, and to use creations of the imagination for this purpose is legitimate; but they must be understood to be figments and not facts. If an appeal be made in behalf of a certain line of action based on a statement that certain facts have taken place, as soon as it is perceived that the statement was not true the force of the appeal is lost. Conduct, so far as it depends on history, requires a correct presentation of that history. But the correctness of presentation needed under such circumstances need not extend to the minutest details. It is enough if it be substantial; it is not enough if it fail in its chief cardinal points. This is the argument of the Apostle Paul in 1 Cor. xv., with reference to the resurrection

of Jesus Christ. "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is vain." If the preaching of the historic fact that Christ was risen was to serve as a basis of faith, it must be true preaching; it must state a truth.

To sum up this principle makes it necessary to ascertain in each case the aim of a historical statement, before we can pronounce on its value as tested by standards of history. Summary. If history be given for the sake of illustration; if the purpose is not to call for a course of action because the facts narrated have taken place, but to furnish a distinct framework for the abstract principles to be taught; if the history might have been given hypothetically, or as a parable, the critic will not pronounce it valueless because he has found inaccuracies or lack of fulness in it. If it is given as a ground of action, he will insist on correctness in the essential features of the account. If it is given as history for the sake of its historic interest pure and simple, he will be more rigid and require precision in details as well as in the chief elements of the history.

History as a form of literature may serve as a specimen of all literary forms, so far as the treatment of the question of value is concerned. On the same principles that have been illustrated in speaking of history, the critic should carefully distinguish between the primary and accessory aims of other kinds of writing, and pronounce on their value relatively to these aims.

From what has thus far been ascertained of the objects sought to be attained by the Higher Criti-

cism it must be very plain that these objects are legitimate and proper, and that it is extremely important to reach definite results regarding them. Can we now go a step further, and say that, before any use can be made of any literary productions, it is absolutely necessary to obtain definite answers to these questions? This question seems hardly worth asking; and yet, with reference to the books of the Bible, the importance of the knowledge secured by the Higher Criticism has been not infrequently exaggerated into an absolute necessity, as if no proper use of them could be made without it. This position is neither logical nor historical. It is not historical, because it ignores the history of the use of the Bible in the past. Without this critical information the Bible has proved from the beginning, and throughout the ages, not merely a source of comfort, but a means of building character. And the type of character built without this knowledge has been and is, so far as it is being produced at the present day, of as good quality as the character that is likely to be built by a study of the Bible in the light of critical investigation. To say, therefore, that this light is absolutely necessary is to belie the facts of history and experience. The facts prove in this case that the Bible is a popular book and is clear in its main contents to every one that may make use of it. There are some things that it is absolutely necessary to know in order to use it aright; but these are not the facts brought to light by the Higher Criticism. It is true also that there are parts of it

These questions important.

But not indispensable.

which may be and are misunderstood without this light; but, upon the whole, the harm done by such misunderstanding is of a negative rather than of a positive kind. It consists in the loss of valuable information, rather than in imbibing injurious thoughts or standards; in being deprived of the inspiration and suggestiveness that come from a true and full knowledge, rather than in being dragged down morally by wrong moral ideals or standards that may be built on the absence of that light.

However important some of these questions may be, therefore, they are not such as to need solution as a condition *sine qua non* of the right use of the Bible. They touch not its vital and essential nature, but its details. This is not, of course, equivalent to denying that some theory of the nature and origin of the Bible must underlie all use of it. Nor is it equivalent to denying that any theory serving as a basis must be true or untrue, right or wrong. But it is denying that any theory is so far true and right as to make it, and it only, the theory upon which the Bible must be used. The theories which have come into vogue have varied so much, and changed so rapidly, that for any of them to claim this exclusive right to furnish the basis of use is premature and arrogant. They are all, at the best, but working hypotheses of varying plausibility. Some minds feel the force of the reasons for one more strongly than the force of the reasons for any other, and proceed to accept that as their starting-point in using the Bible. To many, for

Critical views: working hypotheses.

instance, the views concerning the Bible commonly called "traditional" constitute the most reasonable working hypothesis for the proper use of the book. These views were held by scholars in past generations; their being called "traditional" is neither for nor against their validity; they certainly constitute a good working hypothesis. Until something more satisfactory is demonstrated to be true they are entitled to hold a place among the possible theories. The situation therefore which is assumed by some of the more enthusiastic supporters of recent views held in the name of the Higher Criticism is not real, in that it presupposes the worthlessness of traditional theories; or rather recognizes the value of only such views as are based on modern critical research. Thus Cheyne * says: "I would rather that my readers adopted one or the other [of the views of the historic situation of a Psalm both of which he rejects himself] than that they reject all attempts to find historical situations for the sacred lyrics." In a remark like this either the so-called "traditional" view of the historical situation in this Psalm is among the legitimate ones, or it is not. If it is, then the remark loses its force; because every one who uses the Psalm, depending on the traditional view of the situation, has a "historical situation" for it. But if the "traditional view" of this historical situation is not worthy to be classified among "attempts to find historical situations," and the only ones worthy of the name are those which have been conjecturally put forth by expert critics

* *Jeremiah*, p. 105.

in recent years, then it exaggerates the importance of a solution of the critical questions and is to be rejected.

Thus also we must reject the views on this subject of those who like Professor Briggs hold to the giving to the solution of these questions a fundamental place in religious life and experience. This eminent scholar says:* "You may be willing to take it [The Bible] on the authority of your pastor, or your parents, or your friends, or the Christian Church. But there are multitudes who cannot do this. They want to know by what authority the Church claims that the Bible is the Word of God. The Church has committed so many sins against truth and fact that it is necessary for us to know whether the Church is in error about the Bible, or whether it is right. How can we know this except by criticism?" That the reasoning in this paragraph is not conclusive or valid may be demonstrated by reversing its point and noticing how applicable it is when thus reversed. For example, let us say: "You may be willing to receive the Bible on the authority of specialists, experts, scholars, Higher Critics, but there are multitudes who cannot do this; they want to know by what authority Higher Critics claim that the Bible is the Word of God. Higher Criticism has committed so many sins against truth and fact that it is necessary for us to know whether the Higher Criticism is in error about the Bible, or whether it is right. How can we know this except by inquiring of the Church, the Guardian of the Bible, its history and nature?"

Unessential to religious life.

**The Bible, the Church, and the Reason*, pp. 119, 120.

The fact is neither this position nor the position of Professor Briggs, which is not a whit stronger than this, is tenable. The Bible commends itself, apart from criticism or the authority of the Church, as a source of religious information and inspiration. Criticism and the Church may increase or diminish the light in which the Bible is used, but they are not absolutely necessary, either singly or combined, to authenticate the Bible.

Conclusion.

To sum up, therefore, while it is from every point of view of the utmost importance that investigation should be encouraged in the pursuit of the objects aimed at by the Higher Criticism; while it is necessary that some views be held regarding these subjects, and that these views must be wrong if not right; while it is a solemn duty to seek the most light that can be secured, and to hold the views which are the nearest to the truth on these subjects; it is not so necessary that all use of the Bible without the light which may come on it from the Higher Criticism is valueless or misleading.

CHAPTER III.

THE METHODS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

I. The Literary Method.

The attainment of the objects enumerated in the preceding chapter may be sought for in one of two ways; *i. e.*, either through the testimony of competent witnesses, who can give such information as will solve them; or by examining the characteristics of the productions and comparing these with each other. And by characteristics in this connection are meant, first, the phenomena of the productions as literary works; and, secondly, the statements found in them regarding themselves. Kinds of evidence.

The first of these modes of solving the critical problems is the way of external evidence; the second the way of internal evidence. External evidence is historical in its character; its value depends on the trustworthiness of the witness who gives it. It is generally agreed to that the highest value attaches to the testimony of eye-witnesses, and that as soon as such testimony is known to be not that of eye-witnesses, but that of men who have obtained it at second hand, it assumes the character of "tradition"; it is open to the doubts and limitations of traditional testimony, and External and internal.

is in general classified as such. This sort of traditional evidence the Higher Criticism admits only indirectly, and in order to ascertain how far its results may conflict or agree with this evidence. The more precise definition of the relations of tradition and criticism will be considered at an appropriate place in this discussion. It is sufficient to note at the present the fact that traditional evidence is not the direct subject of investigation in the Higher Criticism, strictly speaking. But historical evidence which cannot in any way be called traditional is also excluded from the field. And this not so much as a matter of theory, but of practical necessity. It is not denied that historical testimony at first hand, or the testimony of eye-witnesses of undoubted competency and character, if obtainable, would be paramount and even final. But the value of this principle is lost when we take into account the fact that such testimony is available only in rare instances with reference to ancient and medieval literary productions, and is utterly lacking as far as the books of the Bible are concerned. History, as far as it is external to these books, tells us nothing directly about their origin. As far as it throws light indirectly on the periods and regions within which they may have originated, it is not within the scope of criticism but of archeology to examine the information secured. Accordingly we shall be led to consider, at the proper place, the relations of criticism and archeology. For the present we may note that criticism has no direct use to make of external evidence of this sort more than of tradition;

External evidence excluded.

though for different reasons, as already explained. We are thus led to limit the field within which the Higher Criticism may carry on its investigations to internal evidence. Its work here consists in estimating the significance of the facts to be found in the books as literary productions, in comparing these with one another, and reaching conclusions on this basis.* It does not concern itself with opinions regarding these facts, no matter how old or by whom held; but with the facts themselves. The evidence it deals with is internal. But in dealing with such a book as the Bible the term internal must include evidence found in the Bible as a whole, not evidence found within the special book that may be under investigation at any special time. Light may be thrown by the various parts of one book not only on that book but on the whole collection commonly known as the Bible.

Internal evidence admitted.

Term "internal" in the Bible.

The question, therefore, in formulating the methods of the Higher Criticism, resolves itself into the following: What are the different classes of phenomena which serve as a basis for forming an estimate of the authorship, date, and historical situation of a writing? As each class of phenomena must be treated

Classification of methods.

* In a relative sense such considerations are, of course, entitled to be called external; and in this relative sense the word is used in Professor Briggs' enumeration of the rules of the Higher Criticism. He classifies these into: (A) External, comprising (*a*) Use, and (*b*) Silence; and (B) Internal, including (*a*) Style (*b*) Historic setting, (*c*) Theological content, and (*d*) Citation. Cf. *The Reason, the Church, and the Bible*, p. 135 *seq.*

according to its peculiar genius, the methods will naturally correspond to these classes.

In answer it is possible to find a line of division given by the distinction between form and content. There are phenomena of a purely formal character, such as the diction, style, etc., and phenomena of a material character, such as the historical content or allusions, and the content of thought; or, in the case of the Bible, the theology taught. These two classes of phenomena have been very conveniently separated into three in the actual use made of them for the purposes of the Higher Criticism; and it will, therefore, serve all practical purposes if we adopt the threefold division in what follows. The three methods of the Higher Criticism are: The literary method, which works on and through the literary features of language, style, etc.; the historical method, which deals with historical features; and the theological method, which bases itself on the characteristics of the theology. These three methods are sometimes called arguments for the results to which they lead, and they may be called indiscriminately methods or arguments. We now proceed to examine these arguments in detail.

I. The Literary Argument.—This is based, as already indicated, on qualities of expression. Its fundamental principle is that an author will be consistent with himself in the use of words, idioms, phrases, and figures of speech. "The style is the man." It is well known that every literary man develops peculiarities, sometimes more and sometimes less marked, but always real and perceptible,

1. Literary method: Its basis.

which betray his personality in his work. He may disguise himself; but if he succeed it will be at the expense of great effort and by dint of long and patient labor. The least tendency to slacken his attention or diminish the strenuousness of his effort to maintain his disguise, the least tendency to fall back into his natural habits of expression, will endanger his success. Without an effort to conceal his identity he must necessarily exhibit those traits which distinguish him from all other authors.

This principle is, no doubt, valid, and, wherever it can be used, it is extremely valuable. It is particularly useful in determining questions of authorship and integrity. Given a writing known to be the work of a certain author, the critic has a basis for judging whether another writing is also his or not. The special phases of the argument are the use of words, idioms, phrases, and rhetorical figures, or all the features commonly grouped together under the single term of style.

1. With reference to the use of words the general principle is, of course, that out of the mass of vocables in any language each individual has at command only a limited number; that the vocabulary of no two individuals is precisely the same, and that each one recurs to his own vocabulary, choosing his own favorite words out of the list of their synonyms. In case a particular shade of meaning is not adequately expressed by the words at command he may resort to the use of a phrase; whereas, if his vocabulary were coextensive with the vocabulary of the language, he would find the special term needed.

1. Vocabulary as means of judging.

Another person using the same language, whose vocabulary had a different range, might have been familiar with the word and used it in the proper place.

Use of synonyms.

Whenever the language has many synonymous terms for the expression of a given concept, the habit grows on one using it to settle down, so to speak, to the use of certain of these synonyms to the exclusion of the others. Associated with this habit is another, that of disregarding the specific shades of meaning attached to synonymous words and using them interchangeably, or using the favorite synonym when a more appropriate word should have been selected.

Peculiar use of word.

Another tendency or habit, somewhat different in its nature and effect, is that of using words in peculiar senses not warranted by their etymology or historical usage. The number of words that any single person is likely to divert in this manner from their proper use is ordinarily very small. In most cases it is so small as not to be appreciable; but there are exceptional individuals, who either from force of education, or from an innate tendency, vary so much in their use of terms from the standards of usage that they have been misunderstood by ordinary readers, or else neglected on account of the obscurity which necessarily results from this habit. Especially is this apt to be the case with those who have worked in the field of philosophy, attempting to construct original systems or breaking ground in new branches. There have been

authors of this class who have departed so much from the ordinary meanings of words that special vocabularies of their works, commentaries on or editions of them with notes and explanations, have been called for to make their writings intelligible. These peculiarities, whether more or less striking, it is the aim of the Higher Criticism to utilize through its literary method or argument.

2. Another field where characteristics are apt to be developed is that of idioms and phrases. Every language has its stock of grammatical constructions different from the normal and natural, and therefore called idiomatic, *i. e.*, peculiar to that language. And as in the use of the words of a language, so also in the use of its idioms, no two persons have the same skill or follow the same mode of procedure. One man, for instance, may use an idiomatic phrase because he has heard it used, but has not fully grasped its peculiar shade of meaning; while another may use it with that full appreciation of what it conveys that truly makes it an idiom. So, sometimes, the use of idioms is similar to the use of expletives with very little distinctive meaning attached to them; sometimes they emphasize particular phases of thought not expressible in single words; sometimes their use is habitual, a peculiarity acquired by long and constant use, either consciously or unconsciously to the one who is using them; and sometimes, finally, such use is the result of a natural quality of mind, a fondness for the singular and striking inherited, it may be, from one's ancestry. But in whatever way one has come to use them, or whatever his method

Idioms and phrases.

of using them, it gives distinctiveness to the result of his writing and furnishes the critic with a basis of operations in establishing his identity.

3. Still another field where individual characteristics are apt to show themselves in literary work is the rhetorical quality of the style. There is a real difference between the tendencies of different men in the matter of the use of rhetorical figures. One is addicted to the use of inverted order in the construction of his sentences; another to frequent parentheses; another to abrupt transitions; another to repetition of the same thought in different words in two or more consecutive sentences; while another repeats the same word in two consecutive sentences expressive of different thoughts. One writer is distinguished for his fondness for hyperbolic expressions, another for metaphorical language; one for a habit of personifying inanimate objects and another for the frequent use of interrogation; one may be dry and statistical, another imaginative, picturesque, and poetical.

Rhetorical qualities of style.

And within the limited sphere of these peculiarities developed by each much difference will be discerned by the careful student of style. Of two writers equally addicted to the use of metaphors one may be refined and chaste in his selection of figures, while the other may be coarse and homely. One may be accustomed to manufacture his figures, while the other culls them from the masterpieces of literature. One may be inclined to elaborate these figures, while the other condenses them or flashes

Refinements.

them out in sharp and short sentences. One may derive his parallels from history, while the other resorts to nature for his illustrations. These are simply samples of the differences which actually occur in the writings of different authors. They might be multiplied, if there were need for it, at much greater length.

Grouping of peculiarities.

It scarcely needs to be said that all characteristics are observed and recognized not as individual traits of style merely, but in their various and characteristic combinations. Though even as individual traits they might and actually are very valuable in many cases, yet as they occur sometimes in one combination, and sometimes in another, the force of the inference drawn from them is enhanced. Just as the occurrence of certain groups of lines in the spectroscope is a sure sign to the spectroscopist, as he analyzes the light coming from some distant star, that certain primitive chemical elements exist in the constitution of that star, because the lines are known to be grouped in the same relations whenever those chemical elements are found in earthly bodies, so in determining the unknown factors of a literary production, the grouping together of characteristics of style constitutes to the critic a sign of individuality more or less sure, as these characteristics are more or less definite and palpable.

Style and diction.

The validity of these considerations can hardly be questioned. All such indications of individuality or of local color are constantly used even by the most inexperienced in literary matters. Let a striking article be pub-

lished in some prominent magazine or review, and it instantly sets the whole reading public to guessing who the author may be ; and in guessing, each one justifies his or her conjecture on the basis of some known peculiarity of style or expression. The fact that these guesses are quite often mistaken indicates not the falseness of the logic on which they proceed, but the lack of skill or sound judgment on the part of those who make them. In other words the criticism which underlies such unsuccessful efforts is futile not because of the argument it uses, but because of the indiscriminate way in which it uses it. For criticism is, after all, the exercise of sound judgment ; and in order to secure soundness of judgment, it is necessary to secure favorable conditions for it.

What, then, are the favorable conditions for the use of the literary argument ? Let it be remembered that the argument proceeds from peculiarities in expression. Where there is a single writing to be examined, and comparison is impossible, further progress is, of course, impossible except perhaps in locating it within a very general surrounding. But where there are more than one writing, and the question turns on the identity of the author, or where there is one document, but the question is one of the unity of its authorship, progress depends on the nature of the peculiarities discovered. If we suppose that there are striking resemblances between the peculiarities of different writings, the identity of whose author is questioned, the next step to be taken is to ask, Are these resemblances sufficient to

Conditions for proper use.

warrant the inference of identity? or are they such as may be explained on some other and more reasonable ground? Or if, on the other hand, we suppose that there are differences in one document or in more than one, purporting to be the works of one author, the next step will be to ascertain whether these differences are such as to drive us to the conclusion that the different parts are works of different authors, and that the unity is only apparent or factitious. For while differences in the style and language of different writings may arise from difference of authorship, they may also arise from other causes. Among these we may notice:

Style shows: 1. Time of writing.

1. Difference in time of writing. The style of the same author may be different according to his age. One may be highly exuberant in youth, but calm in old age; very imaginative and picturesque at first, but very prosy and dry in later life. Or the opposite of this may be the case; one may be labored and dull as he begins, and may acquire grace and freedom, simplicity and ease, as he grows in experience, and thus present an entirely different aspect at the latter end of his course. Or again, in case one writes little, and at long intervals, changes may come over his modes of expression of which no record is left; so that his later utterances may betray no likeness to his earlier. The chain of connection between the earlier and the later style may be thus broken by an interval of literary inactivity. The fact of his writing only casually and for practical ends may make it impossible for him to acquire literary habits that shall be distinct, and recognizable, and permanent,

and shall put his earlier and later writings into line of affiliation or family resemblance. This possibility ought to be borne in mind, especially in dealing with productions coming from a primitive and rude age, whose tendencies were altogether other than literary. It ought to be borne in mind also in dealing with the production of unliterary individuals. If a general or military man should undertake to write books, his style may not prove as consistent and characteristic as the style of a purely literary man. So, if an author is an author only secondarily and a man of affairs, a laboring man, or what not, primarily, allowance should be made for the lack of uniformity or consistency in his style. Change of employment may also induce change in modes of thought and expression. When a military man, for instance, like Ambrose of Milan becomes a bishop, it would be natural to anticipate a change in his literary style.

2. But secondly a cause of difference in style is to be found in the character of the subject to be treated. History and historical accounts cannot properly be dealt with poetically; and conversely, poetry would lose its special character if it were treated in a narrative style. In our own days this differentiation of literary departments is so marked that each department has gathered a mass of technical terms necessitating the construction of separate vocabularies to explain these terms. Words may be used in philosophy in senses peculiar and strange, and never associated with them in any other form of writing. Law and medicine and theology as sciences and

2. Subject to be treated.

professions, in fact all the sciences and the arts, have developed peculiar vocabularies of their own. This differentiation may not have been as sharply marked in earlier times, but its incipient stages are noticeable even there. Thucydides makes an unmistakable difference between the style of the narrative portions of his history, and the speeches which he puts into the mouths of his characters. And so great is this difference that it is necessary to treat the two separately, and one might almost say on different principles ; at any rate the student of Greek who reads Thucydides finds it convenient to use different vocabularies and commentaries as he takes up the narrative portions or the speeches in this author. If the speeches were to be collected into one under the title of *Orations of Thucydides*, and the history were to be put by itself, the characteristic differences might have led critics to ascribe the two writings to different authors.

Differences growing out of the nature of the subject treated of are apt to appear more clearly in short productions than in long ones.

Especially in short productions.

Letters, short poems, sonnets, anecdotes, speeches growing out of occasions and inspired by transient influences represent the writer in a short-lived, though perhaps vivid, mood or state of mind. They bring to the surface and leave traces of peculiarities of language, which it is utterly impossible to distinguish from peculiarities due to separate authorship.

In such brief productions a single word may be used to the exclusion of all its synonyms. The same writer may use an entirely different set of

words in some other writing. He may use words in peculiar senses—senses which he does not usually attach to them ordinarily in his other writings. It is a sufficient explanation of these phenomena that the writing was produced under a given occasion and was determined in its external features just as much by the nature of the occasion as by the innate peculiarities of the author himself.

3. A third cause of indifference in stylistic peculiarities may be found in the use of different assistants by the same author. The case of Julius Cæsar, who was in the habit of dictating abstracts of his productions to different secretaries or amanuenses, is an illustration of the principle at this point. In primitive and what we may call military stages of civilization it was almost necessary to resort to the aid of specialists in putting products of mental activity before the public. Charlemagne, fond as he was of education, and eager to promote the mental cultivation and development of the peoples he governed, did not himself write anything, as far as we know. Some historians interpret the statement of his biographer that "he regretted that his fingers, long accustomed to the use of the sword, could not be trained to trace letters on paper" as meaning that he was not able even to use writing for the commonest and most practical purposes. If this interpretation be correct, all of the work that passes under his name must necessarily have been put into form by secretaries. But whether it be true or not that he was unable to write, it is certainly true that most if not all the legislation known as the *Capitularies*, as well as a

3. Use of assistants.

treatise on image-worship entitled the *Caroline Books*, were written by Charlemagne's secretaries in his name.

And this may have been and probably was the custom in Oriental lands in the most ancient times. It was probably in consequence of this custom or mode of literary work that the class of workers arose known as the scribes or writers. The scribes of the New Testament times were a class of men whose functions were manifold. They had special charge of the interpretation of the Mosaic law. But before they became interpreters of the law they were evidently guardians of it, and before they were guardians of the law they were copyists or transcribers, and before they became copyists of the law especially they were perhaps simple and professional copyists or men of letters, ready to do literary work for others who were not especially qualified to do this for themselves. Such literary men or "scribes" one sees at the present day in Oriental towns, sitting in public places with their inkhorns and paper, ready to draw up for stated prices letters or other documents of any sort for all classes of people. Men of wealth who have never acquired much skill in composing their own papers, as well as poor persons who are not expected to write for themselves, resort to these scribes for assistance in putting into due form their commercial correspondence, their petitions to the government, their family histories and genealogies, and even their correspondence with absent friends and relatives.

Scribes in Oriental countries.

The degree of freedom which an amanuensis or

scribe of this sort takes to himself, in fashioning the style of a writing committed to his care, naturally will vary with circumstances, and the result will be different. One extreme may be illustrated by calling attention to the familiar method of modern business men of dictating to a stenographer. The result is a complete reproduction, if the scribe does his work faithfully, of what the author has said even to the choice of the least significant words. The part of the amanuensis in this case is purely mechanical. He virtually has no share in forming the style. If it were to be proved that this method was employed in the composition of a writing no further use could be made of the information thus gained than to establish the responsibility of the author exclusively for the style of the writing.

Freedom used by assistants.

The opposite of this is the extreme where the bare substance of what is to be written is given to the scribe and by him elaborated in his own words and favorite idioms. In such a case evidently the part of the amanuensis is of the utmost importance. Though he may add nothing to the substance of thought, he would have the largest liberty to mold the style of the production. Here and there an occasional favorite word or idiom of the author himself might crop through, but in the main it would be the language of the amanuensis that the reader would see throughout. It is manifest at once that under such a system of literary work a writer may employ a different amanuensis in composing different productions, and the unwary critic not taking the fact into account, or making light of it, might

be misled to think that works of the same author were composed by different men.

Between these two extremes there may be many shades and degrees of revisory interference and oversight on the part of the author. Evidently the problem of unraveling the composite work and assigning to the author and secretary each his proper share would be under these circumstances not a very easy one, to say the least.

The degree of certainty attainable through the use of this literary weapon in criticism must, therefore, vary according to the ability of the critic to prove that all other causes of similarity or difference in style are not real causes, and therefore such similarity or difference is due to the authorship of the writing in question; that it is because the author is one that similarity exists, or that it is because there is more than one author that there is difference. By as much as the critic fails to prove this, doubts will naturally remain as to the correctness of any radical inferences he may draw from these phenomena.

Task of the critic.

It will be seen from the above exposition of the grounds and methods of using the literary argument that extreme caution and great skill are the necessary conditions of such use. Of the first of these it will hardly be necessary to say anything further. It is, no doubt, a condition for all successful work in any field where the results of work may be doubtful. With reference to skill its necessity will not be questioned. And yet we must recognize a difference between expert work of the narrower and that of the broader kind.

Caution needed.

Value of "expert" judgment.

The narrower expert, and by that term we mean in this connection the purely literary critic who devotes his whole attention to the discovery, classification, and interpretation of characteristics of style and expression, is in some respects the best judge of these matters. His constant application to one single phase of the subject makes him familiar with its details and gives him a perspective into the situation. He can see more quickly and into more of the minutiæ than the layman. Shades of difference so delicate that they escape the eye of the ordinary uncultivated observer are plain to his experienced sense. The value of expert's service is no more to be underestimated in this department than in any other department. The bank clerk can instantly and almost instinctively tell whether a bank-note presented over the counter at which he serves is genuine or counterfeit. The astronomer can tell at a glance whether a mass of light at which his telescope is pointed is a nebula, a comet, or a cluster of stars. Similarly the literary expert can tell differences between the features of two documents, between the two parts of the same document. He can discover with great ease and precision the facts in each case. And as far as he deals with mere facts he ought certainly to command all the respect and deference that all experts command in the domain of their specialty. But the task of criticism is, as has been already pointed out, much larger than the mere discovery of certain facts; it includes the correct interpretation of those facts; and as he approaches this part of the task the literary critic must lay aside his narrowness.

He must be an expert of the broader kind, if he shall maintain the claim to deference and respect which has been conceded him in the field of literary criticism as a mere field of literary facts. He must be more than a skilled observer of characteristics of style or diction. While his work as a specialist may be exceedingly valuable, his very limitation to it as a very narrow specialty creates a certain unfitness on his part for a correct estimate of other than purely literary or linguistic facts. The acuteness he develops in these particulars is compensated by a loss of acuteness in other fields. Thus, while his judgment may be relied on in matters of linguistic refinement, his judgment on other matters might be so much the less to be trusted. The expert, therefore, who would claim the most implicit confidence in his judgment and use of the literary argument of the Higher Criticism is the expert who, in addition to his ability to discern and point out facts of language and expression, is also endowed with the further ability, either native or acquired, of interpreting these facts correctly. And this is an ability which is not easily acquired or frequently exhibited. There is no department of investigation where original and independent research leads investigators to a wider variety of conclusions than the meaning of the same phenomena in a literary production. The same differences, for instance, between the first and the last half of a writing will appear to one expert to indicate a difference of authorship; to another only a difference of purpose or object in view; to a third only occasional or in-

Breadth of view needed.

cidental variation; to a fourth a difference of age and surrounding in the author, and to a fifth a difference of medium or amanuensis employed in the composition of the two parts.

Conclusion.

To sum up: In order that a critic may be followed with any degree of confidence it is necessary that he should establish his claim as a man of calm and broad culture as well as a man of special experience and skill in stylistics. In the hands of experts of this class the literary argument not only can be but has been used with extremely satisfactory results.

CHAPTER IV.

THE METHODS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM (*Continued*).

II. The Historical Method.

The fundamental principle of the form of reasoning in this method or argument is that contemporaneous history is naturally reflected and expressed in the writings emanating from any age. This reasoning is similar to, but larger than, that underlying the literary argument. Just as in the case of the latter reliance was placed on the unconscious cropping out of the personal characteristics of the author of any production, so here the argument is built on the unconscious appearance of the traces of the environment. As honey made by bees that have fed on buckwheat, thyme, or any other material betrays its origin by its flavor, so literary work is supposed to betray the sources from which its author derived his materials and his inspiration. This is undoubtedly a valid form of reasoning. It may be analyzed into several subordinate arguments as follows :

II. The Historical Method.

1. The facts and institutions of contemporaneous history are reflected in the literary products of any period. There are two conditions on which this principle can be made exceedingly useful: first, sufficient knowledge of the contemporaneous history and condition

1. Direct references to history.

of things apart from the literary productions investigated, and second, clear and marked traces of that history in the writings. In other words this method yields undisputed results when the history environing an author is known well, even apart from his own writings; and when the author is in a true sense a man of his age, steeped in the civilization of his generation, fond of its institutions, and active in participation in current events. When these two conditions are complied with, it is not very difficult in any individual case to set definite dates for books or to arrange different discourses or letters in their proper order. It is quite possible to take the numerous writings of a voluminous writer and make a chronological list of them; to refer them to their respective occasions or to trace them to their causes.

But these conditions, it is needless to say, are not always present. And their absence renders the use of this method of criticism a delicate one, needing care in its use. There are writings that come from periods of which scarcely anything is known. There are other writings whose authors lived the lives of recluses, separate from the main streams of civilization and history. Some authors are not in touch with the men and the events of their respective ages. They are indifferent to what is going on about them. Their works, therefore, exhibit a certain generality and vagueness that makes it exceedingly difficult to apply to them the test under consideration. In the sphere of the Old Testament literature these two extremes might be represented

Authors and their environments.

by the periods within which spring on the one hand the works of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel; and on the other the prophecies of Joel, the book of Job, and the Pentateuch. In the first of these two classes of writings the material outside of the books themselves is abundant and the authors have made use of it lavishly; the result is that the prophecies of Isaiah may be grouped with sufficient certainty about a number of well-known events, such as the fall of Samaria and the invasions of the Assyrians. This is indisputable of the first half of Isaiah, whatever view one may hold of the age of the second part. So also the prophecies of Jeremiah may be satisfactorily put into historical settings derived from the period of the Babylonish invasion culminating in the deportations under Jehoiakim and Zedekiah. The prophecies of Ezekiel are to be placed within the period of the exile. These are conclusions reached by comparing the traces of the history found within these works with the accounts of the times furnished by other sources. And these books are mere specimens representing a large class. On the other hand the prophecies of Joel may be and have actually been ascribed to the earliest and to the latest ages of prophetic activity. Thus Joel has been placed as early as in the first quarter of the ninth century B. C. and as late as the middle of the fifth century.* The

Illustrations: Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel.

Prophecies of Joel.

* Credner undertook to prove that this prophet flourished between 878 and 839; Kleinert placed him at 875–860; Hitzig at 870–860; Wünsche, 860–850; so also during the ninth century in general Steiner, Reuss, Movers, Hofmann, Delitzsch, Ewald,

book of Job has been considered with good reasons the oldest book in the Bible; and with as much plausibility it has been put among the latest. The reasons for the great variety of conclusions as to the dates of these books is that the historical setting is not sufficiently reflected in them. The Pentateuch furnishes an illustration of the other class of works; *i. e.*, those which contain history concerning which collateral information is wanting. As this history is not easily associated with anything found outside of these books, they form a sort of circle or world by themselves. The Pentateuch is as yet practically its own only commentary. It is true recent discoveries are tending to establish a connection between it and the world within which its material is found, but up to these discoveries it was hardly possible to compare its historical content with what was known of that history outside, because scarcely anything was thus known. Hence attempts to associate the books of the Pentateuch with the eighth century B. C., or even with the period after the exile, were made; and many plausible reasons were furnished for such association. But

The Book of Job.

The Pentateuch.

Winer, and Kirkpatrick. Others make him a contemporary of Amos (about the beginning of the eighth century or 800 B. C.). So Hengstenberg, Hävernick, DeWette, Eichhorn, Rosenmüller, Bleek, Von Cölln, and Schrader, besides the older scholars Vitringa and Abarbanel. Driver hesitates between this view and the later, rather inclining to the later. Others still, like Schroeder, Kuenen, and Farrar, set the date of Joel just before the exile (about 700 B. C.). Still others, finally, like Hilgenfeld, Seinecke, Vatke, Ad. Merx, and Duhm, assign him a post-exilic date as late as 445 B. C.

these reasons could not be made conclusive, because there is much in the Pentateuch that will not easily be brought into line with the later dates above mentioned.* The critical problem furnished by such books is difficult, because it is impossible to avoid reasoning in a circle. The critic is compelled to construct the history out of the very documents whose date and authenticity he is to investigate, and then compare the facts regarding the document with the facts in the document. This is certainly not a pure application of the historical argument. It is rather kindred to the special form of that argument which will be later considered under the name of the argument from concinnity.

The force of this first form of the historical argument must then vary according to the closer or looser conformity with the conditions above named. It may amount to demonstration in cases where these conditions are fully and squarely met; or it may not reach more than a vague probability, or even a bare possibility, where the conditions are not fulfilled.

2. A second form of the historical argument may be called the argument from anachronism. An anachronism is a confusion in chronology by which events are misplaced with reference to one another. It may be used in criticism in several ways. For instance, if an event is mentioned or implied in a book or part of a book; that book, or at least that part or section of it in which the mention or implication occurs, must have

2. Anachronism.

* See Bissell, "Historical Situation in Genesis," in *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, October, 1895.

been produced after the event. On any other theory of the date the allusion to the event is an anachronism. Anachronisms are proofs of the impossibility of the views against which they militate. They indicate carelessness, disingenuousness, or lack of information on the part of the author. Ordinarily this form of reasoning is valid and useful. It is not, however, free from liability to misuse. One class of works must be made an exception to its application—those which claim to be predictive prophecies, until their claim is discovered to be unfounded. The argument can be applied in the case of purely human works, and such as lay claim to nothing more than mere human origin. It can also be applied to works which, though claiming to owe their origin, partly at least, to supernatural inspiration and guidance, are still not predictive; works in which the authors claim to speak not of the future as such, but of the present or past. An allusion to an event, even in a book of the Bible, is presumptive evidence that the book was written after the event, when the book is apparently a history or an epistle or a psalm. But the principle is inapplicable to allusions to future events in books of predictive prophecy. Its application would be a virtual denial of the supernatural origin of those prophecies, or at least of the possibility of predictive prophecy.

Predictions not Anachronisms.

Let us take a concrete illustration. The name of Cyrus appears in Isaiah xlv: 1. Isaiah flourished two hundred years before the time of Cyrus. If the book were a purely human production we would say, without hesitation,

Illustration.

that either the whole or at least that part of the book in which this allusion to Cyrus was found must have been written after the time of Cyrus. In such a case Isaiah, of course, could not have been the author of the book, or at least of that passage in it which bears his name. But Isaiah speaks in the name of God, and claims to have received revelations of the divine will and purpose. If this claim be well founded, it was perfectly possible for him to have foreseen future events and persons, as far as they are involved in the divine purpose. To deny the validity of this claim, without assigning any reason for so doing, or to ignore it, would be unscientific and arbitrary. And to treat the case as an anachronism would be to ignore or deny this claim. The existence of the name of Cyrus in a work does not militate against its Isaianic origin if it be a prophetic work. It is not necessarily an anachronism. But if the author does not write prophecy here, but merely an address to persons contemporaneous with himself, and presumably speaks only of events and persons of his own day, then evidently the ascription of the passage to Isaiah would be an anachronism. But whether he does this or claims to be uttering a predictive prophecy it is not the part of criticism to say, but a task for exegesis. When the real meaning of the author has been brought to light, criticism can then apply the argument from anachronism, or declare it to be irrelevant.

Isaiah predicts.

There is another caution that must be observed before the argument is used properly. While the existence of an allusion to an event in a document

fixes that event as the *terminus*—extreme earliest date for that statement which contains the allusion—it does not necessarily fix it as the extreme earliest date for the whole document. The possibility must always be taken into account of the division of the document into two parts, the first antedating the event, and the second coming after it. This possibility may be a very remote one, but the critic has not done his work thoroughly if he has not considered the question and answered it. And even after this has been done, the further possibility of a revisory insertion must be considered. The question must be asked and answered, whether the special phrase in which the anachronism occurs may not be an interpolation by a later hand. Here again the possibility may be very slight that the text has been interpolated, but the result would be surer if it appeared that interpolation was impossible.

Use of anachronism limited.

The use of the argument under these safeguards may appear to be difficult, but this is only an apparent and theoretical difficulty, not a real and practical one. As a matter of fact, anachronisms do not occur singly in writings, but in groups, and the task of the critic is much simplified when he finds them recurring over and over again; as in that case the theory of their being interpolations becomes less and less tenable (even as a supposition) the more frequent they become.

3. The third form of the historical argument is in a certain sense the counterpart of the argument from anachronism, and consists in using silence as a ground of inference. The principle, very broadly

stated, is that silence as well as expression is significant. This principle, however, in order to be made practically useful, must be narrowed down very much. The question must be asked, Of what is silence significant? The answer can be one of three, *i, e.*, silence may mean (1) ignorance of the facts in regard to which the author is silent, or (2) indifference to them, or (3) design to keep back or suppress the knowledge of them.

3. Argument from silence.

What does silence mean?

Taking the third of these possible causes of silence first under consideration, we may notice that intentional silence cannot be demonstrated, except in very rare instances. Whenever this is done, however, from the nature of the case, its further significance and bearing upon the questions of the Higher Criticism become clear. For the very processes which pierce through and lay bare the purpose of an intended suppression of knowledge at the same time bring to light the facts sought for by the means of criticism. If, therefore, an author sets out to conceal the time and circumstances under which he is composing his productions, and studiously excludes all references that may thwart this purpose, by the very process by which his intention is not only discovered, but traced to its causes, he becomes identified.

1. Suppression of information.

The second cause of silence named above as possible is indifference or discrimination on the part of the author against the facts omitted. All writing is after all a selective process; the writer choosing, out of what

2. Neglect by the author.

he has come to know, that which he considers of the greatest importance or relevancy to the subject he is treating of. No author pretends to incorporate in any one or in all of his writings the whole sum of his knowledge. To begin with, a large number of details are left out because they are insignificant. Even though they may not be in reality insignificant, let the author suppose that they are, and that is sufficient to secure their omission from his work. Or, it is supposable that many details originally of great importance should lapse into insignificance at the time of writing; or the reverse of this, details insignificant at the time of writing may attain to greater prominence in the consideration of the subject later. The author being the judge in every such case, he will choose to omit these details and incorporate others which in his view are more important. This choice of material need not always be a conscious process in the mind. The writing may be governed entirely by his unconscious promptings and tendencies. Thus many things, which if he were to deliberate and choose after mature thought would have gone into his production, may be left out, owing to natural forgetfulness or a loose habit of composition. The same result may be reached on the ground not of the intrinsic insignificance of matters to be taken into account, but of their irrelevancy to the subject under treatment; and in the same twofold way of conscious or unconscious estimation of their relation to the subject. And here again, these matters, it must be remembered, are estimated by the author, not by the critic or any

Things omitted may be insignificant.

other person. The critic must ask not what would appear to him to be within the scope of the writer writing on such or such subject, but what appeared to the author to be within his scope. The relevancy of certain matters to certain subjects may be agreed upon as undoubted in many cases, but there are also cases where there may exist a wide variety of opinion as to the pertinency or impertinency of given matters to given subjects; in all such cases the exact viewpoint of the writer himself should be sought carefully. When found it should be made the viewpoint of the critic in judging of the cause of silence.

As estimated by the author.

The third of the causes of silence above mentioned is ignorance of the facts concerning which silence exists. When a writer is found passing by certain facts, the most natural and the most common inference drawn from his course is that he did not know of those facts. The logical validity of this inference depends on conditions to be examined presently. Meanwhile, in order to understand more fully the exact force of considerations of this class, it is proper to go back of the ignorance which explains the silence and ask how that may arise, for it must be evident at the first glance that ignorance is not always to be traced to the same cause. First of all, and simplest, ignorance may be due to the non-occurrence or non-existence of that concerning which the author is silent; in other words, the events which were expected to be noticed by the author, and are not noticed, may be posterior to the time of the author. Moses could not have recorded the events

3. Ignorance by the author.

of the life of David or Solomon. The force in criticism of silence due to this sort of ignorance is similar to, only the reverse of, the argument from anachronism. Just as an anachronism has the force of fixing the earliest date for the document in which it occurs, so silence would have the force of fixing the latest date. The document must have been composed earlier than that of which it is ignorant. But secondly, ignorance may be due not to the non-occurrence of that which is omitted, but to lack of opportunity on the part of the author to become acquainted with it. And this again may result from the nature of the event, institution, or person ignored, or from the character of the author himself. It results from the nature of the facts ignored when these are local, remote from the common life and interest of men, and insignificant. It results from the character of the author when he is a person of defective observation or small mind, or otherwise limited ability; or when he lives far from the centers where he might obtain information; or when he has neglected to use ordinary diligence and available means for securing the needed information. Ignorance originating in this way will be very valuable to the critic as he approaches the question of the value of any writing either general or specific. It may show the author to have been incompetent or careless, but it cannot be used as the equivalent of ignorance due to non-occurrence.

Inference from such ignorance.

These principles may be applied to the determination of the date and historical environment of writings by estimating the value and significance of the

silence of the writings themselves, regarding events which they might have been expected to allude to. They may be applied in the second place to the determination of the date and circumstances of origin of writings, by examining other writings and the significance of their silence concerning them, and they may be applied thirdly in the determination of the date and manner of origin, of institutions, and events, as preliminary to the determination of the same questions with regard to literary productions. In illustrating them thus far we have limited ourselves to their application first above mentioned. We are now prepared to go a step further, and glance at these applications severally, including the first.

Applications of above principles.

The argument has been succinctly stated as follows: "Arguments *e silentio* are only of force when a strong independent probability can be established that the writers would have used it [the material of which they are silent], or would at least have expressed themselves otherwise than they did, if they had known of it." * This may be regarded as a fair statement of the principle that should govern the application of the argument in determining the question of authorship and date. The non-occurrence of allusions to events, documents, men, institutions, etc., when a strong antecedent probability can be established that they would have occurred had they been known to the writers, is an evidence of their being unknown ; and this, in a case

First application: Rule deduced.

Proper use of argument.

* Bacon, *Genesis of Genesis*, p. 32.

where the antecedent probability is that they would have been known if they had occurred, is strong evidence that they had not occurred at the time of the writers. The critical question of the date of the authors would receive all the light that may come from the establishment of these conclusions. The question then turns on how can an antecedent probability be established that any writer would have used knowledge possessed by him; and further: How can such probability be established that he would have known certain facts if they had occurred? In other words, What are the conditions on which an expectation may be entertained of finding allusions to any given events or the influence of any given situation? The answer to such a question is, naturally, not easy; nor can it be framed in such distinct and specific terms that it may be used uniformly and with the same confidence in every case. Still, in general and in accordance with the principles already discussed, these conditions may be defined as follows:

1. Importance in the matters expected to be met. It could hardly be expected that every detail would be incorporated by every writer subsequent to its occurrence. It is true that details are very frequently recorded, and that where they would least have been looked for. It is also true, as Dr. Briggs says,* that the science of history depends on the expectation that whatever occurs leaves its record and is somehow made known; but it is

1. Importance of things omitted.

* Paper in the *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis*, 1883, p. 8.

true, on the other hand, that the weakness of the science of history consists in the fact that some things evade this law, or rather that this law is not universal in its application, and the record of some things is never made ; or being once made is not deemed of sufficient consequence to the world to be perpetuated, and is thus lost. And it is further true that many unimportant features of a transaction may and do often impress themselves on the minds of observers or historians, and acquire a meretricious importance; usurping the place of the more cardinal features, and by reiterations come to be considered the salient points of history. But all this is determined *à posteriori*. As to what minor features of a historic situation or transaction shall find its way into the records, it is not possible to say *à priori*. While the historian, therefore, may be thankful for any minute information that he may receive concerning such matters, he cannot outline to himself the extent of the world that he may expect in his sources. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that the cardinal or pivotal events and personalities of history should pass into every comprehensive record of their period. It can be safely insisted, therefore, that silence regarding these events is an unexpected feature in a record of this sort and must be explained. The antecedent probability is quite strong that the writer would have mentioned them had he known them.*

* Sometimes very slight causes may determine the insertion or omission of items from the consideration of a subject. Intimate familiarity, for instance, may lead to the omission of certain things on the ground that they are too commonplace to need mention,

2. A second condition creating such antecedent probability is pertinency or relevancy to the subject under treatment. The matter omitted must be germane or within the scope of the subject. It would not be reasonable, for instance, to expect the mention of the military exploits of Charlemagne, or the wresting of the Magna Charta from the king of England, in a history of Gothic architecture. The nature of the subject would not demand it. In fact a proper economy of style would lead to the exclusion of everything not within the scope of the subject. And this principle should be applied with greater rigor to ancient writings than to modern; because modern modes of research and composition are more searching and broader in their survey of subjects. The modern writer knows, as the ancient did not, the importance of side-lights, the value of showing a subject in its interrelations with other kindred subjects, of bringing to the surface the inner and hidden meaning of

2. Relevancy to subject.

The writer may assume that they are too familiar to be specially alluded to. An eminent authority on early English literature delivered a lecture of over an hour's length on the life and work of the historian Bede, and never once either directly mentioned or indirectly betrayed the knowledge of the fact that the subject of his lecture had earned or was ascribed the title of the "Venerable." Was he ignorant of that fact? It is incredible. Evidently nothing but the extremely commonplace character of the fact could account for the apparent neglect of it. And in this regard again it is worth observing that the more a writer aspires after originality, the more he avoids treading in the beaten paths and seeks to make his own way in the subjects of which he treats, the more apt he will be not to incorporate the trite and commonplace in his writings.

facts, by associating them with facts from allied and connected fields. While the ancient author might have made an occasional excursus, and introduced irrelevant material into the consideration of a given topic, as if from sheer inability to limit himself to that which is pertinent, the modern methodically extends his treatment over a larger area of territory for the sake of thoroughness. Except in extremely technical and special works one is not surprised to find the whole realm of knowledge made tributary to the elucidation of a comparatively narrow subject. And this not in the way of digression, but integrally woven into the texture of the writing. The ancient writer was more limited in his range. He went out of his way less frequently to bring from other spheres light on his special task. Hence his silence may more frequently be due to the irrelevancy of what he may have very well known ; or to what he considered its irrelevancy, whether it were really such or not. The second condition to be met therefore, before the antecedent probability that a writer would have mentioned what has occurred, if he had known it, is relevancy to the subject of which he is treating.

3. The third condition for the establishment of this antecedent probability is absence of sufficient reason for designed or intentional silence. We have already remarked that it is possible to explain silence as intentional. For reasons good and sufficient to his own mind, whether sufficient for others or not, an author may see fit to suppress many items that would be both pertinent and important. He may

3. Absence of motive to suppress.

deem it wise to ignore men, facts, and institutions, because the mention of them, looked at from his point of view, or from that of his aim, might interfere with the usefulness of his work. It is on the ground of reasons similar to these that statesmen at the head of affairs withhold much important knowledge from legislative bodies to which, however, they hold themselves responsible for their whole conduct, including the sufficiency of the grounds for which they keep back such information for a time. Such reasons for the suppression of knowledge possessed by an author, it would be difficult under ordinary circumstances to discover ; but by as much as the critic approaches the standpoint of the author, by so much does he become the more competent to penetrate into his intention and discover the reasons that have actuated him. On this assumption—and it is a fair one to make, for, after all, the critic's whole work is to come as near as possible to the position of the author, and realize his motives as well as the outward situation within which he labored—it has often been attempted to explain the silence of authors in this way, when it could be explained reasonably in no other way.

Illustrations.

Several pertinent instances are given by Professor Briggs in a paper on the subject in the *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis*,* among which are the argument of Warburton,† for the silence of Moses regarding a future life ; and Archbishop Whately's

* 1883, pp. 6, 7.

† *Divine Legation of Moses Vindicated*, Lond., 1837, vol. ii. p. 531.

argument from the silence of the New Testament regarding precise forms of church polity and modes of worship.* It may be set down then as a third condition of establishing a strong antecedent probability of an author's not using information possessed by him.

The second application of the argument *e silentio* is illustrated in the processes of investigation regarding the canon. It consists in examining the literature posterior to the alleged date of a writing, and if there be discovered a considerable silence concerning it, reasoning to its non-existence until after the works which are silent regarding it. This is the application made of it by Richard Bentley in his investigation of the origin of the *Epistles of Phalaris*. He argues as follows: "Had our letters been used or transcribed during that thousand years, somebody would have spoken of it, especially since so many of the ancients had occasion to do so; so that their silence is a direct argument that they never had heard of them." † Similarly, in attempting to ascertain the date of the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, church historians very commonly resort to this argument. Their reasoning generally takes this form: These Decretals were first used in the middle of the ninth century; if they had been known previously, they would have been appealed to by the partizans of the ideas inculcated in

New Testament Canon.

In *Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals.*

* *Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion*, 5th ed., Lond., 1846, essay vii.; and *Kingdom of Christ*, New York, 1859, p. 28 *seq.*

† *Epistles of Phalaris*, Lond. (?), New ed., 1883, p. 481.

them.* And Du Pin † argues for the age of ecclesiastical writing: "Secondly from the testimony or silence of ancient authors; from their testimony, I say, when they formally reject a writing as spurious, or when they attribute it to some other author; or from their silence when they do not speak of it, though they have occasion to mention it. This argument, which is commonly called a negative one, is oftentimes of great weight. When, for example, we find that several entire books which are attributed to one of the ancients are unknown to all antiquity. When all those persons who have spoken of the works of an author, and besides have made catalogues of them, never mention such a particular discourse. When a book that would have been serviceable to the Catholics has never been cited by them, who both might and ought to have cited it, as having fair occasion to, 'tis extremely probable that it is supposititious. It is very certain that this is enough to make any book doubtful, if it was never cited by any of the ancients; and in that case it must have very authentic characters of antiquity, before it ought to be received without contradiction. And on the other hand, if there should be never so many conjectures of its being genuine, yet these, together with the silence of the ancients, will be sufficient to oblige us to believe it to be a forgery." ‡ It is to be noted that in all these illustrations the

* Cf. Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, vol. iv. p. 272.

† Quoted by Professor Briggs in Paper in the *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis*, 1883, p. 9.

‡ Du Pin, *Ecclesiastical Writers*, Paris, 1694; Lond., 1696, p. viii.

conditions on which this application may be made safely are either clearly or implicitly met. These conditions are the same as those on which the first application of the argument from silence was seen to be permissible. They are summed up in the brief phrase "occasion to mention," in Du Pin's statement of the case. This phrase, of course, implies the importance and pertinency of the matters whose mention is expected, and the absence of any valid reason why they should not be mentioned.

But in addition to these conditions there is found here a new and fourth condition; that is to say, the universality or absoluteness of the silence that is used as an argument. The writings that claim to be those of the ancient Fathers are never mentioned by the very terms of Du Pin's principle. The Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals are first met with in the middle of the ninth century, never before. No one mentions the *Epistles of Phalaris*. A single genuine mention would in the nature of the case be a break on the silence, thus destroying its very essence.

4. Universality of silence.

3. The third application of the argument from silence is more intricate and only indirectly useful in the Higher Criticism. It consists in arguing from the silence of writings, whose date is assumed as approximately fixed, regarding alleged events or institutions coming down from preceding periods to the non-existence of these events or institutions. On this basis the history and historical setting are made the subjects of reconstruction. This, as will be seen at a glance, is the reverse of the first application. In that the

Third application explained.

silence of documents regarding events was used as a foundation for the conclusion that these writings did not originate until after the events of which they are silent; for if they had, they would have exhibited a knowledge of those events. In this case, assuming that the writings do proceed from given historical settings, the argument goes on to the conclusion that those historical settings were devoid of certain characteristics or facts; for if they were not, these would have appeared in the writings.

Illustration.

To illustrate the strength and weakness of this application, and more especially the way in which it is made, let us cite an actual case from the course of the history of the Higher Criticism in the Old Testament.

Silence regarding Mosaic ritual.

From the silence of the periods of Samuel and the Kings regarding the provisions of the Mosaic law, or certain parts of that law known as the Priests' Code, it is reasoned that the provisions of this code were unknown at the time; hence they were not in existence; for they must have been known if they existed; hence the books commonly ascribed to Moses,—the Pentateuch,—in which alone we have a record of the alleged origin of the Priests' Code, were not in existence at the time of Samuel and the Kings. To give the full force of this specific case, however, it must be added that the actual conduct of Samuel in offering sacrifice in utter disregard, and what we may denominate contravention, of the legislation of Moses regarding sacrifices, seems to harmonize with and bear out the silence of the rest of the

literature of the period on the subject. The force of these additional considerations depends, of course, on the answer to the question whether Samuel was a mere executive of the Mosaic law or even an individual subject to that law, or something more. The records leave no room for debate on this question. Samuel's position was that of the legislator as well as executive. He had direct prophetic powers and functions; and by virtue of these, even though we should assume that the law was in observance, it would not follow that he must follow its prescriptions in every detail. He might set it aside for special reasons. His known standing and prophetic function would naturally explain his departure from the ordinary and regular course as an exception made under divine guidance. If we now attempt to estimate the force of the argument from silence without the additional force derived from the apparent transgression of the code by the prophet, we would find that it is of the nature of the chain; and it is as strong as its weakest link. It might be analyzed as follows: If the Mosaic books had been in existence, the Mosaic legislation contained in them must have been known; if the Mosaic legislation had been known, it must have been observed; if observed, its observance must have been recorded. Taking this chain in the reverse order to that in which it is given, we may notice that the last link is quite strong. If the Mosaic legislation were observed during the period in question a record of its observance, or at least traces of the same, must have been left. Though not absolutely certain,

Inference drawn from it.

this conclusion may be allowed to stand. The next link, however, presents us with a weaker probability. It does not necessarily follow that the legislation must have been observed, if known. In times such as those of Samuel the law might, and naturally would, have been kept in abeyance. The probability of this is made much stronger by a survey of the subsequent history. Over and over again in the later period this same legislation fell into disuse on account of circumstances that made it impossible to observe it. As we go a step further back and examine the next antecedent link in the chain, we find it weaker still. The Mosaic books might certainly have been in existence without leading to the knowledge of and observance of the law regarding sacrifices. That a body of laws should fall into disuse, and therefore oblivion, is not impossible or improbable. Any legislation of a highly developed character, given to a rude people which is hardly ready to receive it and obey it ideally, must suffer lapse and comparative neglect, though not always permanent oblivion. It may well have happened, therefore, that while the Pentateuch was still in existence the legislation contained in it had passed out of any considerable knowledge by the public. Thus, this application of the argument, though not illicit, nor useless altogether, is apt to prove of little value practically, on account of the intricacy of the process it requires and the temptation to introduce a weak link into the chain it involves—a temptation which, even with the utmost care, it would be hard not to fall into

But not legitimately.

unawares. Even after centuries of use and approximate perfect observance of the law, we find violations of it recorded calmly, without the least suspicion of their needing explanation. Thus, according to Josephus,* Aristobulus is made high-priest at the age of seventeen. The strict application of the argument from silence would lead from this fact to the inference that the law was unknown at the time, therefore that it was not in existence.

A parallel.

To show that it is possible for a legislation of considerable proportions to be given and exist for a long period without leaving traces of itself in the history along which it exists unheeded, the following parallel from the history of France may be cited. Sir J. Stephen, in his *Lectures on the History of France*, has the following passage: "When the barbarism of the domestic government (under the Carlovingian dynasty) had thus succeeded the barbarism of the government of the state, one of the most remarkable results of that political change was the disappearance of the laws and institutions by which Charlemagne had endeavored to elevate and civilize his subjects. Before the close of the century in which he died the whole body of his laws had fallen into utter disuse throughout the whole extent of his Gallic dominions. They who have studied the charters, laws, and chronicles of the later Carlovingian princes most diligently are unanimous in declaring that they indicate either an absolute ignorance or an entire forgetfulness of the legisla-

* *Antiquities*, XV. iii. 1 *seq.*

tion of Charlemagne."* This case demonstrates, from a field in which scientific investigation can reach demonstration, the possibility of the lapse of a great legislation in such a manner that all observance of it, and even all knowledge of it, seems to disappear for a long period of time. It does more than this; it suggests that under given conditions it is more natural to expect the relapse and disappearance of institutions in such a way that the silence of the immediately following literature regarding them is a result needing no farther explanation, when these conditions are known.

Lessons of the parallel.

Taking the proved lapse of the Carlovingian legislation and the silence which follows it, and the alleged lapse of the Mosaic legislation with the silence and ignorance of the ages of the Judges and of Samuel, regarding it as the basis for an inductive study of these conditions, we may posit the following to be some of them: 1. A people in its infancy. The Franks before and during the time of Charlemagne, and the Hebrews before and during the time of Moses, were nearly in the same stage as far as development of civilization was concerned. Setting aside such differences as grow out of climatic and temperamental character, the two peoples were very much in the same stage of growth. They were both in a primitive and rude state of civilization. 2. A great leader. Charlemagne and Moses were both above their constituencies; they were both in advance of their respective ages. Setting aside again the differences between them as regards previous training, source

* *Lectures on the History of France*, lect. iv. p. 94.

of power, wisdom, inspiration, etc., the men, and their relations to the times and the peoples among whom they lived, were very much alike. Their peculiarities as leaders were the same : they were comprehensive in their view of the functions of their offices ; they were organizers, generals, literary leaders, religious leaders, and above all legislators. 3. As a result from the two conditions already named, we have, relatively speaking, an ideal code of laws. In both cases the legislation was meant not only to regulate the national life, but also to elevate and refine it. And the standard which it set up was far too high to be realized at once. The capacity of the peoples to appreciate it was too restricted. As long as the mind that had put forth the code was present to guide in its enforcement, it might move on smoothly, though from the records of the practical application of the Mosaic system, at least, it appears that the presence of Moses was deemed indispensable ; and even a few days' absence was apt to interfere with the smooth running of the order he had established. But as soon as the mind which sees this legislation in its entirety, and apprehends at its true value the good that is to result from its realization, has passed out of the sphere of its operation, the legislation must fall into disuse and obsolescence. Under these conditions what else could be expected ? But if these conclusions are correct, it follows that the use of the argument from silence must be made with additional care,*

* The argument from silence is discussed here exclusively from the point of view of its application to questions of literary character, such as have been enumerated in chapter ii. It is needless

when applied to the reconstruction of history, as a step preparatory to the settlement of the questions of literary origin and nature.

4. The fourth form of the Historical Argument may be designated in general the Argument from Concinnity. And it may be used in one of two ways, *i. e.*, either destructively or constructively. (1) In its simplest form this consists in drawing inferences from confusion or disorder in a literary production. If two events are put in the opposite sequence from that in which they occurred, it is an evidence that the author of the book in which they are so put was either misinformed, or that he had some sinister purpose in transposing their true order. His trustworthiness as a historian is thus at once brought into question. Thus also all contradictions, discrepancies, repetitions, and parallel accounts are taken as evidences of imperfect work. This argument is also valid, and may be used first in stripping a writing of its meretricious value and determining its true value, and, second, in deciding the question of integrity. For the first of these uses contradictions and discrepancies, whenever distinctly proved, are very useful grounds of reasoning. The presumption is that an author who is well-informed on the topic of which he is treating will not give an account of it contradictory to another he has already given.

4. Argument from Concinnity.

(1) Simple form. Lack of it.

Confused writings, untrustworthy.

to say that the treatment of it must have been entirely different considered from the point of view of its application in the broader field of historic investigation.

Whenever he does this he shows that his information is either not well grounded, or that it is not well digested by him, and in either case his testimony cannot be taken at its *prima facie* value, but must be sifted and tested. Confusions are thus negative evidences ; they serve to indicate what a writing is not, *i. e.*, absolutely trustworthy. In order to base this conclusion on a proved case of confusion, it must be shown that it is not accountable in some other way, as for instance, from the desire of the writer to substitute a different order from that expected by the critic ; in such a case the apparent confusion vanishes on closer examination. In other words there is no confusion left to argue from. In a work of history, for instance, the chronological order may be set aside by a historian for a logical order of grouping his material. As soon as this is made evident, no inference can be drawn from the apparent confusion of his work.

But secondly, this argument may be used in throwing light on the unity or integrity of a writing. Upon certain conditions it is fair to infer that the contradictions, discrepancies, or confusions found to exist in a writing are the result of the blending of the work of more than one author in the writing. Again, the critic reverts here to the presumption that a writer will not contradict himself ; if, therefore, he finds this taking place in a work purporting to be the product of one person's activity, he will examine with care whether the alleged unity of the writing is not artificial rather than natural. If these contradictions are found in passages which are appar-

Confusion shows lack of integrity.

ently duplicates of one another, if they show marks of differences in style, the suspicion will be strengthened that they are due to the combination of two originally separate documents.

The difficulty in using this process of reasoning arises in distinguishing between such repetitions as may be made in any writing for the sake of clearly presenting a subject, and such as are due to the process of compilation. There are the minor repetitions not uncommon in any literary work, and the larger repetitions that require a different explanation. Josephus repeats a part of his account of the *Jewish War* in his *Biography*, and a part of his *Antiquities* in the *Treatise against Apion*. But no one has ever thought of ascribing these repetitious passages to other authors, because the apparent object of the different writings explains the occurrence of the material repeated. So also the putting of the same thought in a slightly different expression is not an uncommon resort of writers whenever they wish to enlarge and intensify the impression that may be but slight with a first and single statement. Such repetitions need not be further pressed by the critic; their meaning has been exhausted when it has been discovered that they accomplish the above named purpose.*

Caution needed.

* Writing in *The Forum*, Mr. W. H. H. Lecky says that, without disputing the value of the work of German and Dutch scholars in dealing with the early Jewish writings, "I may be pardoned for expressing my belief that this kind of investigation is often pursued with an exaggerated confidence. Plausible conjecture is too frequently mistaken for positive proof. Undue significance is attached to what may be mere casual coincidences, and a minuteness of accuracy is professed in discriminating be-

To sum up then briefly; the first form of the application of the argument from concinnity is the negative form, the use of the absence or lack of it. This lack may show itself as (*a*) confusion, (*b*) repetition, (*c*) variation. Each of these phenomena may again have its varieties. Confusion may be slight or serious. Its meaning will vary accordingly. If slight, it may be ascribed to the temperament of the author; if considerable, to his incompetency as witness or authority in the matters treated of. Repetition may be for the sake of clearness, fulness, or emphasis; or as a result of compilation. Variation may be due to change of point of view by the same author or to difference of authorship. These phenomena may occur singly or combined. When occurring singly their significance is slighter, and they may be adequately explained on the ground of the subordinate causes above given for each. When appearing in combination with one another, they are more naturally to be taken as indications of the more important causes.

Summary.

(2) The constructive use of the argument from concinnity consists in the discovery not of defects in the actual order, but in the discovery of possible order where there is only apparent confusion. It is virtually the establishment of a center or starting-

(2) Reconstructive forms explained.

tween the different elements in a narrative which cannot be attained by mere internal evidence. In all writings, but especially in the writings of an age when criticism was unknown, there will be repetitions, contradictions, inconsistencies, and diversities of style, which do not necessarily indicate different authorship or dates."

point, and the successful grouping about that center of the confused material; or the tracing out of a consistent whole, beginning at the starting point. If this can be done, a presumption is created that that was the original order and that departure from it is due to the disturbing influence of time, accident, and ignorance or incapacity in handling this original order. The process of reasoning is used in other branches of investigation, and with satisfactory results. In paleontology, if an investigator were to unearth a group of bones, he would fit them into one another after the analogy of the skeleton of some type of animal known to him; and if the result of this work were a complete whole, he would reason naturally and properly that he had succeeded in reconstructing the skeleton of the extinct animal in its original form. The fact that the parts seemed to fit into one another would be in itself a strong evidence of the naturalness, and therefore of the originality, of the arrangement. In archeology, if a group of fragments were to be brought to the expert, he would attempt to put piece into piece; and if he managed by so doing to get a vase or statue or bas-relief, he would be justified in inferring that he had the original order of the fragments. The same process could be pursued in history. It has actually been pursued in the recovery of the lost histories of Oriental nations, especially those of the Mesopotamian valley. When the heaps of inscriptions found in that valley were first brought to the attention of European scholars, the first step in making use of them was their arrangement in some order.

Analogies.

In the very process of deciphering the earliest found inscriptions the argument from the consistency of the conjectures regarding the arrangement of the letters proved a strong help in reaching sure results; and similarly, in the later stages, the fitting of the records into one another, and their agreement with a natural chronological scheme, were a strong ground for believing that their true order had been discovered.

These analogies not only furnish a ground of confidence in the argument from concinnity and the results that may be attained by its application, but also give us some hints as to the conditions under which the argument can be used with safety. These conditions are: (*a*) The existence of apparent disorder. The investigator in paleontology approaches a heap of bones with the conviction that, as a heap, it is certainly not in its primitive and natural order. So also the archeologian and historian are certain at the first glance that they are in possession of materials that have been dislocated and thrown together in some other than their original form. This dislocation may not be indeed a matter of certainty; it may merely be suspected that it exists; but, at any rate, to go to any body of materials expecting to rearrange them, whether they are in actual disorder or not, is to approach the subject in a wanton and not in a serious spirit. As a first condition before undertaking a serious attempt at reconstruction, the critic should assure himself that the order in which he finds his materials is not the original one; that it is at least not reason-

Conditions: (a) Apparent disorder.

able to so consider it. In the cases cited as analogies, from the nature of the case this part of the work would be simple and could not detain the investigator very long. In historical and literary investigations this is not as easy a process. Literary sources of history come to us always in some plausible order, and it must be established that this order is either impossible or at any rate attended with serious difficulties. (*b*) But secondly, another condition for the right use of this argument is the proof that the order which is proposed as a substitute for the disorder is a reasonable one. The analogies would, in fact, lead further and compel us, if we were to press them closely, to say that the order proposed must be the only order possible. And in order to produce the impression of certainty and compel universal assent, such a reconstruction, on the basis of the argument from concinnity, must show the facts in the only possible order. By as much as it comes short of this, it is apt to be controverted and disputed. This may be a hard condition to fulfil; and yet the compliance required to it is a practical one, not mathematical. As in all other cases of reasoning, here also what is aimed at as an ideal may not be attained in practice, except in very rare cases. And after all, wherever there is doubt in the application of the argument, it must be a matter of comparative rather than of absolute certainty. In other words, if a new way of arranging materials removes all difficulties that seem to attend an old order and offers no difficulties of its own; if it is so far superior as to be in comparison with the old a

(b) Order proposed: Reasonable.

real and not an artificial one, it is to be preferred.

All that has been said thus far applies directly to attempts at complete restoration on the assumption that what is to be restored has been completely disarranged. The principles on which the argument is based may be, however, applied to partial disarrangement with the intent of restoring what has been put out of its natural order. The results that may be reached in such cases are the more certain because, in attaining them, the parts which are disarranged serve to indicate the general outline of the whole and enable the investigator to make his reconstruction with confidence. In this field, accordingly, some of the most trustworthy results of the application of this method have been obtained. The books of Isaiah and Jeremiah furnish illustrations of the historical rearrangement of discourses delivered and put in other than their historical order. But these results also vindicate the validity and value of this method.

Partial use of concinnity.

CHAPTER V.

THE METHODS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM (*Concluded*).

III. The Argument from the Content of Thought.

THIS method is sometimes called the "theological argument"; it is so called when used in the examination of literary works which, like the books of the Bible, are sources of theology, or contain theological material. As used in any other connection, or with reference to any other class of books, the argument should be more properly called the argument from the content of thought. It differs from the literary argument in dealing with the content rather than the form of literary productions, and from the historical argument in taking account and using as a basis of operations, not the historical setting and its correspondence or non-correspondence with the historic content in the books, but the subject matter of the books as especially reflecting directly or indirectly the system of thought of the authors. This content of thought may (1) reveal the individuality of the author; in such a case the use made of it is analogous to the use of considerations drawn from style and qualities of expression. It may, however, (2) identify the writing with a period by its correspondence or lack

III. The Theological Argument.

Its two forms.

of correspondence with the thought outside of the writing, and by its other inner characteristics. In this case its use is analogous with the use already described of historic data, and it becomes in a sense a form of the historical argument. We may examine these two uses separately.

1. An author's thought is characteristic of him just as his style is. His circle of knowledge, his meditations or speculations, are determined to a large extent by his character, education, and environment. Taken all together, they constitute a complex which, to the skilled workman in this department, is recognizable just as the features of his face are to the physical eye and the character of his style to the literary critic. These features evince themselves in everything to which he gives expression. He may disguise his thoughts as he may disguise his style, but the presumption is that he will not do so without sufficient reason, and if he should, it would not be impossible to strip him of his disguise and discover his identity in the minor features of his system. But disguise is exceptional and is not to be taken into consideration, except as a last resort, when other hypotheses have failed to solve the difficulties of the situation. Under ordinary circumstances a man loves to dwell on a circle of ideas. They become his pets, especially if he has himself conceived them in the first place, and not borrowed them from any one else. Or even if he have borrowed, if he has but given them a new turn or become possessed by their living importance; if they have become convictions, he loves them and

1. Characteristics of thought.

broods over them, and comes back to them. Every man, moreover, draws his inspiration from a limited and well-defined sphere; the product of his thinking is marked by the tinge of the source whence he has derived it, just as glass colored with certain chemicals always indicates their presence by the color it assumes, or porcelain made of clay from one region betrays the source of its material. One man, for instance, is a lover of nature and a close student of it; it is impossible but that his thoughts should be full of the beauties or suggestiveness of nature. He has made it the starting-point of his thoughts, and the source of his inspiration, even in a secondary sense. Another is introspective; he is accustomed to reflect on the inner processes of thought and feeling. He is apt to show his philosophic tendency toward whatsoever variety of philosophic thought he may be addicted. Another is fond of sociological and political problems, and spends much time in turning them over in his mind; it will come about almost inevitably that his system of thought will run in the molds of sociological or political life. Thus, in the thoughts more strictly of religion and theology, there arise different types. One is accustomed to think of the power, another of the wisdom, and another of the love of God preeminently. Each of these thinkers is apt to crystallize, as about a center, his whole thought of God around that attribute which to him is preeminent. In fact, this same unconscious selection of a center, and grouping one's views of religion, takes place not in the narrow department of the doctrine of God only, but through

Indications of authorship.

the whole field of theology in its broadest sense. No one who has compared the presentation of the Gospel in the Epistles of Paul with that in the Fourth Gospel, or the Epistle to the Hebrews in the New Testament, or the prophecies of Isaiah with those of Ezekiel or Zechariah in the Old Testament, will be tempted to question the grouping of the theological content of these writings around different centers. This necessarily affects not only the position of the details, but also their significance on the whole. The whole new discipline of Biblical theology, as a department of theological science, is based upon the existence of these characteristic differences and the possibility of recognizing them and using them as a basis of further constructive work in building up the systems of different periods, schools, individuals, or standpoints found within such a collection of books as the Bible. But if these peculiarities can be used in Biblical theology, they can be used in criticism.

Illustrations.

But in applying the argument a difference is to be noticed between Biblical theology and criticism. It is one thing to recognize characteristic differences in works whose authors are already in other ways known to be different, and another to establish authorship or any other point in criticism from assumed differences or peculiarities. Whenever, therefore, it is shown on the ground of the use of other processes of argumentation that certain results are probable, the reasoning from the content of thought, if it point to the same results, will have a corroborative

Basis of Biblical Theology.

force. In other cases it is limited in force and leads to uncertain results. As an original or initiatory step in procuring answers to the questions of criticism, its value is small. Thus, as a matter of fact, it is used almost altogether in connection with other arguments. In other respects also the conditions on which safe use can be made of it are similar to those already observed as requisite for the application of the literary argument. The causes which produce variation in the style of one author may produce variation in the system of thought of the same author. It should be made clear, therefore, that such differences do not arise from change in the point of view of the author due to time or surroundings, to difference in topic or occasion, or to the employment of a different assistant in the composition of different works, before the reasoning from the difference of content of thought can be conceded its full force.

2. Development of thought.

2. The second form of the argument now under consideration is that which may be designated as the argument from the development of thought. It is perfectly analogous to, in fact, it rests on the same principle as the form of argument we have called the argument from concinnity in speaking of the historical method.* Given certain ideas or systems of ideas—A, B, C, and D, on the same general subject—they can be arranged on the ground of their internal relations of development from one another. Conversely, if they are not found in the order in which they can thus be arranged, they are in disorder and must be rear-

* See chap. iv.

ranged. A more advanced type of thought is distinguishable from a less advanced by certain marked peculiarities, just as a photograph of an individual taken in advanced age is readily distinguishable from one taken in youth or manhood. It is not difficult to arrange in their chronological order a number of such pictures of a growing object taken at the different stages of its growth. If in a series of writings there appear a regular order of succession, the presumption is that the order is original, and the writings must be put in the succession indicated. If of two documents that which claims a later date gives the cruder form of a teaching, the natural inference would be, upon this principle, that the claim is not valid; that the order of the two writings has been somehow inverted, and that the true order is the reverse of the apparent.

In attempting to safeguard this form of the argument and render its application sure and useful it is to be borne in mind that, while there is an undoubted law of development and the different stages of a developing object are distinctly discernible, yet this is true of stages that stand widely apart from one another. Closer and nearer stages are not as easily distinguishable. It would not be easy, for instance, under ordinary circumstances to mark or recognize the difference in the appearance of a grown man from one month to another or from one year to another. Growth need not involve a specified time, but it must be considerable before it can be recognized. Moreover growth, especially in stages nearer one another, does not always take place in direct and straight lines. In

Limitations of argument.

fact it takes this simple course only rarely and by way of exception. More usually the way of development is circuitous and complex. The line of progress has been properly compared to the figure of the spiral, which returns upon itself and rises higher in succeeding stages. While this comparison is generally true, even this figure cannot give an absolute and invariable rule to be applied without deviation. History is full of sudden, unexpected, and unaccountable freaks in development. No theory of evolution has thus far succeeded in explaining all the actual phenomena of this kind. Men, systems, codes, sometimes appear apart from and seemingly without reference to any regular line or law of development. Men are born out of due time; they come on the scene generations, sometimes centuries, in advance of the apparently natural place of the ideas they advocate. They put forth their thoughts on an unappreciative environment; their high ideals seem like exotics transplanted from some later age into the past, as if some tropical plant had been put back into the glacial age. It would manifestly be untrue to history, as it would be unjust to these men and their ideas, to argue them forward in history in order to make them take their places in a line of development. Large views are often put forth and have a brief career of glory and apparent appreciation, and then dwindle and pass away. A degenerate generation may shrink from the earlier and larger views and fall back on narrower, reactionary views. It would be untrue

Development not uniform.

Advanced forms: Early stages.

Degeneration.

to history to call every succeeding period an advance on its predecessor. The posterior is evolved from the anterior, but often in the way of retrogression. In many cases the later is an enfolding rather than an unfolding from the earlier.

These unevennesses of development in history, going hand in hand with the obvious general upward spiral movement, have led men to formulate different theories of evolution. For inasmuch as a theory of evolution omits to take account of any set of facts, be they exceptional or not, it proves unsatisfactory and must yield to one that does make the effort to explain all the phenomena. Thus, in our own century we have had first the Hegelian theory of development. According to this all growth is the resultant of the conflict of opposing forces. The appearance of any force or factor is a thesis that inevitably, and as if by its own inherent virtue, brings about the appearance of its opposite or the antithesis. From the conflict which then ensues there emerges the union of the two forces in a synthesis. This law, it was asserted, would satisfactorily explain all the facts of development everywhere. History and literature or thought, whether religious or otherwise, far from being exceptions to its operation were all the more under its power because they were ideal rather than material elements of the universe, if we may be permitted to translate Hegelian thought into unphilosophical language. If one were to assume the validity of this law and proceed to arrange the facts of history, he would reach certain definite results. The Tübingen school of criticism under the lead of

Hegelian evolution.

F. C. Baur tried to reconstruct the history of the New Testament writings, using chiefly this argument from the development of thought. The traditional view of the origin of the New Testament books was set aside as unphilosophical. It was noticed that the four Epistles of Paul—those to the Galatians, Corinthians, and Romans—were pervaded by a spirit of aggressive universalism, an interpretation of Christianity as meant for the whole world and independently of Judaism. Here was the thesis of the movement; the Apocalypse and perhaps one or two other works were put forth in opposition to this tendency to universalize the Gospel; they were the answer of the Judaizers to the attempt of Paul in the four cardinal epistles. Here was the antithesis. The struggle between the Pauline school and the opposing school of Judaizers naturally went on at first with great earnestness on both sides, one might almost say it raged like a fierce warfare, until both camps were wearied with it; meantime arose the inevitable party that desired peace; scheme after scheme of compromise was proposed until the reconciliation finally came toward the end of the second century. This was the synthesis. It was accompanied by a considerable literary activity; and many of the New Testament books, like the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles of Peter, the non-controversial or non-doctrinal Epistles ascribed to Paul, etc., are some of its permanent monuments.

Now, while there is much in this view of development that is true and suggestive; as an *à priori* theory, introduced *ab extra* into the philosophy of history, it was destined to fail. In the field of New

Testament literature, at least, its failure has been a universally acknowledged fact for many years past. Undoubted historical testimony shows that the order of the origin of the New Testament books is not the order assigned to them on the assumption of the truth of this theory of development. Whatever the truth may be regarding that theory as a purely philosophical theory of its application in other fields, it is not satisfactory in New Testament criticism.

Its failure.

Accordingly there has appeared another theory of evolution, more recently. This claims to be not a purely philosophical theory, but one based on natural science. Herbert Spencer has taught that development proceeds from the simple to the complex, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. It is only in these simple terms that this theory can be stated so as to include all the thinkers who have adopted it with many modifications. This theory also has laid claim to the ability to satisfactorily explain all phenomena. It has been applied to all departments of activity. It begins in the domain of natural science and then passes by easy stages into psychology, sociology, history, metaphysics, and religion. The effort has been made to explain the origin and history of all religious phenomena on the basis of this theory. The attempt is being made even now to reconstruct both the Old and the New Testament literatures on this basis. The books that contain the crude and rudimentary views are the earlier; those that contain the complex and refined are the later. This is the simple rule of this method of procedure,

Spencerian evolution.

of course with modifications to adapt it to special cases.

Without denying that this theory also contains elements of truth which it would behoove the philosophic world to note and learn, it may be said that it cannot safely be used as a key to the original order of the Biblical writings. Although the course of development is from the simple to the complex, from the crude to the refined, yet at times there are apparent violations of this principle. There are recrudescences of the refined and the rudimentation and utter disappearance of distinct and highly complicated organs and the simplification of complicated organisms even in the world with which natural science is accustomed to deal. And here the operation of law seems to be absolutely uniform and inexorable. Much more than probable it will be that the world of history, with its network of contingencies arising from the free action of free beings, should present the irregular and unexpected in its course of development. In watching this stream it is not difficult to fall into the mistake of looking upon the eddy as the main current and upon the main stream as the eddy. We are thus led to form an approximate idea of the uses that may be made of this form of the argument. They are two. First, a preliminary and tentative conspectus of the whole situation may be drawn up to be held as a sketch ready for the picture that will be later put into it. This must in no wise be allowed to take such rigid shape that it cannot be modified; no law of evolution, as we have learned, can *à priori* furnish the

Its inadequacy.

Uses: 1. Preliminary sketch.

molds into which the individual case shall run. It only furnishes the type, and the type never coincides with the individual. The critic, as he launches out on his work, may find it profitable to take a chart with him; but he must not allow this chart to prejudice his mind against facts that appear to be at variance from it.

Secondly, the argument from the development of thought may be used in corroborating results which have been reached in other and independent ways; or, in other words, by the use of the literary and historical method already described. This corresponds to the use made by the traveler of descriptions of places in his guide-book. After he has followed the directions given and has according to all indications reached his destination, he may revert to these descriptions and assure himself that he has really followed the directions faithfully, because he has come to the places described.

2. In corroborative results.

A word is needed on the cumulative force of these three arguments—the literary, the historical, and the theological. These arguments may be used singly or in conjunction with one another. In fact, the use of some of the subordinate arguments viewed as varieties of each of these main ones has already been alluded to. The effect of the combined use of the three main lines of consideration will naturally be the same as the effect of the combined use of the subordinate ones; if any different it will be more strongly marked as an effect. The possibilities in the case of the application of

Cumulative force of arguments.

all the different methods on the same subject are: (1) that all these lines of consideration converge and point to the same result. The obvious effect of this convergence is the strengthening of each separate line of testimony. But the strengthening is not to be measured as in a simple and mathematical problem; the force of the three concurrent arguments is not equal here to the sum of the forces of the individual arguments, but exceeds this very much. The convergence itself is a sort of fourth argument, establishing the truth of the results reached by the separate application of the three, and at the same time assuring the critic that his employment of these has been free from the abuses to which they are liable; that he has steered clear of the dangers of error attending their use. In such a case, therefore, we have the force of cumulative reasoning illustrated.

When results converge.

But though such cases of the convergence of the various lines of procedure is not only supposable and frequently actual, yet there are, on the other hand, large numbers of instances in which the processes above named lead to different results. Moreover the degree of difference pointed at by these different arguments is sometimes more and sometimes less. There are instances in which this difference is slight and a careful review of the situation reconciles the apparent discrepancy and harmonizes the result. The force of the arguments, when they run in this way parallel to one another, so to speak, and do not seem to converge, is hardly as great as in the case already supposed of their converging. And yet,

Weaker if they fail to.

as they do not conflict with one another, there is evidently no loss of the force of each. While their whole effect is not cumulative, their separate efficacy is not impaired. This case, however, is particularly liable to call into operation influences that should be strictly kept out of all scientific investigation. When the result seems to tremble in the balance and a slight consideration may affect it one way or another, it is not unlikely that the critic should be affected by subtle influences and assert, with more positiveness than is warranted by the data, one or another of the possible results. He will, under such circumstances, encounter first of all the natural desire to show something positive for the labor he has bestowed on his investigation. It is natural to avoid, if possible, the negative and uncertain. Negative results are generally discouraging; one, therefore, turns away from them and instinctively prefers that which is sure and steadfast. It is under such circumstances that the true temper of the critic will be tested and proved. He only is the true scholar who can resist this temptation and confess for himself, and for his favorite method of investigation, inability to attain sure conclusions with the light available; he who will confess willingness to wait for more light, or else let the questions involved be determined by processes and methods other than those of the Higher Criticism. Then again, in cases where the evidence of different arguments seems to leave the result in doubt, bias will tend to develop; and the knot which sound criticism cannot untie will be cut by the sword of prejudice. It is entirely unneces-

Suspension of judgment.

sary to point out the utter unfitness of any bias as a ground of settling questions of the sort that criticism deals with. It is sufficient to point out just now the dangers which beset the situation under consideration, *i. e.*, that in which the considerations derived from the different arguments point to differing, but not contradictory or irreconcilable, results.

The remaining possibility is that in which these arguments neither converge nor run parallel, but diverge. The results reached by the application of each seem to be contradictory and mutually exclusive. Obviously, in this case either the methods have not been used right or they are not relevant. It is possible that one or two of them could not be very well applied on account of the conditions of the case. Whether this is the case, or there has been some false step in the process, can only be found out upon a careful review of the whole investigation. Assuming that there has been no such flaw, the critic's next step forward will be to verify and correct the results of each process by comparison with those of the others; beginning with that which seems to be certain and advancing to the more doubtful, until he reaches the point where the contradiction appears, and holding judgment in abeyance from that point onward.

When they diverge, review.

Critics are accustomed to speak of "critical divination" in a way to confuse the inexperienced layman. The phrase is an apt one and may be used as a very convenient designation of a power which the successful critic has or must have. But what is "critical divination"?

"Critical Divination."

First of all, it is not a magical power acquired in a way unknown and unknowable to the non-critical world. Neither is it a separate faculty like a sixth or seventh sense, enabling some men to see phenomena which others cannot. On the other hand, it is not a faculty of mere guessing, a habit of conjecture as to matters that cannot be made the subjects of precise knowledge. Critical divination is rather skill acquired by study and experience in using the critical methods above explained and described. It is the use of these methods without perhaps a distinct and analytic idea of the value of each; or of the checking and correcting influence of any on the others. It is the power of using these methods and principles correctly, or of reaching results which, whether secured by the individual application of the methods or not, stand the tests put to them. Apart from this power there is no "critical divination," as a faculty either native or acquired. But as this power is the synthesis of right principles and tact in using them, and as that synthesis cannot at any time be absolute and perfect, it follows that "critical divination" cannot be trusted as absolute and infallible authority. Its trustworthiness is precisely that which belongs to as full and correct a use of the principles as has been made; neither more nor less. When the knowledge of these methods and principles has become so inwrought in the investigator that he can work without being conscious of processes; when critical activity is like a second nature to him; he may be said to have the faculty of "critical divination" developed fully.

Not a magical power.

But skill in methods.

Any other use of the term divination is misleading and confusing.

From the above it becomes plain that "divination," cannot be admitted as legitimate if it mean nothing more than conjecture. In fact, pure conjecture has no place in scientific criticism. Conjecture on the basis of some facts may lead to a working hypothesis; but such a working hypothesis can only attain the trustworthiness of a theory when more facts are brought to its support, and the conjecture ceases to be a mere conjecture as to the meaning of a few facts and becomes the explanation of a complex situation. Even thus, a theory based mainly on conjectural interpretations of facts does not possess the strength of a theory which rests on a complete induction, carried on according to the principles of the science of criticism. As a matter of fact, conjecture is resorted to by critics only as a last resource, and on the ground that the facts at hand do not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Results based on conjecture are distrusted universally as admitting too much play to the subjective element in the critic and thus vitiated by personal preferences based on his education, temperament, or previous beliefs.

Mere conjecture inadmissible.

CHAPTER VI.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM AND ORIENTAL ARCHEOLOGY.

THE Higher Criticism approaches its problems with the light that may be secured within the writings it examines. Some light may be secured within these problems from without by studying the several ages and countries in which the writings originated through Oriental archeology. In its broader sense Oriental archeology includes all that may be made known of Oriental lands and peoples. The Bible may be used as one of its sources. The extra-Biblical sources are the fragmentary notices of ancient historians and the discoveries of recent excavators and explorers. Up to within comparatively recent years by far the largest amount of the materials dealt with by the science of archeology was derived from the Bible itself. Perhaps, even now, the greater proportion of this material might be found to be taken from the same source.

Archeology: Its nature.

There is no doubt, however, that during the last half century the extra-Biblical source has been made to yield a vast array of facts. The proportions of Biblical and monumental material have been changed, if not exactly reversed. So large is in fact the contribution to the realm of archeology made by recent exploration and excava-

Recent development.

tion that it has been properly designated as a "new world." It constitutes not by any means the least of the remarkable achievements of the last half of the nineteenth century to have recovered this vast array of facts, and to have reconstructed out of them the record of the life of more than one empire and civilization. To tell the story of this recovery and reconstruction in detail would lead us too far aside from our immediate task. So much of it as may lead to a clearer understanding of the situation, as far as it bears on criticism, may be summed up in a few words.

Research in Egypt.

At the beginning of the present century the languages and histories of the Nile and Mesopotamian valleys were almost altogether unknown. As late as 1842 it was said that "a case three feet square enclosed all that remained not only of the great city Nineveh, but of Babylon itself." It was in 1817 that Champollion deciphered the famous Rosetta Stone and discovered the key to the hieroglyphics of Egypt. This opened the numerous and rich monuments of the Nile valley as a field of investigation for scholars. One after another, able men entered the field, and after the main accessible inscriptions had been collated and read, an organization under the title of the "Egyptian Exploration Fund" took the work, in 1883, of searching, through the means of pickax and shovel, for such data as were buried under the surface.

Somewhat earlier, 1802, Grotefend began the recovery of the cuneiform alphabet—if the name may be used of such a system as that of the Assy-

rian and Babylonian writing. Lassen and Sir Henry Rawlinson later completed this recovery and made it worth while for Layard and Botta, and the many who have since followed them, to enter Mesopotamia and unearth the remains of its great cities. The more immediate seat of Biblical history, the land of Palestine, was entered by Edward Robinson in 1838 in the interests, first of all, of a careful topographical knowledge.

In Assyria.

William M. Thompson followed Robinson. In 1865 the "Palestine Exploration Fund" was organized under the auspices of Queen Victoria. Its first president was the Archbishop of York, Dr. Thomson. On the list of its supporters appeared the names of some of the foremost scholars, ecclesiastics, and Orientalists. Some of the men who have served in connection with it as active explorers are Sir Charles Wilson, Sir Charles Warren, Lieutenant Conder, H. S. Palmer, and Flinders Petrie. It has published its *Quarterly Statements* of the results secured. The volumes put forth by those who directly or indirectly helped to secure these results constitute veritable mines of materials illustrative of Bible times and events. In 1870 the "American society for the Exploration of Palestine" was organized, and carried on work similar to that of the English society until 1883, when it withdrew from the field.

In Palestine.

The labors of these societies and individuals have enriched the museums of Europe with a vast store of interesting articles from antiquity, besides occasioning the erection of local museums for the care of such articles as

Materials accumulated.

might not be removed from the scene of their discovery. Rock and wall inscriptions have been copied with exemplary accuracy. Temples, columns, statues, monoliths, and obelisks have been studied, photographed, and described in detail. Cylinders, seals, coins, funeral tablets, contract tablets, papyrus rolls and slabs have been collected, and the inscriptions on them have been reproduced in facsimile impressions. The whole territory of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria, Phœnicia, and Palestine has been surveyed and accurately mapped out, with a view to bringing before the mind the precise surroundings within which events occurred. To bring about these results two classes of patient, specially qualified, hard-working scholars have devoted their time and energy, viz., the explorers and excavators on the field and in the midst of the mounds and ruins of the East, and philologists and historians in European museums, who have taken the discoveries of the excavators, deciphered them, arranged them, and out of their contents have written the histories of the Egyptians, the Hittites, the Chaldeans, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Persians.

Deciphered by scholars.

The Biblical student is especially to be congratulated on the resuscitation of these ancient civilizations and histories, because almost all of the material thus recovered bears either directly or indirectly on the content of the Bible. Jewish history came in contact with the peoples and lands thus rehabilitated at almost every point. Beginning with Abraham, even before he left the home of his ancestors near the Persian Gulf,

Bearing on the Bible.

and ending with the time when Jerusalem, the Holy City, fell into the hands of the Romans under Titus, the combined life and history of these races and lands, now made to live again, form the environment within which Bible history moves.

The questions which this science of Oriental archeology raises with reference to criticism are: How does the light from the monuments affect the problems of criticism? Do the two sciences—criticism and archeology—come in contact at any point? If they do, are the results they reach in agreement or conflict? In case of conflict, how shall the difference between them be settled?

Relation to Criticism.

As to the first and fundamental one of these questions, it takes but a casual and cursory examination to show that these two branches of investigation, starting from opposite points and working independently, still come into direct touch with one another at several points. Archeology, as we have seen, throws a flood of light on the periods during which the literary productions examined on internal grounds by the Higher Criticism made their appearance. As far as it gives us an insight into the manners, customs, thoughts, and habits of the times, it must confirm, disturb, or upset results apparently established by the internal method of research. What is possible under one set of conditions is impossible under another. What is likely to happen in a given environment is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, when that environment has been changed. Light thrown into this environment will help us to see the

Contact inevitable.

conclusions of criticism as well founded or unfounded. Even though archeology may not be able to tell us directly whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch, or Isaiah the last half of the book ascribed to him, it will nevertheless tell us whether Moses could or could not have written the work assigned him by tradition ; whether, in the times of Isaiah, such words as are found in the last part of the book were or were not appropriate as a prophetic message.

Results, how adjusted.

But if such contact does take place between archeology and criticism, it is of importance to fix the principles on which the results of the two sciences shall be fitted into each other. Let it be observed then that, in determining the *modus vivendi* of these two sciences, regard must be had to the transitional nature of both of them. Results are not final in either. Archeology, like criticism, has not yet reached that age and condition wherein it may claim for its findings finality. If it is not on the one hand an infant science, it lacks on the other hand the strength and assurance which come from having gathered in all the material available for it. By this is not meant that, in order to secure trustworthy results through archeology, the whole field should have been scoured and all the facts brought to light ; but that the light on any individual point shall have been gathered and focused on it in sufficient abundance to make us see it clearly. Besides the collection of the facts, in order to obtain assurance as to results, it is necessary that time and opportunity shall be given to have these

Caution necessary.

discussed, their bearings on one another realized, and the proper inferences from them formulated into conclusions. New excavations and new discoveries are being made yearly, one might almost say, daily. New facts are coming to light, and while these facts do not annul previously discovered facts, they may modify their meaning. The present conclusions of archeology cannot therefore be in every case assigned a certainty and finality which can only come later. They cannot be used without exception as a norm or standard to which the conclusions of criticism must be brought to be corrected. For the most part they are too vague and general to serve in testing such specific and precise assertions as critics are accustomed to make about authorship, integrity, and literary form.

But while it is necessary to enter this caveat against the indiscriminate or premature use of archeological data, it is important on the other hand not to underestimate the significance of these facts which Oriental researches have definitely ascertained. Moreover it would be a mistake to suppose that the circle of these facts is a small one. Archeology has made known a large number of historical facts, in the light of which certain views become absolutely certain and their opposites absolutely untenable. It has therefore thus set some general limits within which criticism must move. Some of these may be stated as follows :

Yet must be used.

1. The general credibility of Biblical history. Formerly criticism was free to begin with the as-

sumption that the historic accounts in the books of the Bible were not credible. This might be denied as an arbitrary assumption, but there was nothing of a positive nature to set over against it, if made. The result might betray the weakness of reasoning with such an assumption at its base ; but if the critic still persisted in taking his stand on it, it was not possible to convince him that he was wrong. Archeology now changes the situation. It says to the critic that that assumption is not only arbitrary, but contrary to all the known facts. Parts of that history which was assumed to be incredible are known to be true, being tested by tests as stringent as those applied to any other historic accounts. The critic need not wait until the weakness of the result shall reveal the weakness of the basal assumption; he can perceive that the assumption is contrary to facts. This result archeology has brought about by throwing considerable light on the darkest and most isolated portions of the Biblical history, the patriarchal age and the monarchical age of Israel. With reference to the patriarchal age, the allegation made by some of the earlier critics, that this was simply a Hebrew mythology analogous to the mythologies of the Greeks and Romans, is set at rest by the discoveries of explorers. The age of Joseph and the twelve sons of Jacob, of Jacob, of Isaac, and even of Abraham, was in no sense a parallel to the ages of the Greek and Roman heroes and demigods. At the time of Abraham, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and even Canaan, "the bridge from Egypt to Syria and

1. They confirm Bible history.

Patriarchal history true.

Babylon," enjoyed a comparatively high state of civilization. The Babylonian bricks indicate that Chedorlaomer was a probable if not an identified character. The Tel el-Amarna tablets show that there was diplomatic and commercial correspondence between Egypt and Canaan. That a history like that contained in the Pentateuch should be considered impossible in the pre-Mosaic age in Israel, is not a sound assumption for criticism. The history is altogether too natural, and accords with the facts discovered outside of it too well, to be set aside summarily.

2. There is a special correlation of the history gathered from the monuments with the history recorded in the Biblical sources. The Egypt of the Exodus corresponds with the Egypt of the period of the Exodus as read in the hieroglyphics. The accounts of the kings of Judah and Israel fit into the accounts of the conditions of the world as found in the Assyrian tablets. Ahab, Jehu, Benhadad, Azariah, Menahem, Pekah, Hoshea, Rezon, Jehoahaz, Hezekiah, are names which occur in the Assyrian monuments, and what is said of them positively coincides with what is recorded in the Biblical books as far as the two accounts touch on the same points, and neither account renders impossible the truthfulness of the other at those points where they do not touch. This is true of the accounts of Nebuchadnezzar and the later Babylonians and the Persians, as far as their histories come in contact with the Biblical history. These histories dovetail into one another. Any results of criticism that would undertake to

2. Light thrown on the history.

dislocate and rearrange this history, so constructed and verified by facts drawn from two sources, must now settle its accounts, not with the Bible merely, but with Oriental archeology also.

3. Archeology renders untenable any theories which assume false positions regarding literary work in early and Oriental surroundings. The date of the beginning of the art of writing has been set much farther back than it was commonly supposed to be before the dawn of modern archeological science. The first historical critics of the Pentateuch denied its Mosaic authorship, partly on the assumption that the art of writing was not known at the time of Moses. Such a conclusion would now find itself face to face with the remains of the art of writing that come from centuries, if not, as some say, millenniums before the time of Moses. One may now actually see in the museums of Europe papyri from Egypt, tablets from Assyria, and inscriptions from Babylonia which antedate Moses. The critic who still desires to use this assumption must now do as Vernes and Havet have done—speak only of the comparative scarcity of the art of writing in Palestine before the Babylonian exile; and even then his assertion will fall to the ground: first, from the unwillingness of men to believe that while Egypt, Babylonia, and all other surrounding regions had a literature and literary methods quite advanced in character, Israel had no knowledge of writing; and secondly, because the Moabite stone and the Siloam Inscription positively render such assertions unscientific, and the views based on them as hardly worth repeating.

3. Literary methods cleared.

4. Archeology leads to the coordination of the traditions and beliefs of allied races. It has done this with the Indo-European family of peoples.* It has gathered materials and made beginnings in the same direction with the Semitic peoples. These are but mere beginnings; but pursued with due diligence and caution, there is no reason why they should not be followed by ample and more or less satisfactory results.

Light thrown on traditions.

There are four main subjects in the early Biblical account that may be associated with allied Semitic traditions. These are the creation, the Fall, the Deluge, and the Tower of Babel. The question before Oriental archeology is, How are these traditions related to one another? Are the Biblical accounts received from the extra-Biblical, or *vice versa?* Or are they all received from some common and earlier source? When answers have been found to these questions, the next step in the process is to inquire

Genesis and Semitic traditions.

* The process of reducing traditions and legends to system is the same in general as the process followed by comparative philologists in defining the relations of different but allied languages. Words and grammatical peculiarities existing in all the individual members of a group, it is argued by philologists, must have existed in the original stock from which these sprang. Had they appeared after the separation and departure from the common original they could not have been the same in all. So traditions and legends common to a family of peoples must have a common origin as far back in time as the age of the common existence of the peoples together. There may be in language an amount of material transferred from language to language after separation; so there may be traditions which have been carried from place to place. But in both cases these are distinguishable from the original stock and do not confuse the specialist.

how these answers fit into the conclusions reached by criticism. If criticism has proceeded on the assumption that these traditions were of later date than archeology proves them to be, it must review its conclusion and correct it. But there are alleged to be within the Biblical documents duplicate forms of the traditions—two or three accounts of the Deluge, etc.—and these are distinguished from one another by the characteristics of the alleged documents in which they occur. If archeology by comparing these duplicate accounts with extra-Biblical forms of the same, especially such as come from very early and remote regions, should prove that the characteristic features which distinguish the documents are found in the extra-Biblical forms also, the force of the consideration from these characteristic differences would be destroyed. For if what was supposed to be the characteristic of an author of the eighth or fourth century B. C., living in Palestine, should turn up in a production or tradition proved to be as old as the nineteenth century B. C., in Babylonia, any conclusion based on the imaginary characteristic must fall to the ground. In this, and many similar ways, archeological investigation of primitive traditions will prove a corrective of purely conjectural results.*

5. Light on critical questions.

5. Finally, archeology may serve as an auxiliary of criticism, whenever its light is abundant and clear, as given settings enabling the critic to announce with more confidence results which his own mode of investiga-

* See Bissell, "The Situation Presupposed in Genesis," *Presbyterian and Reformed Review.*

tion had reached tentatively. The chronology, for instance, of the Bible has never been clear. Strictly speaking there is no chronology in the Biblical records, but only chronological data. These may be arranged variously, according to certain fundamental assumptions or ascertained facts. And the results would serve as already indicated in the discussion of the historical argument in criticism. Now, if archeology throw light on the nature and mode of using the chronological data above mentioned, and if, above all, it enable the critic to proceed not on the basis of assumptions, but of well established facts, in building his chronology, the use of the historical argument will be strengthened by so much. As a matter of fact, this has been a most fertile field of research and a source of many valuable results. Many of the prophetic discourses of Isaiah and Jeremiah, not to speak of others of the Biblical writers, have received an immense amount of light in this way. The chronological and historical data furnished by archeology have enabled critics to rearrange and to surround these writings with their natural environments. It is thus made possible to realize, in a measure, the situations within which they were first used.

Good results already achieved.

Again, archeological research may fix with certainty the geographical situation subsumed within the Biblical narratives; and, by so doing, it may enable the critic to establish or overthrow either old theories that have been accepted or new ones that are proposed as to the historicity and origin of those narratives. Pro-

Ramsay on Acts.

fessor Ramsay* claims that his geographical researches in Asia Minor, taken together with his view of the course taken by Paul on his missionary journeys, prove the book of Acts to be exceedingly accurate and trustworthy. Its author speaks as an eye-witness of the conditions existing in Asia Minor between 41 and 72 A. D. Its data correspond with the conditions of the Roman Empire at that time and at no other. Without hastily conceding this claim, we may use it as an illustration of the way in which archeology throws light on the problems of criticism.

Much of this work is done in connection with and as involved in special interpretation and is thus apt to be lost sight of as criticism and mistaken for exegesis. The light of archeology falls first on the text of the books of the Bible. It makes clear obscurities, removes apparent discrepancies, shows true order where it has been disturbed or indicates what the chronological or logical order would be in accordance with modern ideas, if for some reason, which it is not necessary or possible to discover, some other order had been chosen by the original authors, and thus makes the content of the writings usable as vehicles for the discovery of the time and place where they were put forth. But the light thus indirectly reflected on the questions of criticism is none the less real and valuable.†

Archeology and interpretation.

* *Church in the Roman Empire.*

† Cf., as a specimen of this indirect light of archeology, the work done by A. Jeremias and Ad. Billerbeck on the book Nahum.

On the relations of archeology to the Higher Criticism see Sayce, *The Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, 1895; and on the general subject of the results of recent archeological research as directly or indirectly affecting thought and belief regarding the Bible, cf. *The Records of the Past*, published by S. Baxter, 1873, and onward; *By-Paths of Bible Knowledge*, published by The Religious Tract Society, 1883, and onward; St. Clair, *Buried Cities*, 1892; Brugsch, *Egypt under the Pharaohs*, new edition, 1891; Flinders Petrie, *Egyptian Tales from the Papyri*, 1895; Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften, und das Alte Testament*, 1872, 2d ed. 1883; English translation, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, 1885–86; McCurdy, *Prophecy, History, and the Monuments*, 1894.

CHAPTER VII.

POSTULATES IN THE USE OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

Methods are but instruments. They may be used properly or improperly. They derive their efficiency from him who uses them. Success in their use depends altogether on the equipment of the user. And this equipment is to be found in the user's tone and spirit and previous preparation and state of mind. It is not enough for a man to possess and to know the value of a microscope; he must also know many other things before he can go on to make even the most elementary use of the instrument. And if he should perhaps wish to enter into investigations of an original character in unexplored regions, his results will be taken as trustworthy or not, according as he is known to have had adequate equipment and preparation for the handling of as complicated a piece of machinery. Now this preparation that is prerequired consists either in the knowledge of well established facts or the adoption of mere opinions and convictions of men regarding the general constitution of the sphere in which the investigation is to be made. It is, in other words, either the knowledge of undisputed fundamentals or theory, independent of the sphere, and yet affecting one's view of it, at least in part.

Equipment needed.

That an investigator proceeds with the assumption of certain theories as true rather than their opposites is apt to affect the whole complexion of his results. If the microscopist, for instance, were to start with the presupposition that the current theory of scientists regarding the nature and laws of light were entirely wrong, and that light, instead of being a mere form of motion, was in reality a substance emitted from the luminous body, his conclusions from certain observations would be different from those he might reach if his presuppositions on these subjects were the very opposite. And just as the microscopist approaches his task with a view more or less definite of nature, and especially of that part of it which he is to examine, so the critic approaches his field with theories regarding its nature. These are presuppositions. What should be his attitude toward them? It may be said: Let him get rid of them. At first sight this answer may strike us favorably; but it is not the right one. Presuppositions are inevitable. It is true it is customary to deprecate *à priori* conceptions and deplore their admission into scientific investigations, but it is very doubtful whether purely *à posteriori* research is possible in any field. The cry for the use of the inductive method is a legitimate one and should be carefully heeded; but it does not altogether exclude the entertainment of presuppositions. The mind does not need to be turned into a blank in order to enter upon a research. Criticism is not one of the first activities of a man, of a Christian, or of a Christian

Presuppositions as equipment.

Inductive method.

scholar. It comes after views have been formed on other and kindred subjects and cannot take or usurp the place of these preceding departments. And indeed, from one point of view, these previous opinions or items of information are of great service. They throw light on the subjects under investigation by criticism, in more than one way. Let the mind of the student be preoccupied with certain views on subjects kindred to the topics dealt with in criticism; and the clearer these views are before him, the abler he will be to grasp the bearing of critical principles and results on the circle of subjects he is investigating. It is only necessary that he should not be so thoroughly infatuated by the views thus previously acquired and held as to reject everything that cannot be reconciled with them. To be prejudiced is not, after all, simply to hold views of a certain character antecedent to an investigation, but so to hold them as to close the door to others better accredited to the reason.

All sciences have presuppositions.

Thus, as a matter of fact, no sphere of knowledge is without its presuppositions. The so-called exact sciences are not exceptions to this principle. The exact sciences differ from all other sciences simply in this, that the presuppositions underlying them are universally agreed upon. In mathematics, for instance, the presuppositions are the axioms. They are defined as self-evident truths. To deny them is to put one's self outside the class of those who can speak intelligently on mathematics. This unanimity in accepting certain presuppositions as postulates makes the exact sciences what their

Exact sciences.

name implies. The metaphysical sciences proceed on the assumption of presuppositions not so universally recognized as valid; the consequence is that there are different theories, sometimes diametrically opposed to one another, held in the same field and on the same subject.

History.

History stands between the exact sciences and the metaphysical, in that at times it proceeds upon the basis of definitely ascertained facts and at other times again is compelled to emphasize theories and interpret facts by theories. When its sources are full, and clearly in the domain of the known and fixed, it must, if true to itself, deduce all its philosophy from these clearly known facts. If, however, its sources are obscure and the facts to be found in them few and insufficient in themselves to furnish a sure basis of operations, history must supply the gaps and interpret the dark passages. But how shall it do this without some theory or working hypothesis?

Illustration.

Take a concrete illustration. Let a primitive historian first look at the pyramids in Egypt. Evidently they offer to his understanding many puzzling problems. First of all, how did they originate? The answer to this question would depend almost altogether on his view of how other things of the same general sort originate. If his theory regarding the origin of these should be that they grew in the course of ages, he would conclude that the pyramids also grew. If his view were that human beings built them he would conclude, in spite of the apparent impossibility of the work, that human beings had built the pyramids also.

But if his view were that works of the size and character of these could not possibly have been put together by human beings, he might be led to infer that a race of beings of superior strength or skill had lived there and erected these structures for their own purposes. This is not an imaginary case, but the actual theory and result of those ancient Greek historians who devised the theory of a race of Cyclopes and ascribed a system of peculiarities and a type of art and civilization to them solely on the basis of a postulate, as they viewed the gigantic work of their own ancestors. The postulate was that those works could not have been contrived by beings as weak and frail as themselves.

But if presuppositions or postulates are unavoidable, how shall the critic prevent their influencing his results unduly or unfavorably? In order to obtain an intelligent and clear view of the situation at this point, let us inquire, first, what postulates the critic is most tempted to take to his task. Evidently there are two classes of these, *i. e.*, the philosophical and the historical. The first class consists of views of the universe—its origin, constitution, and government. The second class consists of views regarding the nature and treatment of historic evidence. A third class, arising from the nature of religious belief, and the place and relation of religious beliefs to critical results, will be considered separately in a subsequent chapter. The postulates of the other two classes may be taken singly or in combination with one another. To illustrate the attitude of mind to be maintained by the critic with reference to them, it

Classes of postulates.

is sufficient, without going into too much analysis, to present the whole effect of these presuppositions as forcing him into one or another standpoint. The critic, for instance, who approaches his work with that philosophy of the world which we call the pantheistic, is forced into a position with reference to critical questions which should be called the pantheistic standpoint; and thus it would be called, were it found as a standpoint into which pantheism only led. But as a matter of fact, as already indicated, the postulates with which we are dealing exist in combinations, and the standpoints into which they drive critics are not simple but complex. They may, however, be named, from their predominating principles, either philosophical or historical, as follows :

Results in standpoints.

I. *The standpoint of naturalism.*—The principal and differentiating postulate of this standpoint is the impossibility of the supernatural. The miraculous, anywhere and under any conditions, is incredible. Accounts of the supernatural arise in connection with the early history of peoples and make up their mythology. All early history has its mythology, and all mythology must be exscinded from the sources which criticism investigates. This is the very task of criticism, viz., to sift out, to eliminate the impossible and incredible from the sources of history. This principle is, it is claimed, applied with rigor and vigor in the examination of all other sources of history, and must be applied in the Bible also. The Bible, after all, according to the critics of this standpoint, is neither more nor less than the collection of the

I. Naturalistic standpoint.

records of a people in its infancy, and must be treated like all the earliest records of other peoples. It is one of the sacred books of the East. The Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, the Hindoo *Vedas*, the *Zend-Avesta* of the Persians, the mythologies of the Greeks and Romans, are the other and perfectly analogous members of the class to which the Biblical religion and history belong. Like these analogues the Bible must be subjected to the same process of winnowing. It cannot be conceded any exemption from the philosophical presuppositions with which the student of comparative religion approaches its sister religions.

Most critics of this standpoint make no secret of their approaching the task with presuppositions of this sort. Thus in the sphere of New Testament criticism F. C. Baur,* answering the charge that upon the principles of his school of criticism all that is supernatural and miraculous in Christianity would disappear, acknowledges that such would be the case. "This is certainly the tendency of the historical method of treatment, and in the nature of things it can have no other. Its task is to investigate whatever happens under the relation of a cause and effect; but the miracle, in its absolute sense, dissolves this natural connection; it sets a point at which it is impossible, not for want of satisfactory information, but altogether and absolutely impossible, to regard the one thing as the natural consequence of the other. But how were such a point demonstrable? Only by means of history. Yet, from the historical

Baur's position.

* *Die Tübinger Schule*, 1859, p. 13.

point of view, it were a mere begging of the question to assume events to have happened contrary to all the analogy of history. We should no longer be dealing with an historical question, as that concerning the orgin of Christianity incontestably is, but with a purely dogmatic one, that of the conception of a miracle; *i. e.*, whether, contrary to all historical analogy, it is an absolute requirement of the religious consciousness to accept particular facts as miracles in the absolute sense."

So also Kuenen, in a sentence now become famous, "The religion of Israel is for us one of the great religions of the world; neither more nor less." These statements may be taken as purely *à priori* philosophical statements, or they may be presented as the results of historical investigation. If they are presented as purely philosophical statements, it is evident that they constitute a bias which vitiates all the further steps of the criticism that bases itself on them. If, on the other hand, they come as the results of historical induction, then the question arises, How broad was that induction? Science has too often been made the victim of narrow inductions to be easily led at this late date, in such a case as this. Now, when this test is applied to the principle of this standpoint as above defined by these two representatives of naturalistic criticism in the Old and New Testaments respectively, it turns out to be a groundless assumption. Taking the positions of the two critics separately, we find that the principle of Baur is apparently, that if historic criticism were to admit the supernatural

Kuenen's.

it would be compelled to deny its own nature, which is the examination of events in the relation of cause and effect. But evidently, so far as this is more than a mere assertion, it amounts simply to a definition of the "historic method," *i. e.*, Baur's standpoint, and does not justify the exclusion of that class of phenomena which we call the supernatural. Does Baur mean that, whenever the connection of cause and effect is not perceptible between two events, the historicity of the second is put in question? Does not history know of events without number whose causes it has never discovered and never will? In his zeal to give a reason for excluding this class of facts Baur has made his rule too stringent; it will exclude other things besides miracles. Besides, miracle does not necessarily dissolve the relation between cause and effect. The more recent discussions in this field take for granted that miracle need not even be considered as the suspension or contravention of law; that it may be simply the result of the operation of unknown law. Baur, therefore, cannot base his exclusion of the supernatural from the sphere of historic investigation on sufficient grounds.

The same weakness is discoverable in the procedure of Kuenen; for, as Dr. Beecher has shown,* he has dragged into his premises the very proposition which he set out to prove through the investigation. Had he, before coming to the conclusion that "the religion of Israel is one of the great religions of the world, neither more nor less," made an investigation of the religion of Israel in and for

* *Presbyterian Review*, vol. iii. p. 703.

itself, he might have found that this religion was either something less or perhaps something more than the other great religions of the world. This exclusion, then, of the supernatural, without adequate investigation of it by methods appropriate, is unscientific.

Results attained by the employment of the criticism on the basis of these assumptions cannot have the value which results reached by the use of purer critical processes possess. It is not to be denied that critics of this standpoint may and actually have contributed directly and indirectly to the sum of the critical work done in recent years, but it is only after the influence of their philosophical assumptions has been eliminated that the contribution has found its proper place in the net result of the work done.

Results unsatisfactory.

II. *The standpoint of the so-called traditionalist.*— The characteristic postulate of this standpoint is the truth of the views held in the past regarding the subjects investigated by the Higher Criticism. The object of the Higher Criticism is then reduced to the verifying of those views. In so far as criticism corroborates these views handed down by tradition, it is accepted as a legitimate method of research; but in so far as it fails to accomplish this end, it is discredited as a false and misleading process. The critics of this school have been called traditionalists. Whether there are any true traditionalists in this strict sense, at least among experts, is questionable. The class is a possible one; and it is alleged by the critics of

II. Traditionalist standpoint.

the other standpoints that the logical principles underlying the use of the Higher Criticism by the critics of the conservative type are as above described. Some even go to the extent of denying the name Higher Critic to the critics of the conservative school; on the ground, it is to be presumed, of their limiting the use of the Higher Criticism to the extent above described. Whatever the truth as to the existence of any large number of experts who would openly take the stand that tradition should be taken into criticism as a postulate; the seductiveness of the standpoint to the ultra-conservative, and the natural tendency of the inexpert to gravitate toward it, render it proper to indicate the unreasonableness of the presumption.

Also unsatisfactory.

Tradition cannot be regarded as infallible in this field any more than in any other field of investigation. That tradition possesses a certain value we shall be led to see somewhat later. That there are different sorts of traditions, some of which are more valuable than others, is also true. There are unbroken traditions that carry us back to the very times and circumstances under investigation, and there are traditions arising in dark ages and which it is impossible to trace to any responsible source. To deal with all tradition alike, therefore, and to assign to all the highest value, is entirely unscientific. The most plausible tradition may be based on a mistake; and if the proper use of the Higher Criticism can point out the mistake, there will be gain to that extent. But whether this should ever prove to be the case or not, the mere fact of its possibility is sufficient to brand the assumption

of the truth of tradition as a postulate, in treating of the problems of the Higher Criticism, as a violation of scientific principles.

III. *The standpoint of anti-traditionalism.*—This differs from the preceding only on the point of the validity of tradition as a presumption in criticism. In other respects the two standpoints are in perfect harmony. They agree first of all in putting tradition outside of the field of criticism and in setting it over against criticism. They differ simply as to the value attached antecedently to tradition. According to the traditionalist standpoint, as already observed, this is much greater than that of criticism and overbalances the weight of the latter. According to the anti-traditionalist standpoint, on the contrary, tradition is to be excluded as utterly worthless. And this not as a part of the investigation of each separate question, but as a preliminary and a condition to any and all investigation. As far as external evidence is concerned in dealing with these questions, to the critics of this school it does not exist. Even as applied to the New Testament the Higher Criticism supersedes external testimony of the earliest and most direct kind. One of the representative exponents of this standpoint avers: "It is a significant fact that the most trustworthy information that we have regarding the origin of the greater part of the New Testament books is not to be credited to the Christian writers who lived sixty to one hundred years after they were written, but to the historical criticism so much suspected in some quarters, which took its rise seventeen hun-

III. Anti-traditionalist standpoint.

dred years later." * This is not a clear committal to the principle of setting aside tradition as such. It deals rather with history and historical testimony. It amounts to the setting aside of much of the testimony derived from writers of the first "sixty to one hundred years after the books were written; but if the testimony of the first sixty to one hundred years" after the composition is to be set aside as of little value in comparison to the findings of the criticism of eighteen hundred years later, how much more the force of traditions that can only be traced to a later period than the first sixty to one hundred years?

Wholesale rejection of tradition.

When applied to the Old Testament, the principle becomes more rigid still. The term tradition includes here the orally delivered opinions of the pre-Christian rabbis, the legends of the Talmudists, the titles and claims found in the books themselves, and the statements or implications of the New Testament writers. These latter are considered as either so put as not to commit the writers to any special views of the Old Testament books or else worth no more nor less than the opinions of the Jewish rabbis. And all this body of tradition is not only useless in making up one's results on critical questions, but cumbersome. It is of the nature of an obstacle that blocks the way; it must be set aside if the critic would make any further progress. At any rate it cannot help the critic in his work. "If the questions which the Higher Criticism seeks to answer cannot be answered by its methods, then there is no answer

* Orello Cone, *The Gospel and its Earliest Interpretations*, pp. 28, 29.

for them at all." This is the verdict of a prominent advocate of this standpoint.* Thus it appears that, as far as philosophical theories concerning the world are concerned, or the possibility or probability of the supernatural, the nature and history of religion and all other kindred matters, these standpoints have no quarrel with one another. It is only on the single point of the admission of tradition as a source of information that they part company; the one insisting that tradition should be adopted as antecedently trustworthy, and the other that it should be ignored as valueless if not as a confusing and misleading factor in the case.

And arbitrary.

IV. *The comprehensive standpoint.*—The presumption here is that all evidence has some value either directly or indirectly. All evidence must, therefore, be carefully examined and sifted, with a view to solving the questions arising in each case. Relatively speaking, this is the unbiased standpoint. It repudiates the philosophical postulate of the impossibility of the supernatural, and the dogmatic one of its acceptance as real on the strength of the religious consciousness and the alleged necessity of it to satisfy this religious consciousness. It does not allow even the historically established postulate of the antecedent improbability of the miraculous to prejudge individual cases; it refers each separate occurrence of the miraculous to a special historical investigation.

IV. Comprehensive standpoint.

Tradition also is neither antecedently paramount

* Francis Brown in the *Homiletic Review*, April, 1892.

nor valueless or burdensome. The question of the validity or value of any individual tradition, according to this standpoint, is not to be prejudiced by the suspiciousness of the word itself. No general principle can be laid down as to the amount of credence to be given to traditions. The critic is to settle the question of the admissibility and value of each as he comes to it. It is an integral part of the process of criticism. In fact the term tradition, which is used so indiscriminately by both the antagonizing schools as if its meaning were simple and clear, stands for a very complex and variable conception. There is a tradition that is absolutely worthless because it is manufactured or grows among the ignorant. It is carelessly disseminated, and changes as it passes from person to person and from generation to generation. It becomes more striking and marvelous as it grows. It feeds the superstition of those who accept it and is in turn fed by this superstition, and thus grows to stupendous proportions. No one would think for a moment of ascribing to this sort of tradition any primary historical value. Its only use must be that of illustrating by direct implication or contrast the character of the times and the manners of those among whom it originates. But there are traditions of a kind altogether different from those of this type, differing from them by the whole diameter of historical probability. These are accounts of facts described accurately by eyewitnesses or contemporaries and attested by signs of unmistakable good faith, which were transmitted for a time orally and then written down.

Discriminates between traditions.

They differ very little, if at all, from first-hand testimony. In fact the difference between these traditions and first-hand testimony is one of formal and not of essential nature. Between these two classes of traditions there may be an indefinite number of varieties, approaching the one or the other of them respectively. Some subjects, moreover, have been under discussion from time immemorial, and traditions regarding them have been tested and verified by each successive generation of students interested in them. Such traditions evidently gain in weight by each successive examination. Often the processes of examination may be lost, leaving no trace behind them; and a succeeding generation of scholars, basing itself on the well-known fact of the verification of these traditions by their predecessors, may accept them as true without hesitation. Evidently, it would be unjust to classify such scholars with those who superstitiously and from sheer ignorance accept untested views or statements coming from ages of darkness. The only common feature in these varying kinds of traditions would seem to be the fact that they all in the first place are transmitted or given over by their originators orally to a body of successors. In some cases they are transmitted orally; but in others they are written down and fixed.

It is the part of sound criticism to distinguish between traditions and traditions; to test each as it is met; to allow each its proper force and bearing upon the results of the investigation on hand. This diversity between different kinds of traditions will make an *à priori* stand on them as a class an altogether unscientific procedure.

This diversity further makes it impossible to determine *à priori* the comparative value of traditional and critical evidence, if this distinction must be made. For as soon as the character of the evidence is made clear enough to put it in the class "tradition" the question arises, What kind of tradition? Is it a tradition of the highest value or one of the lowest? and the further question, With what kind of critical evidence is it to be compared or contrasted? For as we have already sufficiently indicated, the force of critical considerations is very different; and to rightly estimate each, reference must be had to its own peculiar features and bearings.

Uses of tradition.

Naturally, tradition forms a starting-point in investigations where it exists. Unless it is absurd on the face of it, or self-contradictory, it constitutes a working hypothesis that may be corroborated, corrected, or disproved and totally set aside. As a starting-point, moreover, tradition may be conceded a certain presumptive right to stand. Unless the testimony against its truth be established, it may be considered true. It has been already intimated, for instance, that the term tradition in the case of the Old Testament books includes the pre-Christian beliefs as found outside the Bible, the claims incorporated in the titles of the books themselves as well as the claims which crop out in the body of the books, and the testimony of New Testament writers. The latter might be put by some scholars outside of the meaning of the term tradition, and in a class by itself; but as such a classification of it would hardly be

agreed to by all critics, it may safely be placed in the class, traditions. For, although it may be more than tradition, and to some it has that force which makes it more, it is at least a part of tradition. But however that may be, the views contained in these traditions constitute a starting-point for critical investigation; and the presumption is that they are true until overbalancing considerations demonstrate their untenableness.

If all this be true, it necessarily follows that the proper postulates of the Higher Criticism are not to be found either in the assumption of the impossibility of the supernatural, the irrefragability of tradition, or the valuelessness of the same, but in the admissibility of all evidence bearing upon the questions it treats as evidence to be sifted and verified before it is allowed to influence the conclusion.

Conclusion.

CHAPTER VIII.

DOCTRINAL ASPECTS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

Power of the Bible depends on men's opinions of it.

THE relations of the Higher Criticism to the religious teachings of the Bible must be, from the nature of the case, of the utmost importance. The Bible is a religious book and has been the source of incalculable religious thought, feeling, and work. It has produced some most remarkable effects on the world; and it has produced these results because it has been believed to be, or at any rate to contain, the authoritative expression of God's will regarding the conduct of man on earth. If it had been believed to be anything less, it is reasonably certain that these results would not have been produced by it. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to its effectiveness that it should be accepted at least as authoritatively as it has been. What men believe it to be is an essential condition of its accomplishing what it has and can accomplish. The question then resolves itself into this: How does the application of the Higher Criticism affect the beliefs of men regarding the Bible? To answer this question it will be necessary to revert to the definition of the objects aimed at by the Higher Criticism. These, it has been said, are the determination of the origin, literary form, and value of

writings. The mere statement of these objects will suffice to show that change of view on any of them will, at least indirectly, change men's view of the Bible. The questions of origin and value are especially apt to be of cardinal importance. What does the Higher Criticism lead to as regards the origin of the Bible or its separate books? Are they divine, or are they products of human activity only? They may be either, or both combined. The easiest and most common answer would very probably be that they are the result of God's work and man's; that they are God's work working through men. But if so, Is the divine activity recognizable through the Higher Criticism? or is it to be relegated to the domain of faith? If the latter, the still more perplexing problem arises, how far the belief that the Bible is a divine production, at least in part, should be allowed to enter in and affect the results of criticism? It is possible, in the first place, to carry this belief into the critical investigation as an *à priori* presupposition; it is possible, in the second place, to hold it as a hypothesis and correct or set it aside, as the results of the investigation may indicate. It is possible, in the third place, to put it aside before entering on the investigation, in order to proceed with the investigation altogether untrammeled. Each of these possibilities is adopted as the proper course to be pursued. And on the course taken depends, to a great extent, the sum of the results found. If the critic carry his beliefs in the divine origin of a Biblical book into his work, he must needs allow his views of the nature of God and

Origin of books referred to man or God.

his relations to the world to influence him as he labors. If he refuse to take this belief with him, he may reach results inconsistent or contradictory to what can be proved true upon other than critical grounds. What he ought to do we do not propose to say at this point; our object just now is to show that any investigation into the origin of the books of the Bible is involved in a network of religious principles. It is idle to assert that the Bible will hold the same place in the estimation of men, whatever the results of criticism may be as to its origin.

Verdict on value important.

But if the investigation of the question of origin is full of significance for religious views and religious views are full of significance for it, much more is this the case with the investigation of the question of the value of the books of the Bible. A distinction may be, and is often made, between the religious and moral elements of the Bible on the one hand, and the pragmatic or historical and scientific elements on the other. The distinction exists in reality. The historical value of a writing—its credibility—is easily separable from its religious value—its authoritativeness as a source of information regarding the nature and will of God. But, upon closer examination, the distinction thus established proves of much less practical worth than we would have supposed antecedently. It is extremely difficult, not to say impossible, so to disassociate these two aspects of the value of a book as to preserve the religious value unimpaired while giving up historical trustworthiness. The religious value of a writing depends in part, at least,

Author's character gives value.

on the authority, as a religious teacher, of its writer; this authority, in its turn, depends on the moral earnestness and sincerity of the man. And by this we mean not the actual perfection of character attained by him, but the purity of his motives and sincerity of his conduct; it is not necessary that a man should be free from human weakness in order to occupy the position of a moral and religious teacher. But if we know a man to be corrupt or insincere, no matter how exalted his teachings, we are apt not to attach to them the same force that we do to the utterances of a consistent and earnest teacher. The conclusion is unavoidable in such a case that our teacher has learned the lessons he is attempting to teach us by rote; that he is simply repeating them to us in a parrotlike fashion without understanding their bearings; but if so, we scarcely feel like trusting his competency. Or else, perhaps, he does understand the deep meaning of these teachings, but is convinced that they are not true; and if so, how shall he rouse in us a desire to do the things he recommends or believe in the validity of the principles he advocates? With such an estimate of the teacher we discount the teaching. A man may, of course, have a keen sense of the moral and religious value of the truth in general, or of some truth in particular, and no historic sense; he may be able to reproduce a moral and religious principle with accuracy and force, and unable to give a historical account without unconsciously introducing into it many inaccuracies. He will certainly not be charged with lack of moral earnestness or sincerity if such are known to be his temperament and

capacity. But let it be proved that he intentionally falsifies records, misrepresents facts, and doctors accounts in order to secure partizan or individual ends, and the sphere of his weakness is removed from the historical to the ethico-religious side. The value of his teaching is at once reduced. If the author has no regard for the moral law as it touches truthfulness, we argue unconsciously, How shall we be sure that he has any regard for the moral law in other particulars?

Fraudulent intention detracts.

An answer may be and is made to this question as follows: We must use our moral and religious sense in determining when our instructor in these matters is right and trustworthy, and when he is not. After all, it is often said, it is the validity of the teaching which appeals to our own moral natures and gives it power with us, and not the character of the teacher as an individual. This answer is unsatisfactory in making the acceptance of truth hinge altogether on its intrinsic and self-evidencing force. That men accept the truth partly because they recognize it as such at first sight is not to be denied. But they also accept the truth often on the strength of the authority of teachers in whom they have confidence. When the truth expressed is simple, fundamental, and practical, the reason perceives it directly. But when it is complex and theoretic, the average reason finds it impossible to analyze and test its parts. It simply wishes to know whether the teacher who enunciates it has made the analysis and tested and proved his teaching to be valid. When satisfied of this, the reason accepts a complex

Truth does not hinge on its intrinsic force only.

presentation on the authority of the teacher. To accept this authority is not to renounce the right of private judgment or to act contrary to reason or without reason. Rather is it to act in accordance with reason. The reason is, after all, the ultimate arbiter as to whether the authority of the teacher shall be accepted or not. Christians have always accepted teachings from prophets and apostles because their reason has taught them these persons have been in some manner constituted authoritative teachers; and part of their credential is their trustworthiness as individuals, and another part the agreement of the fundamental truth in their message with the sound moral judgment of mankind. To make the latter the only test is unsatisfactory, as it raises us at a single bound from the position of learners at the feet of our moral and religious teachers into that of judges and critics of their teaching. While we must be this in truths of simple, fundamental, and practical character, we cannot do it with reference to complex and recondite matters. If man had an ideal moral nature, healthy and normal in every way, and only lying dormant, awaiting the stimulus of a presentation of truth, to be so awakened as to see unerringly the truth or falsehood in every detail of representations made to him, to select and adopt the true and reject the false, this view might have been considered correct. But the above described ideal is far from being the actual state of human nature. The truth is rather that a careful induction of the facts regarding our moral nature shows it to be a very fallible guide, practically and as a whole. The

Human reason, fallible standard.

moral and spiritual nature needs guidance from above. It needs the communication of knowledge regarding God and his will which it does not possess. Neither can it tell instantly and unerringly that which is true from that which is not. Its power of recognizing the divine is impaired. Like the bodily sight when it has become diseased, it may serve as a guide in general, but it is liable to mislead; it needs a corrective and preservative, a standard, a body of ethico-religious truth, whose truth as a whole will be a guarantee of the truth of its parts. This is given in an objective revelation of the divine will. Only such a revelation could escape the danger of being called into question by every sin-blinded moral nature, and curtailed or modified to suit the dwarfed or distorted moral judgment. Such a revelation could be given through accredited messengers of God. If it be assumed that it has been given, it must follow that the tests of its validity must be partly, at least, objective; consisting in the character of the messenger and the signs of God's presence with him along with the divinity of his message, attesting itself to the spiritual sense of men. It is not the verisimilitude of the alleged revelation alone, but its effect on the human vehicle and the other manifestations of its delivery that constitute the adequate witness of the objective revelation. The means through which God gives his word must be adequate. Some one has said truly, "Even God cannot make a six-inch stream of water run through a four-inch pipe." Neither is the moral nature of man like the

Needs guidance.

Rule of faith: Objective.

glazed surface of the interior of a metal pipe, which allows the stream to go over it without leaving a trace on it; but rather like the soil along the banks of the river, which is enriched and fertilized by the touch of the stream. To carry the simile a step further, it is not by seeing the stream that we know the fulness of its content and the quality of its water, but also by noting the effects attending its passage through its channels. Thus, while the force of a moral truth is inherent, and does not depend on its utterer, its value is much affected by the character of the man by whom it is presented for the acceptance of men.

Criticism affects form of faith.

To say then that the findings of the Higher Criticism should not affect the religious faith of men is to use language loosely, or else to take a superficial view of the case. If the religious faith of men is built upon the content of given documents, and the content of those documents be proved either partly or in whole worthless, it must needs follow that the faith be reconstructed after the proof has been established. The extent of the reconstruction may be large or small; it may amount to a slight revision or a complete revolution; it may be nothing but the elimination of unreal features from Christianity; or may be the surrender of its distinctive features, reducing it to a mere natural religion. This last is certainly possible. The religious or doctrinal bearings of the Higher Criticism cannot be a matter of indifference to the man, no matter what he may think as a scholar.

Our reasoning thus far has led us to the conclu-

sion that the Higher Criticism cannot help affecting the forms at least of religious belief, and may affect its substance. Now the problem thus raised would have a very simple solution, if the Higher Criticism could have occupied from the beginning what would appear its natural place as an introduction and preparation for the use of the Bible. Religious belief built on the Bible would in such a case have been subsequent to the examination of the Bible by the methods of the Higher Criticism. But this simple condition of things does not, unfortunately, exist. The Bible has been used for millenniums. On the ground of its authoritativeness as a source there has been elaborated a system of belief. This system of belief is accepted by many as true. Not simply because of the fact that it is built of materials furnished by the Bible, but because of its beneficent results and its adaptation to human needs and its appeal to the human heart, it is received as the truth. Now comes the Higher Criticism with a demand for a hearing on the validity and value of the sources of this faith. It claims to have an important message regarding these. When the message is heard, it is found that it consists in assertions inconsistent with the authoritativeness of the sources. Of course, if this message be true, no harm can come from its acceptance. And even were the absurd supposition to be entertained that harm could come of accepting the truth, it would still be a duty to receive it rather than cling to error for the sake of its beneficent results. No one can too strenuously insist on loyalty to the truth. But is

Criticism comes after faith.

the message of the Higher Criticism true? How shall that question be answered? Here critics again divide into two schools. On one side stand those who reduce all religious belief into subjection unto reason, and on the other those who have accepted what they believe the Bible teaches as the truth. They concede that the teaching of the Bible has its mysteries which cannot be reduced to the form of reason, but they claim that this fact does not render these mysteries irrational. The former of these schools is commonly called the rationalistic, the latter the evangelical school of criticism.

Verdicts compared with faith.

I. *The Rationalistic School.*—The term rationalistic needs a word of explanation. It is in danger like most much used words of being variously applied and of thus leading into confusion. There are rationalists and rationalists. A rationalist is sometimes understood to be one who rejects the supernatural upon philosophical grounds. The rationalistic standpoint, accepting this definition of it, is a philosophical one, and has been considered under the subject of the possible philosophical postulates assumed in using the Higher Criticism. But a rationalist is often supposed to be one who uses the reason in interpreting away the miraculous from the scriptural narratives by substituting some naturalistic explanation in every case. According to this conception of the term, only he is a rationalist who reduces the content of the Bible into the forms that can be conceived and traced out by the reason. Such rationalists were Paulus and

Methods of correlation: I. Rationalism.

Meaning of the word.

Semler in the last century, and Strauss and his followers in the present. Others, however, take a broader view of the term and include under it the use of the reason in almost any form. Those who attempt to harmonize differing or inconsistent accounts, according to this view of it, belong to the category of rationalists, because they use the reason in the same sense and manner as those who would give a merely naturalistic explanation of things apparently supernatural. Usage has thus fluctuated. It would be a gain, because it would conduce toward clearness of thought, if the term could be applied only to systems in which the reason is either the only or the supreme authority in matters of religion. And by reason, in this connection, it were well to understand not the whole intelligent nature of man, but specifically those faculties through the use of which he consciously reaches conclusions. This supremacy of reason exercised in the sphere of the interpretation of Scripture would constitute the rationalism of Semler and Paulus; exercised in the sphere that precedes interpretation, *i. e.*, the sphere of criticism, it constitutes the rationalism of the school of Kuenen and Wellhausen. In the former case the task of reason is assumed to consist in reducing everything to the forms which it can grasp and trace out; in the latter in allowing no share or weight to the faith which the Bible creates in man; in helping make up results as to the origin, nature, and value of its books. This is the work of criticism, and faith has no share in making nor power to modify the result of criticism. This rationalism

In exegesis.

In criticism.

consists, in other words, in disregarding the religious character of the Bible. While, however, these two forms of rationalism are to be recognizable as distinct, they are not practically separable from one another. The rationalistic critic is apt to be a rationalistic interpreter as he leaves the sphere of criticism and enters that of interpretation; and, on the other hand, the rationalistic interpreter readily becomes a rationalistic critic when he attempts the functions of the critic.

Limiting our attention just now to the rationalistic criticism, we may notice that it is unscientific because it leaves out of consideration a large amount of the evidence at hand; it refuses to recognize in the religious convictions produced by the Bible a valid test of the origin and value of it. The exception to be taken to this mode of procedure is not that it resorts to the employment of the reason. The reason must have a share, and a large share, in the search for answers to the questions involved. It may be even said that the reason must alone carry on the investigation, because the facts are such as can only be dealt with by the reason. But the objection is that it makes the reason the only source and test of truth. While the religious faith may not lead to any answer as to the human origin of any given literary work—as it is not expected to do and does not pretend to do—it may still prove a very valuable means of verifying or checking results otherwise reached. If this faith is not a source it may be a valuable test. Indirectly, at least, the character of that which has been

It is unscientific.

Makes human nature self-contradictory.

constructed out of the Bible cannot but have its scientific value in the determination of the origin and value of the Bible. To take the opposite ground is to prepare the way for the contradiction by one part of human nature of what has been found true in another. For if man by the exercise of one part of his nature has accepted the religious faith built out of the Bible as true; and another part of him—the reason, in the narrower sense—proves that those materials are of no value, there arises a contradiction. And the rationalistic standpoint allows no room for the removal of this contradiction. It ignores it altogether. Hence its unscientific and unsatisfactory character.

II. *The Evangelical School of criticism.*—The chief characteristic of this school is the acceptance of the evangelical faith as true. This includes the acceptance of Jesus Christ as an infallible teacher. On what grounds this acceptance is based it is not necessary to say. It is enough to note that these grounds are independent of criticism, and that the arbiter of their validity is in the ultimate analysis the same reason, (using that term now in its broad sense as the equivalent of the whole intelligent nature of man) to which criticism makes its appeal. While, therefore, the acceptance of this evangelical basis is extra-critical, it is not extra-rational. But, however that may be, the evangelical critic does not consider that a conclusion reached by purely critical methods, and having less than a demonstrative force, is completely established until its consistency with the evangelical faith has been made

II. Evangelicalism.

Faith based on good reasons.

clear. He does not allow himself to rest in merely holding his faith and his critical results apart from each other, but tries to correlate them. As soon as he refuses to correlate them, he ceases being an evangelical critic and becomes an evangelical, perhaps, in faith who holds to rationalistic critical results. The evangelical standpoint is thus different from the rationalistic, and yet not exactly its reverse. For while the rationalist would make reason determine all questions, and take no concern regarding the religious bearings of the results, the evangelical would use the reason but refer, measure, and rectify the results by a principle adopted independently of the reason as used by the rationalist. To do this is not, in his view, unreasonable or contrary to reason, because, as above said, he has found the adoption of his faith a highly reasonable proceeding. If any system of philosophy or criticism seems to lead him back to the state of mind when he had not this faith it is reasonable, he thinks, that he should demand that the considerations which support it shall have at least equal force to the reasons that have led him to adopt the faith. Otherwise he would be abandoning that which rests on the stronger foundations for that which rests on the weaker. If he is persuaded that pure criticism does not as a method of research lead to indisputable results—results, that is to say, having the force and stability of demonstrated truth—as a mere matter of intellectual importance, he will wish for verifications. But he has already adopted his faith as a matter of vital moment to him; it has an irrefragable force in his estimation;

Critical views. Tests.

he must therefore certainly take the attitude of one who has the means of testing, modifying, correcting, and even rejecting merely conjectural results. Only thus can he be rational and loyal to what he holds to be the truth and to have the force of something more than conjecture.

If the above be assumed to be the working basis of the evangelical critic, it becomes a matter of the utmost importance, before going further, to inquire what this evangelical faith is which shall play such a part in the case. The evangelical faith has been defined in the bases of agreement of such institutions as the Evangelical Alliance and the Young Men's Christian Association. The basis of the former is especially clear. It sums up the articles of agreement in the following: the divine inspiration, authority, and sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures; the right of private judgment in interpreting the Scriptures; the unity of the Godhead, and the trinity of persons therein; the natural depravity of man; the incarnation of the Son of God, his atonement for sinners, and his mediatorial intercession and reign; the work of the Holy Spirit in the regeneration and sanctification of the sinner; the immortality of the soul; the resurrection of the body; the general judgment of the world by Jesus Christ; the reward of the righteous and the punishment of the impenitent; the divine institution of the Christian ministry; and the obligation and perpetuity of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper.

Essentials of evangelical faith.

Of this creed it is evident that only two articles

come into direct contact with criticism. These are the articles defining the origin and nature of Scripture, and the nature and authority of Jesus Christ. The relation of these two points to critical views cannot be the same, though from the nature of the case it must be similar.

The acceptance of Jesus Christ as an absolute and final authority on whatever he uttered as a teacher involves the rejection of every view which contradicts this authority. If it be proved that Jesus expressed a definite view regarding even the human origin of an Old Testament book, that is an end of controversy to the evangelical. The ground of investigation is thus shifted into a different field. It becomes a question of interpretation whether Jesus committed himself to any views on these questions or not. Here the evangelical or Christian school of criticism divides into two wings; the one holding to the theory that Jesus believed the views respecting the origin and nature of the Old Testament books to be true which were held by the rabbis of his generation, and that he indorsed and taught those views; the other wing holds, on the contrary, that Jesus used these views as a basis for his moral and religious teaching and work, but did not commit himself to their truth either in detail or even in the main outlines. In the positions taken by both of these wings of evangelical criticism, the most important elements are the presupposed assumptions. There are at least two of these in each case.

Jesus Christ final authority.

Two wings of evangelicalism.

What we may call the right wing—*i. e.*, that

which holds that Jesus is committed to the traditional views—works upon the assumptions that the language of Jesus is to be interpreted rigidly or without allowance for accommodation to popular intelligence, or the preparation of mind necessary for the most precise and accurate expression of the truth. When Jesus speaks, for instance, of a passage in the Pentateuch with the introductory formula "Moses wrote," or of a saying in the book of Isaiah with the formula, "Isaiah says," he means to express his belief that the passages thus introduced actually proceeded from Moses or Isaiah respectively; that these formulas may not be interpreted as phrases equivalent to "the writings commonly ascribed to Moses," or "the book known as Isaiah." This rigid use of language is the first assumption of this wing of evangelical criticism. The second assumption is that Jesus Christ was omniscient. As the Incarnate Son of God, and essentially divine in nature, he must have known the truth about these as well as other historical questions. If these assumptions be granted as correct, the position of this wing is firmly established. If either of them is disproved, the conclusions depending on them for their validity are, of course, invalidated.

Differences: 1. The right wing.

The left wing of the evangelical school of criticism is likewise dependent on two antecedent assumptions. First that Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Son of God, in his estate of humiliation did not preserve his divine omniscience. That it was not essential to his mission and work that he should; that it would

2. The left wing.

have removed him from the human race with which he desired and intended to identify himself to retain this omniscience; that the superhuman knowledge exhibited by him during his earlier life was such as was communicated to him by the Holy Spirit for specific ends; that he does not claim omniscience, but on the other hand clearly says that there are things which transcend his knowledge.* The second assumption usually made by those of this left wing, though not altogether a necessary one, if the first be established, is that it was not an essential part of the mission of Jesus Christ to teach plainly on historical questions; that these questions were not before the public during his day; that it would have cumbered and hindered the furtherance of his message, had he gone out of his way to enlighten the minds of men specifically on such matters; that even had he possessed the knowledge implied by his committal to the traditional views, he would have used language in its popular and not in its scientific and precise sense. The establishment of either of these assumptions would result in the establishment of the standpoint of this wing of the evangelical school.

The determination of the difference between these schools must be the result of a careful inductive study of the facts, *i. e.*, the utterances of Jesus himself and the doctrine of the person of Jesus as taught in the New Testament writings. But in any case the authority of the Master on all questions on which he teaches must be left unimpugned.

* Mark xiii. 32.

It is at this point that the crucial test of evangelical criticism has been and must be applied.*

Doctrine of Inspiration.

The question of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures is also of cardinal importance. Evangelicals have always accepted not only Jesus Christ as an absolutely infallible and authoritative teacher, whose word puts an end to all controversy, but also the apostles and prophets whose writings are collected together in the canonical Scriptures. They have always used these writings as the ultimate court of appeal in their differences from one another. They have planted themselves on their authoritativeness as the ground of their separation from the historic Catholic Church. They have adopted them as their organic principle and fundamental law, believing that they contain and are the infallible rule of faith and practice. And they have done this because, in these writings of the apostles and of those who were associated with them, they perceived the presence of the divine Spirit guiding and informing their minds in some way. This information and guidance in the process of committing the truth of God to others, either orally or in writing, has been called the fact of inspiration. The evangelical believes in the fact of inspiration, and considers the bearings of critical theories on the belief in inspiration of the utmost importance. Though logically following any examination of the Scriptures and built on an inductive study of its

Inspiration: fact and theory.

Fact: independent of criticism.

* Cf. Mead, *Christ and Criticism;* and A. Cave, *The Battle of the Standpoints.*

features and facts, the belief in inspiration need not be based on results of criticism. It has been held without any careful, critical investigations, and before these were undertaken. If critical investigations make it appear a delusive belief, they must show reasons stronger for their own truth than the reasons which have led to the evangelical belief in inspiration.

Theories modified by it.

But while the fact of inspiration may be thus held as a truth, there may be a wide difference among evangelicals as to the mode and the limits of inspiration. A sharp distinction is rightly made between belief in the fact and in specific theories as to its extent and the results it secures in the Biblical writings. Evangelicalism is not bound to any special theory on this subject.' Within evangelicalism—in fact within every special body that holds to the evangelical basis—there are held widely diverging views. The two extremes may be cited as, on the one hand, the theory of the absolute inerrancy of the original writings in all matters small or great, and, on the other, the view that the Bible contains the word of God, but is not the word of God strictly. According to the first view, inspiration secured freedom from all error for the inspired man; according to the second, it does not relieve him from the liability to err in matters of mere subordinate importance or in matters which are tributary to his main purpose but only indirectly connected with it.

While, therefore, evangelicalism would be antagonistic to the denial of inspiration either explicitly or implicitly, it is not committed to any historically

expounded view of inspiration. It admits of the possibility of some new definition of the doctrine as a result of critical investigation.*

* The literature of the subject of this chapter is very extensive. But as the product of current discussion it is to be found scattered in the recent issues of periodicals. A few works of small compass, but great value, have been contributed to the discussion, but none that has been recognized by all the parties in debate as a satisfactory presentation of the principles on which the debate may be closed. Perhaps the time has not yet come for such a work. Upon the whole, evangelicals generally do not swerve far from the positions laid down in the following works: Ellicott's *Christus Comprobator*, 1892; Mead's *Christ and Criticism*, 1892; Sanday, *The Oracles of God*, 1891; Girdlestone, *Doctor Doctorum*, 1892.

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM. ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL.

THE questions which occupy the Higher Criticism, and whose solution is sought for through the application of its principles and methods, have always been regarded as of the highest interest by intelligent students of the Bible. Accordingly efforts have been made at different times and in different ways to furnish answers to them. In the course of these efforts the very principles and rules constituting the Higher Criticism, as already described, have been used by investigators. Very often these principles were used blindly or unconsciously. Especially was this the case in those earlier days when all the sciences lacked in systematic exposition; when all study was carried on somewhat at random and the principles of investigation were as yet not formulated in any. There is a sharp difference to be observed and a distinction to be drawn between this stage in the development of any science and the subsequent one, in which all its processes and rules become distinct subjects of study. In criticism especially this stage was marked by a lack of discrimination between theological, critical, historical, or other phases of questions. The same per-

Criticism very old.

Though not long a science.

son in the same connection would apply a pure critical principle and proceed to bring forth a theological consideration to support the result, as if unconscious of the difference in the place and force of the two considerations. This makes it extremely difficult to disentangle the critical work done by even the best of the men of this stage from the conjectures and baseless traditions with which it seems to be interwoven. Criticism seems to be accidental and sporadic rather than systematic and premeditated. Nevertheless, critical arguments—we may almost say *the* critical arguments one and all, as later developed by the constant practice of criticism—are used throughout this stage. It is therefore an error to speak of the ancient times as though criticism was unknown in them, or of the history of criticism as dating from the latter half of the eighteenth century. This history cannot be complete without going back to the very origin of the writings with which it deals.

Periods in its history.

From the above it is evident that our division of the history of the Higher Criticism must be into two periods, the ancient and the modern. The characteristic difference between these two periods has already been given in its main outline. The first of the periods is the period of the infancy and helplessness of criticism. It exists along with other sister methods of research, altogether unconscious of its functions and its rights. In the second it comes, so to speak, to its self-consciousness; it realizes its work and soon claims exclusive control and dominion of a field where it had been long content to dwell in

peace, and labor unobserved, with others on undefined terms. The first of these periods extends from time immemorial to the days of Astruc. More especially the date of demarcation between the ancient and the modern stages of criticism ought to be set down at 1753—the year of the publication of the treatise by Astruc entitled: *Conjectures sur les Mémoires originaux dont il paroit que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Génèse.* The second stage, it goes without saying, extends from Astruc to the present day.

I. During the period preceding the publication of Astruc's epoch-making book we are to distinguish three epochs based on changes of standpoint as follows: First, the Pre-Christian epoch; this dealt with the questions of authorship, structure, and aim in direct and positive statements without undertaking to discuss them. Second, the age between the beginning of the Christian era and the Reformation; this approached these same questions with a definite understanding of their bearings, but no clear principles as to the influence which their discussion should have on the general subject of religion and theology. Third, the epoch between the Reformation and the rise of the modern criticism; this dealt with the same questions with prepossessions drawn from dogmatic theology; *i. e.*, conclusions from the study of the content of the Bible (and by content in this connection is meant the theological or religious elements and not the historical and literary features of the books). The first of these subperiods, that which precedes the

I. Period: 1. Pre-Christian age.

Christian era, may be set aside as furnishing no appreciable material for a sketch of the development of the Higher Criticism. Whatever there is in this period of criticism in the dealings of men with the Biblical books is lost in the manner with which utterances regarding the answers to the questions of criticism are made. We have bare statements; whether these represent antecedent processes of investigation it is not clear. They may represent much diligent research; but as there appeared to be no controversy on the questions alluded to, it seemed unnecessary to expose the course of investigation which led to the statements. Or it is possible that there were no investigations, and the results we have in these statements are mere opinions or hereditary traditions received unquestioningly by each generation from its predecessor. Whatever the truth, it is evidently too late to attempt to go behind the bare statements and discover critical methods, if any were used in reaching them.

2. Early Christian age.

With the advent of the Christian era and the appearance of the documents that give an account of the origin of Christianity and a rule for guidance in faith and conduct, criticism found a new field and a new impulse. Thus it came about that in this epoch the books of the New Testament formed the subject-matter of discussions. Moreover, it is in the earlier years of the epoch, while there was room for doubt and discussion, that critical discussions are to be found. As a matter of history the first appearance itself of the New Testament books seems to have caused no

discussion. Their importance was not appreciated at once. The faith which they expounded and promoted was scarcely considered a historic factor as yet. They served to make it such. But as this faith grew in significance to the world, and differences of opinion arose as to its exact nature and intellectual and practical applications, the question of the authority of the documents arose and with it all the questions of the Higher Criticism. The most important of these questions, from the point of view of its bearing on the practical use to be made of the answer, was: Did an apostle write or cause to be written any given document? The object of the whole investigation seemed to be to trace each book to its source, with a view of determining the further point of its binding authority as a part of a canon or rule of faith. The application of principles, however, in obtaining answers to this question is not clear at first. The idea was no doubt entertained that there is a difference between two classes of early Christian writings, *i. e.*, the genuine and the spurious; but that these two classes can be distinguished from one another by internal marks does not come into view until the time of Origen. The fact that Marcion established a canon for himself may illustrate the case. Marcion had reasons, which he could and did assign, for rejecting the authority of a great number of the New Testament writings; he had reasons for accepting as authoritative the ten epistles of Paul and the Gospel of Luke. But whether these reasons were to any extent based on linguistic and historical grounds, or whether linguistic and historical con-

siderations were among the reasons that moved him to accept the books of his canon, and these only, does not appear from anything we know of his processes of thinking. His chief motive we know was the desire to confirm his philosophy of religion. Whatever books tended to do this he was inclined to accept as authoritative; those that did not he was inclined to reject. This is as far as we can go in discovering the sum and substance of his criticism.

Origen (185–254 A. D.).

With Origen there is a marked change of base. Students of the Bible begin to distinguish between what should be accepted or rejected not simply because it confirms or disturbs preconceived views, but because it is attested by historical and philological evidence. They also begin to specify this evidence. They assign their reasons for the acceptance or rejection of the genuineness of books. Origen himself, writing of the Epistle to the Hebrews, uses the arguments from language and style; from the character of thought contained in the Epistle; and from the testimony of the ancients or tradition. He carefully balances the evidence furnished by these sources. The style points to a different author than the Apostle Paul; the thought is very much like Paul's, and tradition ascribes the letter to the apostle. His conclusion is that those who believe the writing to be Pauline are not unreasonable; but for himself, no result based on the evidence at hand can have demonstrative force. "As to who wrote the letter God only knows the truth."* He further

*Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, vi. 25.

adds that "some assert that Clement, who became bishop of the church at Rome, wrote it; and others that this was done by Luke, the author of the Gospel and the Acts." Thus it appears that in discussing the question of the right of some parts of the canon to be where they are, it came to be customary not merely to express a belief one way or another, but to inquire into the reasons which support it or militate against it. This is nothing but criticism in its incipient stage.

Closely following Origen, in these first days of Biblical criticism, came his successor at the head of the Alexandrian school, Dionysius. The special occasion which set him to employ critical methods was the controversy regarding the authority of the Apocalypse. He contended that this book was not the work of the Apostle John. The reasons he gave for supporting this view were: (1) The literary argument. The style of the author of the Apocalypse is not the same as that of the author of the Fourth Gospel. As this was written by the Apostle John, the Apocalypse is not his work. (2) The argument from difference of personal habit and characteristic. The author of the Fourth Gospel never names himself. So also the author of the First Epistle of John, assuming that he is the same as the author of the Gospel, never mentions himself. The author of the Apocalypse frequently does so. (3) The argument from silence. This is used twice: First, inasmuch as there were many Johns, it was to be expected that if this author were the Apostle he would have said so, since he had

Dionysius of Alexandria (fl. 260 A. D.).

already described himself in the Gospel as the disciple whom Jesus loved; as the one who had leaned on the Master's bosom; as the brother of James, and as one of the Twelve. Secondly, there is no mention of the Apocalypse in the Epistle, not to speak of the Gospel, or of any revelation given to the evangelist and apostle. That the mention of such a revelation was to be expected appears from the fact that Paul, having received such a revelation, speaks of it in his Epistles, although Paul did not write down the revelation which he had received. (4) The argument from character of thought. The thought of the Gospel and the Epistle is the same; that of the Apocalypse is totally different. And the conclusion which Dionysius reaches, in view of these facts, is that the Apocalypse is the work of a certain John, but this John is not the brother of James and author of the Gospel. As to who he is, Dionysius cannot tell. He believes in the inspiration and prophetic character of its content, and deprecates the ascription of it to Cerinthus or any other like-minded author.

External bias allowed.

From another point of view Dionysius' criticism shows how easily motives *ab extra* are at this stage allowed to influence the processes and methods of criticism. This early critic can hardly conceal his object in thus denying that the author of the Apocalypse was a different person from the author of the Gospel and the Epistles bearing the name of John. These latter writings are perspicuous. Their writer's style is clear and easy to be understood. If it could be shown that the writer of the Apocalypse is not the same, it

would be easy to assert that its author was an obscure writer; hence that this book should not be used in existing controversies as the others were. Thus the Chiliasts, who constantly quoted it, would be deprived of their chief source of support. Dionysius, without denying the inspiration of the book and its usefulness, when properly understood, aims to disarm those who he thinks were making wrong use of it; this he thinks he can do by proving that it is not a clear writing; to this end he resorts to the criticism that proves it to be the work of another than John the Evangelist, who was manifestly a clear writer. Thus, even at this early date, extra-critical views were allowed to influence, at least indirectly, the course of criticism.*

Common view of the Old Testament.

In the sphere of the Old Testament there was not as much room for difference of opinion. The writings constituting this part of the canon had been received as a binding rule of faith and conduct, and little was to be gained by examining the grounds on which this was done. Jesus Christ had used these writings as authoritative sources of information and presumably accepted the current views of the Jews regarding them. His imprimatur was thus, in appearance at least, put upon the Old Testament as it stood in his day. This belief had the tendency to produce the impression, which it always has had since, wherever it has prevailed, that the question of the origin and nature of the books of the Old Testament was a closed question for practical purposes. This was the state of opinion among Christians.

*Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, vii. 10, 24, 25.

But the opponents of Christianity did not feel the restraints thus imposed upon Christians by tradition and the supposed attitude of Jesus Christ toward the Old Testament. Starting with the rejection of the claims of both the Old and the New Testament writings to supernatural origin, they naturally adopted such theories of their authorship and value as would harmonize with the rejection of this supernatural origin. It was very exceptionally indeed that they deemed the subject worthy of a careful examination; but whenever they did so, the conclusions they reached were as above stated.

Opponents of Christianity.

Celsus, the first great opponent of Christianity, in a treatise written toward the end of the second century considered the book of Genesis not a writing of Moses, but of a number of other authors.*

Celsus (fl. 190 A. D.).

Following in the footsteps of Celsus came Porphyry's investigation of the book of Daniel. Porphyry was a Neo-Platonic philosopher who died A. D. 305. He wrote a treatise *Against Christians*, in fifteen books. Among other things he found the prophetical utterances of Daniel supporting the claims of Christianity to supernatural origin. He made these utterances the subject of special investigation, and came to the conclusion that such minute predictions as were contained in this book could not have been made. The author must have lived after the events pre-

Porphyry (233-305 A. D.).

* Origen, *Contra Cels.*, iv. 42. As this treatise is not extant, we can only conjecture as to the mode of reasoning used by him in reaching this conclusion.

dicted. These were *vaticinia ex eventu.* The writer of Daniel must have written during the Maccabean age, more precisely, during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes.*

It hardly needs to be said that we have here an instance of the use of a critical argument, that from anachronism. As has already been intimated, however, there was a bias behind the use of this critical weapon; viz., the opposition of Porphyry to Christianity.

Somewhat later, Eusebius gave his well-known account of the Christian Scriptures. He did not, however, base his conclusions on critical arguments strictly, but on the traditions of the ancients. Incidentally he used the critical argument from the content of thought in testing and rejecting certain books which he could not classify among his accepted or doubtful books. The utter unlikeness of the expression and teaching of these, he asserts, put them outside the canon, not merely as spurious but also as improper and wicked.†

Eusebius, (270–341, A. D.).

These are some of the clearest cases of the application of critical principles to the Bible in the ancient period. They do not constitute a systematic and scientific criticism, but they show that the critical instinct and method had some share in aggressive and defensive work in the course of controversy. Other instances could be cited; but they would be obscurer in character, and could not add much to our knowledge of the criticism during the

* Jerome, *Comm. in Dan. Proph.*

† Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 25.

period under consideration. The above sufficiently show that this period was a time when the need of criticism was felt and beginnings were made in it.

This time did not last long. When the Church was united to the state, it assumed the authority to say what should be considered canonical among the current Christian writings and what should not. And this not arbitrarily, but on the basis of such reasoning as was thought sufficient. The main consideration in this reasoning was the tradition of the ancients. That there may have been other considerations cannot be denied. But at any rate as soon as the Church pronounced on the canon in its ecclesiastical councils, notably those at Laodicea (364) and at Carthage (397), all necessity for pressing individual investigations in this field seemed to disappear. It became a matter of secondary importance to inquire into the origin of the books of the canon and allied questions when their authority was declared binding by official action of the Church. Tradition thus became almost the exclusive court of appeal. Accordingly there is an appreciable difference in this regard between the attitude of scholars like Origen preceding, and Jerome following, the action of the councils. Both take occasion to speak of the uncertainty of the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews; but whereas Origen uses some critical principles in dealing with the subject, Jerome leans altogether on the authority of tradition.*

Disuse and disappearance.

The long interval from Jerome to Luther and the Reformers is characterized by almost universal and

Ep. Dardan., cxxix. 3, in Migne's edition.

total stagnancy in this department. The reformers were too busy with their controversies in the domain of dogmatics, and in the work of organizing the new movement, to enter into the systematic study of critical questions; and yet the chief of them were not kept out of the field altogether.

3. Reformation age.

Luther's attitude toward the canon is very well known. He instituted a single test, which he applied irrespective of consequences. "That which does not teach Christ," said he, "is not apostolic, even if a Peter or a Paul taught it." Hence on the critical question of the value of the various Biblical books he had something to say. He believed these books were not all equally valuable. He put the Gospel of John, the Epistle to the Romans, and the First Epistle of Peter in the first rank. In fact he made these books a class by themselves. Possessing these, the Church did not absolutely need the rest of the Scripture. The other books were to be estimated differently, always putting the Epistles of Paul above the Gospels. Of the Old Testament books he placed Esther in the same class with Maccabees; Chronicles were lower than Kings for historic value. On the question of authorship, he asks, "What does it matter if Moses should not have himself written the Pentateuch?" perhaps with reference to the denial of the Mosaic authorship by Carlstadt. He rejects the theory that Solomon wrote the Song of Songs; he believes that many of the Old Testament books were revised by later editors; he finds chronological confusion in the present order or arrangement of the prophecies

Luther.

of Jeremiah; he assigns the Book of Ecclesiastes to the time of the Maccabees. In the New Testament the authorship of Hebrews did not disturb him, although he, for the first time, suggested that it might be the work of Apollos. Without dealing with the question of the genuineness of the Apocalypse directly, he rejected the inspiration of that book. His treatment of the Epistle of James has been often quoted as characteristic of his whole attitude and method. He called it "a veritable epistle of straw," and not written by an apostle at all. The reason he assigned is interesting as well as characteristic; "it fully contradicts St. Paul." The Epistle of Jude is "an unnecessary, second-hand, and non-apostolic one." It is evident, even from a bare and summary enumeration of them, that these views are not based on strict critical principles, yet they contain and imply the application of such principles; and so far as they are implied these principles are essentially the same as those used in later times.

Carlstadt.

Carlstadt, as already intimated, took the ground that Moses did not write the Pentateuch. Only an insane person could attribute the passage giving an account of Moses' death to Moses himself.*

Calvin.

The other leading reformers did not adopt Luther's views on the Scriptures. Calvin, and the churches which agreed with him in his theological views, looked on the Gospel more broadly, as diffused throughout the whole of the Bible. This was to them the source of all true

* *Libellus de Scripturis Canonicis*, pub. 1521.

and valid religious thought and the ultimate court of appeal in every controversy among themselves and with the Romanists. They were satisfied to begin with an enumeration of the books making up the Scripture canon. Questions preceding this step were not entertained as important. The authorship, literary form, and specific value of a Biblical work pertained to the outer circumference, and not to the very center of the doctrine of Scripture. If the Bible was the Word of God, and human instrumentalities were merely passive in its production, the chief thing in searching the Scriptures must be to ascertain the mind of God revealed in them. Everything else must be of subsidiary interest, if not altogether unnecessary. This, it may be said, was the mind and attitude of the Reformed wing of Protestantism. And this it continued to be throughout the period of the formation of the Creeds, including the Westminster Confession of Faith; and even later through the first half of the eighteenth century.

Outside the evangelical or strictly Protestant world questions of this sort were regarded as more important, and therefore worthy of investigation. Hobbes disputes the validity of the reasoning that Moses must have written the Pentateuch because its five books are called the "Books of Moses." "No more than these titles," says he, "the Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, the Book of Ruth and the Book of Kings are arguments sufficient to prove that they were written by Joshua, by the Judges, by Ruth, and by the Kings." His position is that: "Though Moses did not compile these books entirely, and in the

Hobbes.

form in which we have them, yet he wrote all that he is there said to have written."* Somewhat more positive and further advanced in the negative direction is the position of Benedict Spinoza. This original thinker took up some obscure phrases of Aben Ezra's in which the medieval rabbi had pointed out some post-Mosaic material in the Pentateuch and elaborated them into a set of propositions leading to the conclusion that Moses did not write the Pentateuch. To this negative theory Spinoza further appended the theory, which has only a loose connection with it, that the historical books of the Old Testament were a body of composite writings put together, probably by Ezra, in the fifth century B. C. out of a larger mass, the remainder of the material having been lost since.†

Spinoza.

Among Roman Catholics, And. Masius (Maes), 1753, suggested that the Pentateuch had been revised by Ezra.‡ Peyrerius, basing himself on some of the suggestions of Aben Ezra (already spoken of as the starting-point of Spinoza's speculations relating the authorship of the Pentateuch), reached the conclusion that the Pentateuch, as at present found, is not the work of Moses, but an excerpt from a larger work by Moses.§ But Roman Catholic criticism reached a crisis in

Roman Catholics.

* *Leviathan*, Pt. III. cxxxiii.

† *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, pub. 1670.

‡ *Comm. Josh.*, Præf.

§ *Preadamitæ*, pub. 1655. Peyrère, however, wrote his *Preadamitæ* while a Protestant, and recanted the views therein expressed when he joined the Roman Church.

the labors of Richard Simon.* This author made use of true critical principles. He gathered up literary and historical data, especially facts relating to style, parallelism of narratives, lack of order and arrangement. On these data he based some new views. He claimed that there were in Israel official annalists, as among other ancient peoples; that in fact Moses appointed some such in imitation of the Egyptians. Moses himself wrote the book of the Law. The annalists wrote records of the events. Out of the materials Ezra, or possibly some later editor, compiled the historical books of the Old Testament; not, however, with strict regard to order, but using large freedom with the official documents. Only a small portion of the Pentateuch is accordingly of Mosaic origin and that not distinguishable, because of editorial alterations. It has often been said that Simon's motive in entering the field of Biblical criticism was not so much love for criticism for its own sake as opposition to the Protestant standpoint of adherence to the Bible as the only rule of faith and arbiter in theological debate. By calling attention to the human origins of the Biblical books he hoped to weaken this position. Whatever his intention may have been, his own Church did not approve these views. The great Bossuet declared himself against them. His book on the Old Testament was ex-

R. Simon.

**Histoire Critique du Texte du Vieux Testament*, pub. 1678–85. His *Histoire Critique du Texte du Nouveau Testament*, pub. 1689, though presumably on the Lower Criticism contains a considerable amount of material gathered together for work in the field of the Higher Criticism of the New Testament.

amined, condemned, and all obtainable copies of it destroyed. Outside his own communion he found an able opponent of his theories in Clericus.* This theologian broached the novel view that the Pentateuch was a compilation by the priest sent by the king of Assyria to Samaria to teach the people the religion of Jehovah. Later he changed his view, and fell back to the traditional theory of Mosaic authorship with later interpolations.† This later view of his found an opponent in Anton van Dale, who contended that the Pentateuch was a compilation originating in the age of Ezra, and properly the work of Ezra. Ezra, however, incorporated into it materials from the book of the Law, which was of Mosaic origin.‡

Clericus.

Van Dale.

The views of Simon, Le Clerc, and Van Dale, different as they were from one another, were all departures from the views commonly accepted before the seventeenth century. These older views now found champions in two classes of writers. First, those who fortified them by considerations derived from dogmatic theology. And second, those who acknowledged the force of the principles used by these critics and the reality of the facts cited; but denied the legitimacy of the conclusions drawn from them, and gave ex-

Opposition.

* Jean Le Clerc, *Sentimens de quelques théologiens de Hollande sur l'Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament par Père R. Simon*, published 1685.

† *Comm. Genes. Proleg.*, Dissert. Tertia.

‡ *De Origine et Progressu Idolatriæ*, pub. 1696; and *Epistola ad Morinum.*

planations of the facts consistent with the older views. Of the first class the most prominent representative was Carpzov.* The influence of Carpzov in the history of criticism is that of a corrective from without rather than that of factor from within. His view of inspiration was a fundamental truth to him. Views as to the origin of the books of the canon must harmonize with this, if they were to be allowed any standing.

Carpzov.

The most prominent representative of the second class of conservatives was Vitringa.† Observing the frequent occurrence of the formula in Genesis of "These are the generations of . . . " Vitringa propounded the view that Moses, in writing Genesis, had used documents composed by the Patriarchs. This amounts to the use of critical methods, without denying the traditional theory of the origin of Genesis or antagonizing any doctrines held in the Church.

Vitringa.

Other writers who taught the earlier views from the standpoint of either of these classes are, Witsius,‡ Prideaux,§ Heidegger,‖ and Huet.¶ But no further progress was made in the elaboration of the Higher Criticism as a science until the middle of the eighteenth century.

* Johann Gottlob Carpzov, 1679–1767. *Introductio ad Lib. Canon.*, Leipzig, 1714–21; *Critica Sacra*, Leipzig, 1724.

† Campegius Vitringa, *Observationum Sacrarum Libri VI*, pub. 1683–1708, and 1723.

‡ *Misc. Sacra*, pub. 1692.

§ *Old and New Testaments Connected*, 1716–18.

‖ *Exercitationes Biblicæ*, pub. 1700.

¶ *Demonstratio Evangelica*, pub. 1679.

CHAPTER X.

MODERN CRITICISM OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

II. Modern era of Criticism.

II. In tracing the history of the Higher Criticism, as we reach the middle of the eighteenth century it becomes necessary to observe a distinction between the Old and the New Testaments. The application and development of critical principles are noticeably different in these two fields. Already, before the time specified, attention in the New Testament had been almost exclusively given to the study of the text. Scholars like Bentley, Mill, and Wettstein had by their labors shown the importance of purifying the text of this portion of Scripture. All other questions, whether regarding authorship or literary form, were not entertained. The wave of rationalism which swept over Europe during the eighteenth century recalled attention from the text to the more fundamental subjects of the origin and nature of the first records of the Christian religion. But the interest thus aroused was not purely literary or historical, but rather philosophical. The point of view from which research in this field was undertaken was thus that of the philosophy of religion. In the Old Testament field, on the other hand, criticism began with what was put forth as a simple literary discovery—that of the alternate use of different

names designating God in the Book of Genesis. It gradually developed from this beginning into the use of literary phenomena of various other classes; then into the use of historical data; and finally into the use of the content of thought as bases for forming judgments regarding the origin and nature of the books of the Pentateuch and subsequently of the whole Old Testament.

This difference will lead us to trace separately the course of the Higher Criticism in the Old Testament first and in the New afterward.

I. THE HEXATEUCH QUESTION.

(A) *Use and development of the literary argument.*— The initial step in the first stage of modern Old Testament criticism was, as above stated, the discovery that in alternate sections of Genesis use is made of different divine names; this fact served as the ground of the division of that book into documents. It was claimed that the book is the work of more than one author. This step was taken by Astruc, and the argument from the use of divine names continued to be the chief ground of appeal for the next generation or so, being by the end of the eighteenth century broadened into what we now call the literary argument in general. Jean Astruc* (1684–1766) was the son of a Protestant minister, who had joined the Roman Catholic communion upon the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685); he studied

1. The "Hexateuch" question.

Literary argument.

* See *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, vol. iii. pp. 83–102. "Jean Astruc," by Howard Osgood, D. D., LL. D.

and taught medicine, but becoming interested in the Old Testament he published in 1753 his *Conjectures sur les Mémoires originaux dont il paroit que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Génèse*, Bruxelles. This was to be a defense of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and an answer to the attacks of Spinoza. It had been noticed that the names Jehovah and Elohim were used in alternate passages of Genesis, which also parallelized with one another as to subject-matter. From this he drew the inference that Moses, in composing Genesis, had made use of two preexisting documents written by earlier writers, in one of which God was uniformly called Jehovah and in the other Elohim. These documents Moses incorporated into his work almost unaltered. The apparent impression of confusion resulting from parallel, but slightly differing accounts of the same events, was satisfactorily explained upon this theory, and there was left apparently no ground for Spinoza's sweeping statements regarding Hebrew literature in general, and his denial of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch in particular. The importance of Astruc's work consists not so much in the discovery of new facts, or in the use of new principles, as in the consistent application of these principles in constructing a theory.*

Jean Astruc.

* It is a singular coincidence that another work of the same nature and purport was published the same year. *Dissertatio qua disquiritur unde Moses res in libro Geneseos descriptas didicerit*, Leyden, 1753. This treatise was ascribed erroneously by Eichhorn to J. J. Schultens. It is the work of P. Brouwer. The view of the author is that, in order to write Genesis, Moses must

Simultaneously with the appearance of Astruc's work on Genesis appeared also Lowth's theory of parallelism in Hebrew poetry.* This theory furnished a new key to some of the problems of Hebrew literature and prepared the way for subsequent research in the subdepartment of literary form.

Eichhorn.

It was thirty years after the publication of Astruc's *Conjectures* that Eichhorn† took a step in advance in the employment of literary phenomena as a basis of conclusions. He pointed out the fact that the sections of Genesis in which the names of Jehovah and Elohim were respectively used were also characterized by other differences of style. Moreover, he extended the application of this kind of criticism to the other books of the Pentateuch and first called this mode of procedure the "Higher Criticism." The sum of the results he reached was that the Pentateuch consists of documents written mostly during the age of Moses, some by Moses himself, and compiled some time between Joshua and Samuel. These views he propounded with vigor and enthusiasm, and they found many adherents in Germany.

have made use of sources or documents existing at his time under the names of History of Noah, History of Jacob, etc. To these sources he refers the formula, "These are the generations," Genesis x: 1; xxxvii: 2, *et al.* He stoutly defends, however, the historic truthfulness and divine origin of Genesis. After the appearance of Astruc's work little attention was paid to Brouwer's dissertation, and it lapsed into oblivion.

* *De Sacra Poesi Hebræorum*, pub. 1753.

† Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, 1752–1827. *Einleitung ins Alte Testament*, 3 vols., pub. 1780–83.

J. D. Michaelis first appeared as an opponent of the views of Astruc, contending that they were based on an insufficient knowledge of the history of Old Testament study since the days of Clericus.* Later, however, he accepted Eichhorn's views, with modifications. He differed rather in his attitude and mode of approach to the Scriptures than in questioning the validity of Eichhorn's method of criticism. He saw better than the latter did the bearings of these concrete views on the theory of the supernatural origin of the Bible, and was not ready, on the grounds presented, to sacrifice this theory. As for purely critical views, he was not over anxious either to antagonize or to adopt them as such.

J. D. Michaelis.

Outside of Germany Astruc and Eichhorn met with little favor. In Great Britain, especially, the literary phenomena whose explanation occasioned the analytic theories of Eichhorn were thought to be counterbalanced by the consideration that the law given in the Pentateuch could be proved historically to have been observed continuously from the days of Joshua to the date of the captivity—a consideration which has been since proved to be without force.

Upon the whole, the net result at the end of this stage of the modern period was the erection of a view which has been termed the *document-theory* of the origin of the Pentateuch. The theory is, in the main, that the Pentateuch was composed, perhaps by Moses himself, by the fusion together of preexisting documents. Of

Results: Document-theory.

* *Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften*, pub. 1787.

these two were distinctly recognized as constituting the bulk of the work as at present extant: *i. e.*, the Jehovistic and the Elohistic. This was essentially the view held by Astruc, Jerusalem,* Schulteus, Eichhorn, and Michaelis, and others. Each of these critics, however, had his own views as to the other minor documents in addition to the two principal ones above mentioned, and also as to glosses, interpolations, and other details.

While, as already noted, the views of Astruc and Eichhorn found not many friends in Great Britain, it was in that country that a new theory, more radical in its difference from existing views, was propounded by the Roman Catholic theologian Alexander Geddes.† This view was that the Pentateuch was reduced to its present form not earlier than the reign of David nor later than that of Hezekiah; most probably in the reign of Solomon and at Jerusalem. "It was compiled from ancient documents, some of which were coeval with Moses, and some even anterior to Moses." This was called the *fragment-theory* and was grounded on the same principles as the document-theory of Eichhorn. It was transplanted to Germany by J. S. Vater.‡ Vater, however, dif-

Geddes.

Fragment-theory.

Vater.

* *Letters on the Mosaic Writings and Philosophy.*

† 1737–1802. *The Holy Bible, or the Books accounted sacred by Jews and Christians, faithfully translated,* etc.; pub. 1792–97. *Critical Remarks on the Hebrew Scriptures, corresponding with a new translation of the Bible,* 1800.

‡ *Commentar über den Pentateuch mit Einleitungen zu den einzelnen Abschnitten der eingeschalt. Uebers. von Dr. Alexander*

fered from Geddes in ascribing Deuteronomy to the reign of David; and the completion of the Pentateuch, as it now stands, to the period of the exile.

The fragment-theory did not become at once as popular as the document-theory. Some of its most prominent expounders and defenders were J. G. Hase,* Fulda,† Corrodi,‡ Otmar.§

Independent of the fragment and document theories and occupying a middle position between them appeared Ilgen.‖ Ilgen's view is that Genesis is made up of seventeen documents which, however, are the works of three independent authors : The First Elohist, the Second Elohist, and the First Jehovist. The compiler put the documents together without be-

Ilgen.

Geddes's merkwürdigen kritischen und exegetischen Anmerkungen. Halle, 1802–05.

* *Aussichten zur künftigen Aufklärung über das Alte Testament*, pub. 1785. But this critic later returned to the view that the Pentateuch was the work of Moses with interpolations, glosses, and supplements, and a final redaction by Ezra. So in *Entdeckungen im Felde der Ältesten Erd- und Menschengeschichte*, pub. 1805.

† Paulus, *N. Repertorium III.* 1791.

‡ *Beleuchterung des Jüdischen und Christlichen Bibelkanons*, pub. 1798.

§ This is the assumed name of J. C. Nachtigall, *Fragmente in Henke Magazin*, vol. iii. pt. 2, 1794, and vol. iv. pts. 1 and 2, 1795.

‖ Karl David Ilgen, 1783–1834, *Die Urkunden des Jerusalemitischen Tempelarchivs in ihrer Urgestalt*, etc., 1798 ; a work projected on a large scale, but left unfinished on account of the author's appointment to the rectorship of Schulpforte, the duties of which office absorbed all his time and attention.

stowing any other work on them than that of fitting them together. This he did more by selecting and arranging together the words of the three writers than by taking sections of the documents and unifying the narrative as such. Ilgen's view, like that of Geddes and Vater, did not commend itself to the critics of the time. It was based too exclusively on literary grounds.

(B) *Use and development of the historical argument.*— A new principle was introduced into criticism by DeWette.* This was the use of historical data furnished by the Biblical books along with the literary phenomena of the books. On this twofold foundation he builds the theory that Genesis was the work of a writer who found an Elohistic document, adopted it as a nucleus, and added to it germane material out of one or more, probably more, Jehovistic documents, thus bringing the book into its present form. This was called the *supplement-theory.* As to the rest of the Pentateuch, DeWette taught that Deuteronomy was composed during the reign of Josiah.

Historical argument.

DeWette.

Supplement-theory.

The supplement-theory enlisted in its defense a large number of able scholars, and was subjected to modifications. In Germany, Von Bohlen † gave it his adherence, attrib-

Von Bohlen.

* W. M. L. DeWette, 1780–1849, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1806–07; especially vol. ii. *Kritik der Israelitischen Geschichte.* Also, *Lehrbuch der hist.-krit. Einleitung in die Bibel*, 1817; 8th ed. by Schrader, 1868.

† *Die Genesis*, pub. 1835.

uting, however, the Jehovistic elements to the personality of the supplementer or author of Genesis. Bleek * extended the analysis to Exodus vi: 2, and revived the view that the Pentateuch was not complete without the Book of Joshua, and that therefore this book, added to the previous five, constitutes with them a Hexateuch. Tuch † and Knobel ‡ attempted to trace out in detail the line of distinction between this ancient Elohistic document and the materials subsequently added. Later exponents of this view substantially are: Stähelin § and Lengerke. ‖

Bleek.

Tuch.
Knobel.

Stähelin.
Lengerke.

Half-way between the supplement-theory and the document-theory stand the views of Ewald and Hupfeld. Ewald ¶ finds in the present Pentateuch the *Book of Origins* composed in "the period of the earlier monarchy," or, more precisely, during the first half of the reign

Ewald.

* 1793–1859. *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 4th ed. by Wellhausen, 1878. Tr. by Venables, London, 1869.

† *Commentar über Genesis*, 1838.

‡ *Genesis in Hirzel's Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament*, 1852; *Exodus und Levit.*, 1857; *Kritik des Pentat. und Jos.*, 1861.

§ *Kritische Untersuchung über den Pentateuch*, etc., 1843.

‖ *Kenaan Volks- und Religionsgeschichte Israels bis zum Tode des Josua*, 1844.

¶ G. H. A. Ewald, 1803–57, was an extraordinary genius, combining in his personality the traits of a great linguist, an acute theologian, a critic, and a devout man. Exception has been taken to his supercilious way of treating scholars who differed from him in results, and his self-consciousness; but the value of his services to critical scholarship cannot be overrated. He founded no school and originated no new method, but faithfully applied principles

of Solomon. To this were added materials from three earlier writings, *i. e.*, (a) the *Book of the Wars of Jahveh*, (b) the *Biography of Moses*, and (c) *the Book of the Covenants*, which was composed about the beginning of Samson's judgeship. Subsequently this *Book of Origins* was enlarged by the *Third Narrator*, who lived during the tenth or ninth century in the kingdom of Israel; again by a *Fourth Narrator*, who flourished in the kingdom of Judah in the first half or the middle of the eighth century, under Uzziah or Jotham, and a *Fifth Narrator*, who revised the work thus grown at the time of Uzziah or Jotham, *i. e.*, during the first half or the middle of the eighth century. Still later, during the latter part of the reign of Manasseh, king of Judah, or about the middle of the seventh century, the Book of Deuteronomy was composed, and the *Blessing of Moses* * perhaps, under Josiah. Deuteronomy was originally a larger independent history, parallel to the *Book of Origins*, but the last reviser of this latter work, extracting the present book of Deuteronomy out of it, fused it with the Pentateuch about the end of the seventh century. This view of Ewald's was called by Delitzsch † *the Crystallization hypothesis.* It

Crystallization-theory.

already known with such skill and insight as to stimulate others to work in this field. His views are best presented in his *Die Poetische Bücher des Alten Bundes*, 1835–39; 3d ed. 1868; Eng. trans. 1880; *Die Propheten des Alten Bundes*, 1840–41; 2d ed. 1867; Eng. trans. 1876–81, and *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, 1843–59; 3d ed. 1868; Eng. trans., or equivalent work, *History of Israel*, 1867–74,

* Deuteronomy xxxiii.

† *Com. Gen.*, 1st. ed., p. 29.

did not find any considerable number of adherents in Germany. In England Perowne and Stanley gave their adherence to Ewald's critical work in general. Stanley especially adopted his views in his *History of the Jewish Church.*

Hupfeld * approached the subject independently of his predecessors. Consequently, he reached conclusions that appear to be more thoroughgoing in their modifications of the supplement-theory; more in the nature of a return to the document-theory. Without knowing of the work of Ilgen he arrived at the same result as that critic, so far as the number and general character of the sources of the Pentateuch are concerned. He found three primary documents or sources, a First Elohist, a Second Elohist, and a Jehovist; these three documents were fused together faithfully and skilfully by a redactor. This theory has served as the basis of subsequent critical analysis. Böhmer presented Hupfeld's results to the eye through the use of different type in an edition of Genesis.† The analysis thus presented was accepted by Kurtz,‡ Franz Delitzsch,§ Schrader,‖ and in the 8th ed. of DeWette's *Introduction to the Old Testament*, 1869, it was elaborated by

Hupfeld.

* *Die Quellen der Genesis und die Art ihrer Zusammenfassung*, 1853.

† E. Böhmer, *Liber Geneseos pentateuchicus*, 1860, and a translation, *Das erste Buch der Thora*, 1862.

‡ *Geschichte des Alten Bundes*, 1855.

§ *Die Genesis*, 3d ed. 1860.

‖ *Studien zur Kritik und Erklärung der biblischen Urgeschichte*, 1863.

the attachment of different names to the sources. Nöldeke * labored to show that the work of the Second Elohist was already embodied in that of the Jehovist before it was used by the redactor.

(C) *Use and development of the theological argument.*—This argument was first used during the middle years of the fourth decade of the present century. It appears simultaneously in the writings of two scholars, Wilhelm Vatke and Leopold George. Vatke † contended that the legislation of the Pentateuch was too elaborate, as compared with the religious ideas of the later age, to be as much older as it is believed to be. This legislation is a growth whose beginnings, perhaps, may go back to the Mosaic period and activity, but whose present form is much later than the prophetic activity of the eighth century. Vatke was an enthusiastic pupil of Hegel's, and his view is based on the fundamental principles of the Hegelian philosophy and the further postulate that the religion of Israel was subject precisely to the same law of development as all other religions. George ‡ placed the whole of the Levitical legislation after the exile, agreeing with the assignment of Deuteronomy to the time of Josiah. Reuss, § the eminent scholar of Strasburg, also

Theological argument.

Vatke.

George.

Reuss.

* *Alttestamentliche Literatur*, 1868; *Untersuchungen zur Kritik des Alten Testamentes*, 1869.

† *Die Biblische Theologie wissenschaftlich dargestellt*, 1835.

‡ *Die Älteren Jüdische Feste*, 1835.

§ *Geschichte der heiligen Schriften des Alten Testamentes*, 1888–91.

claims to have reached this conclusion independently, as early as 1834. But his views were not published until long after the method of theological criticism had been used by others and the views associated with it had found currency.* A pupil of Reuss', however, was destined to give this new phase of criticism its popular form. Graf † insisted on the priority of Deuteronomy to the ritual law, or, as it came to be called, the priest code. He further taught that the ritual law was the work of Ezekiel, and that additions were made to it after the time of Ezra. Graf was also the first to combine the results of the literary historical analysis of Hupfeld with the reconstruction of the history of Israelitish religion undertaken by himself. His first view ignored Hupfeld's analysis. Its essence was the proposition that the whole Levitical legislation was post-exilic. When his attention was called to the fact that this legislation was contained in a document marked by literary characteristics of its own and known as Elohistic, he accepted the suggestion and referred the whole document to the period after the exile. The reverse of this process was illustrated in the course of the next important critic, Abraham Kuenen,‡ who appeared at first as the adherent of the literary and historical criticism as resulting in the analysis of Hupfeld; but adopted

Graf.

Kuenen.

* See also *L'histoire Sainte et la Loi*, 1879, pp. 23, 24.

† K. H. Graf, *Die Geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testamentes*, 1866.

‡ *Historisch kritisch Onderzoek naar het Onstaan en de Verzameling van de boeken des Oudes Verbonds*, Leyden, 1861–65, 3 vols.

the development theory from Graf * and gave it more definite shape. He taught that the religion of Israel is a purely natural religion; beginning, like all other great religions, with polytheism, and developing gradually into the monotheistic and spiritual system of the prophets of Israel.† The theory and method of Graf found another champion of ability in Julius Wellhausen. ‡ Wellhausen's work consists in the elaboration of the Grafian theory. This theory, as now accepted by a large number of critics, may be succinctly put as follows: The credible recorded history of Israel dates from the days of Samuel. With this prophet begins the crystallization also of the religion of Israel into its present form. The process thus begun continues through centuries. The Hexateuch is a composite work, whose origin and history may be traced in four distinct stages: (1) A writer designated as J Jahvist, or Jehovist, or Judean prophetic historian, composed a history of the people of Israel about 800 B. C. (2) A writer designated as E Elohist, or

Wellhausen.

Grafian school: results.

* *De Godesdienst van Israel tot den ondergong van den Joodschen Staat*, Haarlem, 1869–70; Eng. trans. *Religion of Israel*, 1874–75. Also, *De Profeten en die profetie onder Israel*, Leyden, 1875; Eng. trans. 1877; and Hibbert Lectures, *National Religions and Universal Religion*, 1882.

† For a critical estimate of Kuenen see W. J. Beecher, "The Logical Methods of Professor Kuenen," *Presbyterian Review*, vol. iii. p. 701 *seq.*

‡ *Die Composition des Hexateuchs*, 1889, published previously as a part of *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*, 1835, and *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*, 1883 and 1886, published in 1878 as *Geschichte Israels*, vol. i.

Ephraimite prophetic historian, wrote a similar work some fifty years later, or about 750 B. C. These two were used separately for a time, but fused together into JE by a redactor, at the end of the seventh century. (3) A writer of a different character wrote a book constituting the main portion of our present Deuteronomy during the reign of Josiah, or a short time before 621 B. C. This writer is designated D. To his work were added an introduction and an appendix, and with these accretions it was united with JE by a second redactor, constituting JED. (4) Contemporaneously with Ezekiel the ritual law began to be reduced to writing. It first appeared in three parallel forms. These were codified by Ezra not very much earlier or later than 444 B. C., and between that date and 280 B.C. it was joined with JED by a final redactor.

This general view, always allowing modifications in minor details, was accepted by a large number of European and American scholars, and may be said to be the dominant view at the present time. Among its adherents are Kayser,* Smend,† Karl Budde,‡ Bernhard Stade,§ Franz Delitzsch,‖ C. H. Cornill,¶ Kautzsch and

Grafian school: in Germany.

* *Das vorexilische Buch der Urgeschichte und seine Erweiterungen*, Strasburg, 1874.

† *Der Prophet Ezekiel*, 1880; *Lehrbuch der Alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte*, Freiburg, i. B. 1893.

‡ *Die biblische Urgeschichte*, Giessen, 1883; *Die Bücher Richter und Samuel*, Giessen, 1890.

§ *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, Berlin, 1887, 1888, 2 vols.; 1st vol. in 2d ed. 1889.

‖ *Neuer Kommentar über Genesis*, 1887.

¶ *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Freiburg, i. B. 1891; 2d ed. 1892.

Socin,* König,† Hermann Schultz,‡ Duhm,§ Siegfried,‖ Holzinger,¶ and Bruno Baentsch.** In Great Britain a vigorous attack on the traditional view of the Pentateuch was made by Colenso,†† from the point of view of the historical difficulties involved in that view. Colenso.

The earliest exponent of the Grafian hypothesis was Kalisch.‡‡ But the first to make a systematic presentation of it was W. Robertson Smith.§§ These have been followed by a large number of more recent scholars, among them S. R. Driver,‖‖ T. K. Cheyne,¶¶ H. E. Ryle,*** and C. G. Montefiore.††† In America these views have English Grafian critics.

* *Die Genesis mit aüsseren Untersuchungen der Quellenschriften übersetzt*, Freiburg, i. B. 1891.

† *Der Offenbarungsbegriff das Alten Testamentes*, 1882 ; *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1893.

‡ *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, 1st ed. 1869 ; 4th ed. 1889 ; Eng. trans. 1892.

§ *Theologie der Propheten*, Bonn, 1875.

‖ *Hebräisches Wörterbuch*, in conjunction with Stade, 1892.

¶ *Einleitung in den Hexateuch*, Freiburg, i. B. 1893.

** *Das Bundesbuch*, Halle, 1892 ; *Das Heiligkeitsgesetz*, Erfurt, 1893.

†† *The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua, critically examined*, 7 parts, 1862–79.

‡‡ *Commentary on Leviticus*, 1867–72.

§§ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, Edinburgh, 1881, 2d ed. 1892 ; *The Prophets of Israel*, Edinburgh, 1882.

‖‖ *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, Edinburgh, 1891 ; 4th ed. 1892.

¶¶ *The Origin and Religious Content of the Psalter*, Bampton Lectures for 1889 ; London, 1891. *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, 1892.

*** *The Canon of the Old Testament*, 1893.

††† *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews*, 1892.

been adopted by C. H. Toy,* C. A. Briggs,† H. P. Smith,‡ and B. W. Bacon.§ In France by Westphal,‖ Bruston,¶ Darmstetter,** and Piepenbring.†† In Holland by Wildboer ‡‡ and Knappert.§§

American critics.

French critics.

These conclusions are, however, controverted by a school of critics, who, accepting the analysis of Hupfeld, do not follow Graf and Kuenen as to the priority of the historical documents to the priestly legislation, but hold, on the contrary, that the legislation is earlier than the documents J and E, and that Deuteronomy is the latest of the parts of the Hexateuch. So Dillmann,‖‖ Riehm,¶¶ Kittel, *** Baudissin,††† Ryssel,‡‡‡ and H. L. Strack.§§§

School of Dillmann.

* *Judaism and Christianity*, 1890; *History of the Religion of Israel*, 1882; 3d ed. 1884.

† *Biblical Study*, 1883; 4th ed. 1891; *The Bible, the Church, and the Reason*, 1892; *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, 1893.

‡ *Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration*, 1891.

§ *Genesis of Genesis*, 1892; *The Triple Tradition of the Exodus*, 1894.

‖ *Les Sources du Pentateuque*, 1888–92.

¶ *Les Quatres Sources des Lois de l'Exode*, 1883.

** *Die Philosophie der Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes*, 1884.

†† *Théologie de l'Ancien Testament*, 1886; Eng. trans. 1893.

‡‡ *Het Onstaan van den Kanon des Ouden Verbonds*, 1889.

§§ *The Religion of Israel*, 1878.

‖‖ *Kurzgefasstes Exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament*, vols. i.–iii., including *Genesis*, 6th ed. 1892; *Exod. und Lev.*, 2d ed. 1880; *Num., Deut., und Jos.*, 2d ed. 1886.

¶¶ *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, 1889; *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1889–90.

*** *Geschichte der Hebräer*, 1888–92.

††† *Die Geschichte des Alttestamentlichen Priestertums*, 1889.

‡‡‡ *De Elohistæ Pentateuchi Sermone*, 1878.

§§§ *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, new ed. 1895.

He who keeps in mind the distinction already fully drawn between principles, methods, and results of the Higher Criticism will be able to see that there has been from the beginning no serious opposition to the development and application of the principles. The validity of the results announced, however, has been disputed all along the way. Bishop Marsh* defended the authenticity of the five books of Moses against Eichhorn and Astruc. In this course he was commended and followed by T. H. Horne.† Both of these writers used reasoning based on the principles of the Higher Criticism. Marsh alleged that the ceremonial system contained in the Pentateuch had been used by the Israelites "from the time of their departure out of Egypt till their dispersion at the taking of Jerusalem"; and the ceremonial law being thus traceable to Moses' time, the writings in which it was to be found must be Moses' works. Horne reasoned that Moses used no preexisting documents in composing Genesis, "because he is totally silent as to any documents consulted by him." He also cited, as a proof that the Pentateuch was in existence during the time of David, "the number of allusions made in his Psalms to its contents." The principles on which this reasoning as well as that of Bishop Marsh was based are sound, though the basis of fact alleged is not. In Germany it was not until the

Older English conservatives.

Horne.

* Quoted by Briggs in "Critical Study of the History of the Higher Criticism," *Presbyterian Review*, vol. iv. p. 91.

† *Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures*, 1818; 14th ed. 1877.

views of DeWette were put forth that opposition to criticism manifested itself; and here, too, it was not the principles themselves for their application to the Scriptures, but the blow dealt through the critical method at the authority of Scripture that created opposition. And this opposition made use of the same considerations as the criticism itself to which it arose as a protest. The earliest of the defenders of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch were J. G. Hasse,* B. Kelle,† C. H. Fritsche,‡ J. G. Scheibel,§ Jahn,‖ Rosenmüller,¶ Herz,** Hug,†† Sack,‡‡ Pustkuchen,§§ Kanne,‖‖ C. W. Meyer,¶¶

Earlier German conservatives.

* *Entdeckungen im Felde der Ältesten Erd- und Menschengeschichte*, 1805.

† *Vorurteilsfreie Würdigung der Mosäischen Schriften*, 1812.

‡ *Prüfung der Gründe mit welchen neuerlich die Echtheit der Bücher Mosis bestritten worden ist*, 1814.

§ *Untersuch über Bibel- und Kirchen-geschichte*, 1816.

‖ In Bengel's *Archiv*, vol. ii., *Beiträge zur Vertheidigung der Echtheit des Pentateuches*, 1818, and vol. iii., *Ueber das fragmentarische desselben und die vorgeblichen Anachronismen*, 1819.

¶ *Scholia in Vetus Testamentum, Pars I.*, 1821.

** *Sind in den Büchern der Könige Spuren des Pentateuches und der Mosäischen Geschichte zu finden?* 1822.

†† *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Samaritanischen Pentateuchs, Freiburg. Zeitschrift*, 7tes Heft, and *Untersuchungen über das Alter der Schreibkunst bei den Hebräern*, Ibid., 4tes Heft.

‡‡ *De usu nominum Dei* אלהי et יהוה *in libro Geneseos*, 1821; *Christliche Apologetik*, 1st ed. 1829.

§§ *Historisch-Kritische Untersuchungen der Biblischen Urgeschichte*, 1823.

‖‖ *Biblische Untersuchungen*, Part I. against Vater, 1819; Part II. against DeWette, 1820.

¶¶ *Apologie der geschichtlichen Auffassung der historischen Bücher des Alten Testamentes*, 1811.

and Stäudlin.* All these works are based on the recognition as valid of the methods through which the views they attempt to refute were secured; they differ in using these methods on other postulates and principles.

Among these earlier defenses of the older views may be mentioned also Ewald's first critical efforts,† Bertholdt's,‡ and Herbst's.§ These, however, are far less strenuous in their insistence on the precise form of the traditional views. Ewald's first contention was that the parallelisms, discrepancies, and confusions of the historical portions of the Pentateuch were the natural result of the historiographical methods of primitive Oriental writers. He believed in the unity of the work. Bertholdt believed in distinguishing, as the critics of the opposite school had not done, between the Mosaic origin and the subsequent revision of the Pentateuch. While he insisted on the former he believed also in the latter. Herbst was in accord with this conclusion of Bertholdt's, but would have placed the revision, not as Bertholdt did, during the reign of David or Solomon, but later.

With the appearance of the theories of Vatke and George another group of defenders of the traditional views arose. The most prominent representatives of this group are

Later German conservatives.

* *Die Echtheit der Mosäischen Gesetze vertheidigt* in Bertholdt's *Krit. Jou.*, vols. iii. and iv., 1825.

† *Die Composition der Genesis kritisch untersucht*, 1823.

‡ *Biblische Einleitung*, 1813.

§ *Observationes de Pentateuchi 4 librorum posteriorum auctore et editore*, 1817.

Ranke,* Bruno Bauer,† L. König,‡ F. C. Movers,§ Drechsler,‖ B. Welte,¶ A. C. Hävernick,** and, most uncompromising of them all, E. W. Hengstenberg.†† Hengstenberg started with the postulate that "the recognition of the genuineness of the Pentateuch is impossible from the rationalistic point of view, even though the strongest considerations should support it." "For the believer the genuineness is settled before historico-critical investigation of detail. The Pentateuch is attested by the Lord and his disciples, and their testimony is sealed by the Holy Spirit to him who with faith immerses himself in the content of these books."‡‡ Hävernick's and Hengstenberg's standpoint was adopted by Keil.§§ The literary facts, such as the alternation of the divine names in the first chapters of Genesis, are explained by the critics of this school

Hengstenberg.

Keil.

* *Untersuchungen über den Pentateuch aus dem Gebiete der höheren Kritik*, 2 vols., 1834–40.

† *Der Mosäische Ursprung der Gesetzgebung des Pentateuches vertheidigt, Zeitschrift f. Specul. Theologie*, 1, 1836.

‡ *Alttest. Studien*, 2tes Heft, 1839.

§ *Über die Auffindung des Gesetzesbuches Josia, Zeitschrift für phil. und kath. Theologie*, 12tes Heft, 1834–35.

‖ *Die Einheit und Echtheit der Genesis*, 1838; *Die Unwissenschaftlichkeit im Gebiete der Alttestamentlichen Kritik*, 1837.

¶ *Nachmosäisches im Pentateuch beleuchtet*, 1841.

** *Handbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1836.

†† *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1836–38; *Die Authentie des Pentateuches*, 2 vols., 1836–39.

‡‡ *Genuineness of the Pent.*, Prolegomena, pp. lxxvi, lxxvii.

§§ *Lehrbuch der hist.-krit., Einleitung in die kanon. Schriften des Alten Testamentes*, 1853, 3d ed. 1873.

in harmony with the view of the Mosaic authorship of the whole Pentateuch. The language is specially chosen by Moses on account of fitness to express some special phase of thought. This standpoint, after a time of eclipse, has been revived recently in Germany and Holland by Ad. Zahn,* O. Naumann,† and Hoedemaker.‡

But while comparatively neglected in Germany, the works of Hengstenberg, Hävernick, and Keil have exerted a considerable influence in the English-speaking world. They have furnished an explanation of the literary and historical facts brought to light by the critics of the opposite school consistent to that sense of the authority of the Scriptures, which has always been recognized by the Anglo-Saxon mind. Thus the older writers on the Pentateuchal question were almost universally adherents of this standpoint. Bishop Colenso's publications on the Pentateuch occasioned a storm of opposition both in Great Britain and in the United States.

Influence of Hengstenberg.

Not till after the accession of such scholars as W. Robertson Smith, Driver, Cheyne, Briggs, and Toy to the opposing ranks, did this standpoint lose any of its hold. And even after the able presentations of these scholars, defenses of great ability and critical acumen have been made of

English conservatives.

* *Das Deuteronomium*, 1890.

† *Das Erste Buch der Bibel nach seiner inneren Einheit und Echtheit dargestellt*, 1890; *Wellhausen's Methode Kritisch beleuchtet*, 1886.

‡ *De Mozaische Oorsprong van de Wetten in de boeken Levit., Exod., en Numeri*, Leyden, 1895.

the old views by such scholars as Alfred Cave,* Stanley Leathes,† James Robertson,‡ J. J. Lias,§ A. Blomfield,‖ F. B. Spencer,¶ R. A. Watson,** and the authors of *Lex Mosaica*,†† besides many others in Great Britain, and W. H. Green,‡‡ E. C. Bissell,§§ Howard Osgood,‖‖ Stebbins,¶¶ C. M. Mead,*** W. J. Beecher,††† G. Vos,‡‡‡ and T. W. Chambers.§§§ In grouping all these scholars together it is not implied that there are no differences among them on minor details, as there are among the critics of the opposed school, but simply that these adhere to the integrity and substantial Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch.

Americans.

* *The Battle of the Standpoints*, 1890; *The Inspiration of the Old Testament Inductively Considered*, 1886.

† *The Law in the Prophets*, 1891.

‡ *Early Religion of Israel*, 1889; 2d ed. 1892.

§ *Principles of Biblical Criticism*, 1893.

‖ *The Old Testament and the New Criticism*, 1893.

¶ *Did Moses Write the Pentateuch after all?* 1892.

** *The Law and the Prophets*, 1884.

†† *Lex Mosaica, or The Law of Moses and the Higher Criticism.* Edited by Richard Valpy French, D. C. L., LL. D., F. S. A.

‡‡ *The Pentateuch Vindicated from the Aspersions of Bishop Colenso*, 1863; *Moses and the Prophets*, 1883; *The Hebrew Feasts*, 1885.

§§ *The Pentateuch, its Origin and Structure*, 1885; *Genesis Printed in Colors*, 1891.

‖‖ *Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers*, in the American ed. of Lange's *Commentary*, 1876.

¶¶ *A Study of the Pentateuch*, 1881.

*** *Christ and Criticism*, 1892.

††† "The Logical Methods of Professor Kuenen," in the *Presbyterian Review*, vol. iii. p. 701.

‡‡‡ *The Mosaic Origin of the Pentateuchal Codes*, 1886.

§§§ *Moses and his Recent Critics*, 1889.

An entirely independent view of the origin and composition of the Pentateuch has been recently put forth by Dr. Aug. Klostermann.* The fundamental principles of this view are: (1) As to method, that the problem should be approached from the point of view of the body of the Pentateuch, and not from the point of view of a narrow range of literary phenomena in Genesis, such as are found in the first few chapters of that book. (2) That the variations in parallel accounts are such as arose in the cause of multiplication and circulation of copies of an original. Instead of finding documents J, E, P, and D, therefore, Klostermann finds various recensions of the same primitive writings. (3) In the effort to find the original form of these recensions, he finds an original nucleus of legislation and an envelope of history. The present Pentateuch is simply the weaving together by Ezra of the various recensions of this original Pentateuch.

Klostermann: unique view.

2. THE QUESTION OF ISAIAH.

Although the Pentateuchal question has furnished the chief occasion and subject for discussion, and served as the main and primary channel for the stream of the history of the Higher Criticism, and hence abundantly illustrates the development of the science as a science, nevertheless the application of its principles has been broader. As soon as developed in its various stages, this science has been

Pentateuch center of interest.

* *Der Pentateuch, Beiträge zu seinem Verständnis und seine Entstehungs Geschichte,* 1893.

carried to other parts of the Old Testament. In fact, every book of this part of the Bible has been made the subject of minute investigation through the new process, and a multitude of theories have been propounded, not merely on the aggregate of the books of the Old Testament, but also on each of them separately. To attempt to give an account of these would lead us into the field of special introduction. It will be sufficient for our purposes to pass in review, very concisely, the course of criticism as applied to the most important of the questions raised.

2. Question of Isaiah.

Next in importance to the Pentateuch question, in its bearings on theological opinion and theory of religion, is the question of the book of Isaiah. This question was first suggested by Koppe in his German translation of Lowth's *Isaiah.** It is a question of integrity. Did the prophet write the whole of the book bearing his name at present? Koppe's conclusions were negative. Kocher answered him in the *Vindiciæ*, 1786. Doederlein, however,† renewed the attack on the integrity, and was followed by Eichhorn.‡ The theory of more than one author was elaborated constructively by Justi.§ It was then accepted by Bertholdt, 1812; DeWette, 1817; Gesenius, 1820; Hitzig, 1833; Umbreit and Ewald, 1841. With Ewald the analytic theory was lifted up to a high scholarly plane. It has gained adherents constantly since. To trace its course would be to

* Pub. 1778. † *Esaias ex textu Hebr.*, 1889.
‡ *Hebräische Propheten*, 1816–19.
§ Paulus' *Memorab.*, iv. p. 139, *seq.*

enumerate the whole literature of the book of Isaiah. It may suffice to say that the question soon assumed a definite form, and has been argued by those who divide the book into three parts in general, *i. e.*: (1) The first thirty-five chapters as a part by itself, a work of the prophet Isaiah in the main; (2) chapters xxxvi.–xxxix., as a historical appendix to the first part; and (3) chapters xl.–lxvi., the writing of another prophet who flourished at the end of the period of the Exile, commonly called Deutero-Isaiah. Later critics have carried the process of analysis into these sections. In the first section—i.–xxxv.—chapters xxiv.–xxvii. have been separated and assigned to the first part of the post-exilic period.* The third section of Isaiah is further subdivided and assigned by Duhm—with whom Smend and others agree more or less thoroughly—to at least three authors, viz.: (1) The Deutero-Isaiah, who composed chapters xl.–lv. with the exception of the "Servant of Jehovah" passages; (2) The author of the "Servant of Jehovah" passages; and (3) the author of chapters lvi.–lxvi. This development of the question has, however, not fully crystallized, and may be passed over with a mere mention. The reasoning for this analysis is precisely the same as the threefold argument for the analysis of the Hexateuch. It includes considerations drawn from the language, history,

Recent phases.

*So Knobel, Hitzig, Ewald, Delitzsch, Dillmann, Cheyne, and Driver. G. Adam Smith doubts the Isaianic origin of this passage, but fails to assign it any definite date or authorship. Kuenen and Smend find it to be the work of some author belonging to the fourth century B. C.

and theological content of the book.* The last of these classes of considerations, that of theological content, involves, however, a new line of discussion, that concerning predictive prophecy. The application of the Higher Criticism is therefore of extreme importance, in that it leads to the differentiation of views in the critical schools as to the nature of prophecy in general, the possibility of predictive prophecy—and the nature of it, if its possibility be conceded. Upon these grounds already named as those for the analysis, the defense of the unity of the book has also been argued, giving the facts, of course, a different interpretation.†

3. THE QUESTION OF DANIEL.

Jeremiah and Ezekiel.

The book of Jeremiah has furnished critics with difficulties growing out of the difference of text between the Hebrew and the Septuagint version. With the exception of the last three chapters of the book, however, the authorship of Jeremiah has not been denied to any part of it. The book of Ezekiel has enjoyed the distinction of being almost unimpugned, either as to genuineness or integrity. On the other hand the book of Daniel has been, even from the earliest days, a subject of suspicion and attack. The first to deny its genuineness and credibility, as already

3. Daniel.

*Cf. Driver, *Introduction*, pp. 223–231.

†See Forbes, *The Servant of the Lord*, 1890, and literature of the subject in Delitzsch on *Isaiah*, *Biblischer Commentar über den Propheten Jesaja*, 3d ed. 1879, p. xxxiii *seq.*; Driver, *Introduction*, p. 194.

observed, was the pagan opponent of Christianity, Porphyry.* During the Middle Ages vague suspicions were suggested, but it was not till the seventeenth century that these suspicions found clear expression. Hobbes† questioned whether Daniel himself had written down his prophecies or some later writer. Spinoza‡ held that the first seven chapters were not the work of Daniel; the last five he admitted as genuine. Sir Isaac Newton,§ without questioning the credibility of the book, thought that the first six chapters were a collection of historical essays attached to the genuine prophecies of Daniel, which he believed were found in the last six. Collins, the Deist, denied the credibility of the book. Michaelis and Eichhorn perpetuated and intensified the doubts regarding the integrity of it which they had inherited from their predecessors. The first modern critic to assign it to an impostor of the time of Antiochus Epiphanes was Corrodi.‖ Bertholdt elaborated the argument against the integrity and credibility.¶ Bleek defended the integrity, but only in order to deny the genuineness of the whole work and its historical trustworthiness. He has been followed by a large number of later critics.** The grounds

* P. 182.

† *Leviathan*, ch. xxxiii.

‡ *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, x. 130.

§ *Observations on the Prophecies of Holy Writ*, pub. 1754, but written 1690.

‖ *Geschichte des Chiliasmus*, 1781–83; *Beleuchtung der Geschichte des Kanons*, 1792.

¶ *Daniel*, 1806–08.

** See list in Zöckler's *Commentary* in Lange, American ed. by Strong, 1875.

on which these views are held are more specific than those which form the basis of criticism either in the Pentateuch or in Isaiah. The historical and theological arguments are used in their more general forms, the place of the book in the canon serves as a special reason for placing its composition late, and the use of Greek words is given as a ground for the same conclusion. In defense of the integrity of the book appeared Lüderwald* and Stäudlin.† In defense of its genuineness in general Hengstenberg,‡ Hävernick,§ Auberlen,‖ W. S. Volck,¶ Zundel,** Kranichfeld,†† Zöckler,‡‡ and in England S. P. Tregelles,§§ Pusey,‖‖ J. M. Fuller,¶¶ R. Payne Smith,*** Caspari,††† and F. Lenormant.‡‡‡

* *Die Sechs ersten Kapitel Daniels*, 1787.

† *Prüfung einiger Meinungen über den Ursprung des Buches Daniel*, 1791.

‡ *Die Authentie des Daniel*, 1831.

§ *Commentar über das Buch Daniel*, 1832.

‖ *Der Prophet Daniel*, 1854; 2d ed. 1857.

¶ *Vindiciæ Danielis*, 1866.

** *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Abfassungszeit des Buches Daniel*, 1861.

†† *Der Prophet Daniel*, 1868.

‡‡ In Lange's *Bibelwerk*, 1869.

§§ *Defense of Authenticity*, 1852.

‖‖ *Daniel the Prophet*, 1864; 3d ed. 1869.

¶¶ *Essay on the Authenticity of Daniel*, 1864.

*** *Exposition of the Historical Portions of the Writings of Daniel*, 1886.

††† *Zur Einfürung in d. Buch Daniel*, 1869.

‡‡‡ *Les Sciences Occultes en Asie*, 1874; in addition to the above, some of the more recent works on this question are: Fabre d'Envieu, *Le Livre du Prophète Daniel*, 1888; Hebbelyuck, *De Auctoritate Libri Danielis*, 1887; Meinhold, *Die Geschichtlichen*

4. QUESTIONS IN THE MINOR PROPHETS.

Passing over as of subordinate importance the discussions relative to the first four of the Minor Prophets as given in the canon—Hosea, Amos, Joel, and Obadiah—we come to the Book of Jonah. Here we have illustrated the application of the Higher Criticism in the investigation of another of its questions, that of literary form. The problem in Jonah is, whether the contents of the book are myth, legend, history, or allegory. The question of authorship, or at least date of composition, is naturally involved in this; and, in a more intimate way, even the historical and moral value of the book. But the first thing to settle is the form. As to the form, as early as the first quarter of the eighteenth century the view was propounded that the work contains a historical allegory.* This cut the book loose from any necessary authorship of the prophet Jonah named in 2 Kings xiv: 25. The active discussion of the question, however, dates from the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Since then the views that have been put forth are (1) that it is a pure myth, (2) mixture of legend and history, (3) a didactic poem, (4) a symbolical prophecy, and (5) a pure legend. The literal and substantial historicity of the book has also found able defenders.†

4. Minor Prophets: Jonah.

Hagiographen, in Strack and Zöckler's *Kurzgefasster Kommentar*, 1889; also *Erklärung des Buches Daniel*; Kamphausen, *Das Buch Daniel in die neuere Geschichtforschung*, 1893; and Farrar, *The Book of Daniel*, in the "Expositor's" Bible series, 1895.

* Herman von der Hardt, *Ænigmata Prisci Orbis*, 1723.

† Cf. the literature of the subject in Lange's *Commentary on the*

Zechariah.

Of the remaining seven Minor Prophets Zechariah is the only one concerning the extent of whose literary work there has been any discussion of importance. The emphatic phase of the question has been in this case the integrity of the book. The second part, consisting of chapters ix.–xiv., was denied to Zechariah by several English scholars, toward the close of the seventeenth century,* on the ground that a passage from it, xi: 12, 13, was ascribed to Jeremiah in Matthew xxvii: 9. Beginning with this harmonistic ground of doubt as to its unity, critics soon found other internal marks for ascribing this portion of the book to the period preceding the exile. The criticism thus started, in the interests of harmonizing the book with the apparent representations of the New Testament, was thus put on a different foundation. Moreover this second part of the book † was further analyzed by Newcome, who alleged that chapters ix.–xi. are the work of a very early prophet—one of the earliest known—and chapters xii.–xiv. by a later one.‡ Of those who believe the whole of the second part of the book to be the work of one hand, some assign it a pre-exilic date and some a post-exilic. On the other hand many scholars have defended the unity of the book and especially the post-exilic origin of the

Minor Prophets, American ed. by Elliott, ; M. M. Kalisch, *Bible Stories*, Part II., 1878. C. H. H. Wright, *Introduction*, p. 212, also summarizes the principal works of value.

* Mede, *Works*, 1677 ; followed by Kidder, Whiston, and others.

† Chaps. ix.–xiv.

‡ So also Bertholdt and Hitzig in the 2d ed. of his *Zwölf Kleinen Propheten*.

second part. Among these are Köster,* DeWette,† Umbreit, Hävernick, Hengstenberg, Ebrard, Kliefoth, Keil, Delitzsch, Lange, Pusey, and Chambers.‡

The reasons *pro* and *con* in the debate are succinctly, but fairly, given in Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* (*sub voce* Zechariah) and in the *Cambridge Bible for Students* by Ven. T. T. Perowne.

5. QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORICAL BOOKS.

Almost all of the problems in the historical books of the Bible are of very recent appearance and involved in the Pentateuchal controversy. Joshua has been made a part of the subject of controversy under the larger name of the Hexateuch. The Book of Judges is generally assigned to the earlier part of the period of the monarchy, but there seems to be a tendency to see in it the revising hand of a Deuteronomic redactor.§ Very little of peculiar interest attaches to the criticism of the books of Samuel and Kings. The books of Chronicles, however, have, since Wellhausen's attack on their historical value,‖ taken a place among the disputed subjects in the Old Testament.¶ The importance of the question here also grows out of its connection

5. Historical books: Judges.

Kings. Chronicles.

* *Meletemata Critica*, 1818.

† In the 4th and subsequent editions of his *Einleitung*.

‡ In the American ed. of Lange's *Commentary*. For full bibliography see C. H. H. Wright, *Zechariah and his Prophecies*, 1879, pp. xxv and xli–xlviii.

§ Cf. Driver, *Introduction*, pp. 154–158.

‖ *History of Israel*, pp. 172.

¶ Cf. Driver, *Introduction*, pp. 484–507.

with the question of the Pentateuch. Ezra and Nehemiah do not furnish much ground for discussion. The booklets of Ruth and Esther present the question of literary form as the most important one for criticism to answer. Are they veritable histories, accounts of facts which actually took place, or works of fiction? Involved with this question is, of course, the more practical question of the credibility and value of these productions. But, upon the whole, the discussion of these questions has been given a comparatively subordinate place in criticism.

Ruth and Esther.

6. QUESTIONS IN THE POETICAL BOOKS.

The principal question in Job is whether the whole book belongs to one author. Doubts have been entertained regarding the authenticity of (1) the prologue and epilogue, (2) the passage, xxvii: 7–xxviii: 28, and (3) the episode of Elihu, xxxii.–xxxvii. The second of these passages is no longer questioned after the investigations of Giesebrecht.* The first group named, including the prologue and epilogue, has also been abandoned as a ground of debate. The Elihu episode offers a more fertile soil for critical results. Accordingly, many conservative scholars are inclined to concede the possibility of its having been added to the book by a later hand.† The authorship, date, place of

Poetical books: Job.

* *Der Wendepunkt des Buches Hiob.*, Kap. xxvii., xxviii., 1879.

† So C. H. H. Wright, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, 1890, p. 151. Lias, *Biblical Criticism*, 1893, p. 67. See for a full, but succinct, summary of the discussion A. B. Davidson, *Cambridge Bible for Schools*, 1889.

origin and historicity of the book have also been discussed, but with no clear gain, as yet, to the sum of our knowledge of the book.

Psalms.

The Psalms have always been regarded as a collection of religious lyrics meant to be used in the temple service. They claim various authors and historical settings. The critical question furnished by the book is, therefore, a complicated one, and could be presented fully only in an extended review of the discussions regarding each Psalm. But there has arisen recently a question which may conveniently be called the problem of the Psalms. It is as to whether the collection as a whole was composed before or after the exile. Inasmuch as many of the ostensibly earliest Psalms bear testimony to the existence of the Pentateuch at the time of their origin, a theory of their origin consistent with the Grafian hypothesis of the origin and structure of the Pentateuch would necessitate their being put after the exile. This has accordingly been done by Cheyne.* The controversy here may be said to have hardly begun as yet.

Proverbs.

The book of Proverbs furnishes no cardinal question for criticism. It is evidently a collection of different utterances by a number of authors. Solomon is alleged to be one of these. There is no disposition to deny this. The question as to the other authors and their dates, and as to redaction of the collection, may be relegated into the class of secondary problems of criticism.

* *The Origin and Religious Content of the Psalter*, 1891. Bampton Lectures.

Canticle.

The Song of Songs has been made the subject of a large discussion as to the existence among the Hebrews of the drama as a species of literature. The problem of the book is, therefore, purely literary. The production is not alluded to in the New Testament, and the traditional interpretation of it, as an allegory of the relation of Christ and the Church, is no older than Origen. The book is not likely to be involved in any but critical and hermeneutical discussions.

Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth).

The book of Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth) is in the form of autobiographical sketches by Solomon. But scholars of the most divergent tendencies are agreed that this is a literary device.* The question then resolves itself as to when and by what sort of a man the book was written.†

Latest French criticism.

This sketch of the history of Old Testament criticism would not be complete without a word as to a most radical theory of the origin of the Old Testament, recently propounded by the French scholars Havet‡ and Vernes.§ This theory consists in the assignment of the whole of the Old Testament collection to the

* So Rosenmüller, DeWette, Ewald, Hitzig, Knobel, Ginsburg, Hengstenberg, Delitzsch, C. H. H. Wright, and Driver.

† For a fuller account of the literature of Ecclesiastes see Ginsburg, *Koheleth, commonly called Ecclesiastes; with Hist. and Crit. Comment*, 1861; Lange, *Commentary*, American ed. Tayler Lewis, 1872; and C. H. H. Wright, *Ecclesiastes in Relation to Modern Criticism and Pessimism*, 1883.

‡ *Études d'Histoire Religieuse. La Modernité des Prophètes*, 1891.

§ *Essais Bibliques*, 1891.

period between the fourth and second centuries B. C. In order to reach this conclusion the authors are compelled to resort to some extraordinary, not to say grotesque, feats of exegesis. The Assyria of Isaiah, for instance, has to be reduced to Syria under the Seleucid dynasty. Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar have to be taken as names concealing oppressors of the Jewish nation during the Maccabean age. The Jehoiakim of Jeremiah is changed into the Menelaus of 1 Maccabees and Zedekiah into Alkimus.* It will be unnecessary to dwell longer on this view, which has not been received with much enthusiasm in any quarter.

*1 Mac. ix. 23 *seq.*

CHAPTER XI.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT,

The N. T. Text.

The interest started, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, in the purity of the New Testament text, by the printing of the same in Greek, long absorbed the attention and occupied the energies of students in this field. Even Richard Simon, the father of modern isagogics, without strictly limiting himself to the question of the text, devoted the greatest part of his work on the New Testament * to topics which have since been adopted in the Lower Criticism. Simon's tendency was toward minimizing the divine element in Scripture. Other Roman Catholic writers, like Ellies Du Pin † and Augustin Calmet ‡ investigated independently of Simon.

Opposed.

Simon found a vigorous opponent, among Protestants, in J. H. Mai.§ Other Protestant writers were satisfied to follow in the beaten paths. An exception must be made

**Histoire Critique du Texte du Nouveau Testament*, Rotterdam, 1689; later, *Nouvelles Observations sur le Texte, et les Versions du N. T.*, 1795.

†*Dissertation Préliminaire ou Prolegomènes sur la Bible*, 2 vols., 1699.

‡*Dissertations qui Peuvent Servir de Prolegomènes de l'Écriture Sainte*, 1715, and enlarged, 1720.

§*Examen Historiæ Criticæ Novi Testamenti a R. Simone vulgatæ*, 1694.

to this general statement, however, of Joh. David Michaelis.* Michaelis' interest in the bare historical aspects of questions of Introduction increased as he deepened into his studies. His belief in inspiration was not shaken, but he gave a subordinate place to this belief, and denied all real validity to the internal and subjective appeal of the Scriptures as an argument for their divine authority. This doctrine was commonly taught at the time among Protestants under the name of "The witness of the Holy Spirit"—*Testimonium Spiritus Sancti.* It was after the rise of Deism, and in consequence of the denial of miracles, that the origin and credibility of the writings of the New Testament were investigated critically. The Higher Criticism in the New Testament has accordingly followed the course of the history of the philosophy of religion, and gone through four phases—the deistic, the mystic-rationalistic, the Hegelian, and the scientific evolutionistic.

Simon a pioneer.

I. The deistic phase of New Testament criticism. Under the influence of the *Aufklärung* in Germany, Joh. Salomo Semler† laid aside all doctrines of inspiration except such as allowed the critic to find errors and weaknesses in the Scriptures. He held that the Bible was not, but contained, the Word of God, and that all questions of the authorship and credi-

Semler.

* *Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes*, 1750; 4th ed. 1788.

† *Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Kanons*, 1771–75. Semler was a voluminous writer, leaving behind him no less than 171 writings; Kurtz, *Church Hist.*, iii. p. 147.

bility of its literary and historical contents must be investigated without reference to the divine Word in it. These principles were worked out on the one side into a rationalistic system of hermeneutics, and on the other into a rationalistic system of isagogics. Semler was closely followed by Alexander Haenlein* and by J. Ern. Ch. Schmidt.† Both of these writers, though conservative in the main, betray the influence of Semler upon them; and although they do not doubt for themselves the genuineness of all the New Testament writings, they are entirely at a loss as to how to deal with the relations of the doctrine of inspiration to critical investigation.

Semler's influence.

J. G. Eichhorn‡ breaks away decidedly from traditional views in the New Testament as he did from the same in the Old. He was the first to grasp in this field the real problem involved in the relations of the Sypnotic Gospels to one another and to attempt the solution of the same by proposing the theory of an original Gospel (*Urevangelium*). He thus ushered into the domain of New Testament criticism one of the chief problems with which all subsequent critics have had to deal. Other parts of the New Testament collection which he treated critically, with the result of questioning or rejecting them, were the Pastoral Epistles, the Epistle of Peter, and that of

Eichhorn.

**Handbuch der Einleitung in die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, Erlangen, 1794–1800.

†*Historisch-kritische Einleitung ins Neue Testament*, Giessen, 1804.

‡*Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, 5 vols., 1804–27.

Jude. Eichhorn was closely followed by Bertholdt * and Schott. †

Meanwhile, besides the synoptic problem put vividly by Eichhorn, there emerged the question of the Fourth Gospel quite distinctly toward the latter part of the eighteenth century. The genuineness of this Gospel had been denied by Edward Evanson, ‡ Horst, § Vogel, ‖ Cludius, ¶ Ballenstedt, ** and finally by Bretschneider. †† These two questions—the Sypnotic and that of the Fourth Gospel—now took place alongside of the antilegomena of the ancient period as the proper field for critical research.

Synoptic problem.

In defense of the traditional views now appeared Kleuker, ‡‡ and more generally the Roman Catholic scholar, J. Leonard Hug. §§ Hug did not discard or condemn the principles and rules of his opponents, but rather made use of them himself with great acuteness, but from the

J. L. Hug.

* *Historisch-kritische Einleitung, in sämtliche kanonische und apocryphische Schriften des Alten und Neuen Testamentes*, 1812–1819.

† *Isagoge Historico-critica in Libros Novi Fœderis Sacros*, 1830.

‡ *The Dissonance of the Evangelists*, 1792.

§ In Henke's *Museum für Religionswissenschaft*, 1803, pt. i. 47 *seq.*

‖ *Der Evangelist Johannes und seine Ausleger*, 1801–04.

¶ *Uranischten des Christenthums*, 1808.

** *Philo und Johannes*, 1812.

†† *Probabilia de evangelii et epistolarum Joannis apostoli indole et origine*, 1820.

‡‡ *Untersuchungen der Gründe für die Echtheit und Glaubwürdigkeit der Schriftlichen Urkunden des Christenthums*, 1788.

§§ *Einleitung in die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, Tübingen, 1808.

point of view of a believer in the claims of the books of the New Testament, and of the Church as to their origin and value. The genuine value of his work has been universally acknowledged, even by those who have differed from him. He was followed by A. B. Feilmoser,* and later by a large number of other Roman Catholic writers.†

II. The mystic-rationalistic tendency. This has also been called the mediating tendency, standing as it does between the rationalism of Semler and Eichhorn and the traditional views. It is the result of a partial reaction against rationalism. It is characterized by the effort to plant the religious force and the historic content of the Scriptures on separate foundations. It is the distinctive tendency of the school of Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher himself was primarily a theologian, and although he modestly disclaimed the title of founder of a school of theology, as a matter of fact the number and consistency of his followers render it only proper to look upon him as such. He was, however, also a critical scholar and investigator in the field of the New Testament. In both spheres his standpoint seemed to be the combination of contradictions. He dealt with the historical sources of Christianity with almost reckless disregard of consequences; but he continued using them as authoritative regarding Christ and his teaching. His teachings on New Testament criticism were oral. His *Introduction to the New Testa-*

Schleiermacher.

* *Einleitung in die Bücher des neuen Bundes*, Innsbruck, 1810.

† Scholz, Reithmayr, Maier, Haneberg, Guntner, Danko.

ment was published only after his death.* The results of his tendency were anticipated by his pupils.

The ablest exponent of this school, if it may be called a school, was W. L. M. DeWette.† Beginning with a determination to avoid bias of all sorts, DeWette carries on his critical work with a sharp discrimination and declines to go further than the critical evidence will warrant. This appears quite disappointing. The results are often negative; *i. e.*, they are not clearly announced. The critic has had to hold judgment in suspense. Thus, on the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel in his earlier editions he is doubtful; in the later editions he more clearly inclines to accept the theory of genuineness. So on 2 Thessalonians a similar wavering and gravitation toward the old view appears in his works. The work of K. Aug. Credner‡ belongs to the same class as DeWette's. He emphasized the historical idea in Introduction and strove to reach a historical point of view. His results were to be a consecutive history of the New Testament writings. Following Credner in the main, but differing in minor details, was Neudecker.§

DeWette.

Credner.

The theologians of the school of Schleiermacher did not continue as a compact body. From the

* Edited by Wolde in *Sämtliche Werke*, i. 8, 1848.

† *Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Kanonischen Bücher des neuen Testamentes*, 1826; 5th ed. 1848; 6th, by Lüneman and Messner, 1860.

‡ *Einleitung in das N. T.*, 1836.

§ *Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das neue Testament*, 1840.

nature of the philosophical basis of the school much room was left for the subjective and personal equation in the work of each adherent of the fundamental ideas. Thus, although all aimed to reach a platform whence criticism might be freely exercised, regardless of the bearings it might have on religious views, yet, as they compared results, they found that they were compelled to antagonize each other in many particulars. In general, however, the school falls naturally into two sections; *i. e.*, the evangelical wing and the naturalistic wing. The scholars already named belong to the latter. Of the former Guericke,* Hermann Olshausen,† and Neander ‡ are the leading representatives. Neander's labors deserve special mention as of the greatest importance; he defends the authenticity of all the books of the New Testament with the exception of 2 Peter and 1 Timothy.

Schleiermacher's followers.

III. The Tübingen criticism. (Called also the "Tendency Criticism.") The philosophical principle on which the Tübingen school rested was the Hegelian theory of development. History moves in the threefold process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Action is followed

Tubingen school.

* *Beiträge zur historisch-kritischen Einleitung ins Neue Testament*, 1828–31; and *Hist.-krit. Einleitung in das N. T.*, 1843; 3d ed. as *N. T.-liche Isagogik*, 1868.

† *Schrift über die Echtheit der vier Evangelien*, 1823; and special introductions in his Biblical Commentary, Eng. trans. 1847–49.

‡ *Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche*, 1832; 5th ed. 1862; Eng. trans. by Ryland, 1842; and revised by Robinson, 1865.

by reaction, and conflict thus arises. All conflict, however, must ultimately issue in compromise. This was precisely the course of events in the development of Christianity. The founder of the Tübingen school of criticism, Ferdinand Christian Baur,* pointed out the conflicting principles in this case. He found the key to the situation in Romans xi: 1, Corinthians i: 12, and Galatians ii. Jesus Christ and his teaching were interpreted differently by the Twelve and by Paul. He was the teacher of a moral religious truth of universal application, and at the same time lived within the Jewish nation and conformed to the law. The latter of these aspects fixed itself on the minds of the Twelve, and they taught the system of Jesus as a mere continuation of the Judaism under which they had been trained. Paul saw the other side of Christ's work. He understood and developed Christianity as the way of salvation for all men apart from the law. This difference of view occasioned the conflict. Paul was attacked as an unauthorized innovator in Christianity. He wrote in his own defense the Epistles to the Romans, to the Corinthians, and to the Galatians. On the other side as an attack on his

Baur.

Standpoint.

* *Die Christuspartei in der Corinthischen Gemeinde* in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1831, 4tes Heft; *Die Sogenannten Pastoralbriefe des Paulus*, 1835; *Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi*, 1845; 2d ed. by Zeller, 1865; *Ueber Zweck und Veranlassung des Römerbriefs*, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1836, 3tes Heft; *Die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, 1853. Baur gives his own account of the genesis and history of the Tübingen idea in his *Die christliche Kirche des 19tes Jahrhundertes*, 1862; 2d ed. 1877.

teaching appeared the Apocalypse. All the other New Testament writings, inasmuch as they do not show clear evidences of this conflict, must have been produced later by members of the moderate or mediating party, or revised and softened by them and thus deprived of their partizan rancor. The conciliatory writings are later than the partizan, because their tendency is to reconcile the conflicting parties. They represent the state of feeling among Christians during the period when the polemic spirit began to abate, and the Judaists and Paulinists drew near one another; blending finally at the end of the second century in the one Catholic Church.

Results of Baur.

According to Baur only the above named five books were genuine productions of the apostolic age. Of the others Matthew was an originally Judaistic work, revised in the interests of Paulinism; Mark was a conciliatory writing from the beginning; Luke was the obverse of Matthew—originally a Pauline work, it had been amended in the interests of Judaistic thought. The Fourth Gospel and the First Epistle of John are the last of all the New Testament writings, and belong to the latter part of the second century. The Acts are untrustworthy, and written purely for the purpose of showing that Peter and Paul taught the same things. The lesser epistles of Paul present Paulinism accommodating itself to Judaistic Christianity. The Catholic Epistles, including James, show Judaistic Christianity assimilated to Paulinism.

Baur rendered a real and valuable service to

sound criticism by leading it into the use of the historic method. He makes an epoch in New Testament criticism as the first to introduce this method here. Credner had made the effort to write a history of the New Testament writings, but Baur was the first to attempt a reconstruction of the situation of the times in which these writings originated. But he planted the seeds of decay in his own system by infusing into it a speculative and unreal philosophy of history.

Service rendered by Baur.

The fascination of Baur's method drew to his side and enlisted in the support of his views a group of brilliant men. Among these were, Ed. Zeller,* Alb. Schwegler,† C. R. Köstlin.‡ These followed him rather closely.

His followers.

Other followers felt constrained to make concessions of more or less importance to the opposition. Volkmar§ modified Baur's view of the origin and relations of the Gospels to one another. Ad. Hilgenfeld‖ has defended the genuineness of Philip-

* As editor of the *Theologische Jährbücher*, beginning with 1842, and in *Die Apostelgeschichte nach ihrem Inhalt und Ursprung*, 1856.

† *Das Nachapostolische Zeitalter*, 1846.

‡ *In the Theol. Jährbücher* for 1851, corroborating Baur's results by a theory of pseudepigraphic literature during the apostolic age.

§ *Der Ursprung unserer Evangelien*, 1866; *Die synopsis der Evangelien*, 1869.

‖ Editor of *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie* since 1858, and in *Der Kanon und die Kritik des neuen Testaments* 1836; *Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das neue Testament*, 1875.

pians, Thessalonians, and Philemon; thus admitting seven instead of four genuine Pauline epistles in the canon. He has also placed much earlier than Baur the date of the Gospels. Holsten* asserts that conflict between the Petrine and Pauline sides begins after the meeting of Paul and Peter at Antioch.†

Outside of Germany the Tübingen school found adherents in Holland in the person of Scholten,‡ in England, Samuel Davidson,§ in France, Réville‖ and Rénan,¶ and in America Orello Cone.**

Passing into a third phase the Tübingen theory and method lose their distinctiveness and become a form of mere rationalistic criticism, adapting itself to increasing light. This is the case in the works of Otto Pfleiderer,†† Adolf Hausrath,‡‡ Immer,§§

Latest phase of Tübingen criticism.

* *Das Evangelium des Paulus dargestellt*, 1880.

† Galatians ii.

‡ *Historical and Critical Introduction to the New Testament*, 1853; 2d ed. 1856.

§ *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1868; 2d ed. 1882. Dr. Davidson had published an earlier work on the same subject, defending the traditional views, which was superseded by this.

‖ Articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

¶ *Vie de Jésus*, 1863; *Les Apôtres*, 1866; *St. Paul et sa Mission*, 1869; *Les Évangiles et la Séconde Génération Chrétienne*, 1877.

** *Gospel Criticism and Historical Christianity*, 1888; *The Gospel and its Earliest Interpretation*, 1893.

†† *Der Paulinismus*, 1873.

‡‡ *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte*, 1868–73; 2d ed. 1873–77.

§§ *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1877.

H. J. Holtzmann,* C. Weizsäcker,† and Julicher.‡

Baur's criticism led to two side-developments independent of the main stream of the history of criticism. These were the mythical theory of Strauss and the absolute negation of Bruno Bauer. Baur's idea of historicity involved the denial of the supernatural. This phase of his method was emphasized by David Frederick Strauss.§ The result was the mythical theory of Gospel history, according to which every miraculous account was explained as a myth. This work was so exclusively on *à priori* reasoning that Strauss felt it to be necessary to write another supplementing its weaknesses.‖ His importance in the history of pure criticism is secondary.

Strauss.

The total denial of the genuineness of all the New Testament writings, and their credibility as historical sources, was made by Bruno Bauer.¶ Bauer ascribed the whole body of New Testament writings to the second

Bruno Bauer.

* *Lehrbuch des historisch-kritischen Einleitung, in das neue Testament*, 1885.

† *Untersuchungen über die Evangelische Geschichte*, 1863; *Das apostolische Zeitalter der christlichen Kirche*, 1863; Eng. trans. 1893. Besides the above, other advocates of similar views are: Wittichen, Lipsius, Overbeck, Paul Schmidt, W. Bruckner, and Seuffert.

‡ *Einleitung in das neue Testament*, 1894.

§ *Leben Jesu*, 1835.

‖ *Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, 1864; 4th ed. 1877; Eng. trans. 1865.

¶ *Kritik der Evangelien*, 1850–52; *Kritik der Apostelgeschichte*, 1850; *Kritik der Paulinichen Briefe*, 1852; *Christus und die Cäsaren*, 1877.

century.* He remained, however, the sole representative of these ideas until the rise of the most recent destructive criticism by Steck.

Opposition.

Opposition to the methods and results of the Tübingen school arose in two quarters,† *i. e.*, first, in the evangelical school of criticism, which approached the problems of criticism from the point of view of the traditional theories, with the evident intention of defending these; and second, in a group of scholars some of whom proceeded from the school of Schleiermacher, whose standpoint has been given above, and others working independently.

Evangelical criticism.

The evangelical school found an early exponent in J. H. A. Ebrard,‡ W. O. Dietlein,§ followed by H. W. J. Thiersch,‖ Lechler,¶ and the school of Hofmann in Erlangen. Hofmann himself defended the genuineness of all the books of the canon, including 2 Peter.** Hofmann's disciples are Luthardt,†† Rud. Fr.

* 130–170 A. D.

† The first response made to Baur and the Tübingen standpoint was of a semi-humorous nature by H. Böttger, entitled *Baurs historische Kritik in ihrer Consequenz*, 1840.

‡ *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte*, 1842; 2d ed. 1850.

§ *Das Urchristenthum*, 1845.

‖ *Versuch zur Herstellung des historischen Standpunktes für die Kritik der N.-Testamentlichen Schriften*, 1845; *Die Kirche im apostolichen Zeitalter*, 1852; 2d ed. 1879.

¶ *Das apostolische und nachapostolische Zeitalter*, 1851.

** *Die Heilige Schrift Neuen Testaments zusammenhangend untersucht*, 1862–81. This work was left unfinished at the death of the author and completed by Volck.

†† *Die Johanneische Ursprung des Vierten Evangeliums*, 1874.

Grau,* Nösgen,† Th. Zahn.‡ The other wing of opposition to the Tübingen standpoint brought to the surface such works as those of Friedrich Bleek,§ Ewald,‖ Eduard Reuss.¶ These scholars, however, by no means represent a return to the traditional views or even to the rationalistic views of the New Testament which preceded the advent of the Tübingen school, but a tendency toward a nearer approach to the standpoint whence critical investigation might go on consistently with the belief in the divine origin and authoritative nature of the Scriptures. An independent contribution to this tendency was made by Albrecht Ritschl.** The appearance of his work was a blow dealt at the Tübingen criticism. And it proved all the more serious as such, as Ritschl had already appeared as one of the champions of the school.†† Ritschl did not deny the antagonism between Paulinism and Judaistic Christianity, but claimed that this antagonism was preceded by a common gospel, out of which grew both Paulinism and its

Ritschl.

**Entwicklungsgeschichte des N.-Testamentlichen Schriftthums*, 1871.

† *Geschichte der Neutestamentlichen Offenbarung*, 1891–93.

‡ *Forschungen zur Geschichte des N.-Testamentlichen Kanons*, 1881–1884; *Das Neue Testament vor Origenes*, 1888, 1889; and *Geschichte des N.-Testamentlichen Kanons*, 1890–92.

§ *Beiträge zur Evangelienkritik*, 1846; *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, edited by Johannes Bleek, 1862; and by Mangold, 4th ed. 1886.

‖ *Jahrbücher der Biblischen Wissenchaft*, beginning with 1849, and *Die Bücher des neuen Bundes überzetzt und erklärt*, 1871–72.

¶ *Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften: Neues Testament*, 1842, 5th ed. 1874; Eng. trans. 1884.

** *Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche*, 2d ed. 1857.

†† In the first edition of the *Altkatolische Kirche*, 1850.

antagonistic Judæo-Christianity. Paulinism was, according to him, the legitimate outcome of the teaching of Jesus. Against this the Judaistic movement rose as a mild and feeble reaction, but was overcome shortly. Thus the conflict, instead of playing such an important part in the formation of the New Testament literature, was only an episode in the history of early Christianity. Ritschl, moreover, insisted on the admissibility of the miraculous element in history. At the same time his criticism was of the freest. Looking upon the Christian system as a teaching which authenticates itself subjectively by the impression it produces, he had no interest in saving any mere objective statements, or opinions regarding its sources. This mode of treating the New Testament writings has found a large number of adherents. From the very nature of its peculiarity, however, it leads to differing results. Among the scholars who approach Ritschl's standpoint may be named Harnack,* Schürer,† and Wendt.‡

Standpoint.

Followers.

Quite evangelical in their tone are the productions of W. Beyschlag § and of B. Weiss.‖ Evangelical and conservative has been also predominantly the scholarship of

W. Beyschlag. B. Weiss.

* *Das Neue Testament um das Jahr* 200, 1889.

† "The Fourth Gospel," *Contemporary Review*, September 1891.

‡ *Die Lehre Jesu* 1890; Eng. trans. 1892.

§ *Leben Jesu*, 1887; *Neu Testamentalische Theologie*, 1891–92; Eng. trans. 1875.

‖ *Lehrbuch der Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, 1886; 2d ed. 1889; Eng. trans. 1889. Weiss' other works are also of importance in the history of New Testament criticism: *Petrinische Lehrbegriff*, 1855; *Das Markus evangelium und seine synoptische Parallelen*, 1872; *Das Matthäus evangelium und seine Lukas-*

Great Britain and the United States. Some of the most valuable contributions to New Testament criticism have been made, apart from polemic purposes, by J. B. Lightfoot,* B. F. Westcott,† C. J. Ellicott,‡ Sanday,§ Plumtre,‖ Lumby,¶ Salmon,** Marcus Dods,†† and McClymont.‡‡ To these must be added the American scholar Ezra Abbott.§§ In the same strain has been also the work of the French scholars, Cellerier,‖‖ Glaire,¶¶ Gilly,*** Pressensé,††† and Godet.‡‡‡

English critics.

French critics.

parallelen, 1876 ; *Lehrbuch der Biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1864 ; 5th ed. 1888.

* *Epistle to the Galatians*, 1865 ; *Philippians*, 1868 ; 8th. ed. 1888 ; *Colossians and Philemon*, 1875 ; 8th ed. 1886.

† *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, 1860 ; *The History of the Canon of the New Testament*, 1855 ; 6th ed. 1889.

‡ Without dealing with critical questions specifically, this author stands on conservative ground in his Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul and expressly defines his position as that of an evangelical critic in his *Christus Comprobatur*, 1892.

§ *Authorship and Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel*, 1872 ; *The Gospels in the Second Century*, 1876.

‖ *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1883.

¶ *Popular Introduction to the New Testament*, 1883.

** *A Historical Introduction to the Study of the Books of the New Testament*, 1855 ; 8th ed. 1895.

†† *An Introduction to the New Testament*, 1889.

‡‡ *The New Testament and its Writers*, 1893.

§§ *The Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, 1880.

‖‖ *Essai d'une Introduction Critique au Nouveau Testament*, 1823.

¶¶ *Introduction Historique et Critique aux Livres de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament*, 5 vols. 1843 ; 3d ed. 1861–62.

*** *Précis d'Introduction Générale et Particulière à l'Écriture Sainte*, 3 vols. 1867–68.

††† *L'École Critique et Jesus-Christ*, 1863.

‡‡‡ *Introduction to the New Testament : St. Paul's Epistles*, 1894 ; published in French and English at the same time.

An attempt to establish a new standpoint for New Testament criticism on the platform of Bruno Bauer was made by Rudolf Steck.* This critic put forth the view that none of Paul's Epistles were genuine. The four cardinal epistles commonly conceded as such by the Tübingen scholars were the works of a Pauline school in the second quarter of the second century. But if the Pauline epistles are not genuine the other New Testament writings could not be. Steck's view of the development of the New Testament writings is in some respects the reverse of that of the Tübingen school. The conflict between Paulinism and Judæo-Christianity was, according to him, subsequent to the development of the earliest Church rather than its condition and cause. Christianity begins with the teaching of Jesus, and this is differentiated into Ebionism, and Gnosticism in the second century; Judæo-Christianity is the halfway point toward Ebionism, and Paulinism the same toward Gnosticism. The revival of Bruno Bauer's total denial of the genuineness of the New Testament writings has found other promoters, especially in Holland. Here the earlier labors of Naber and Pierson have been followed by those of Loman and Van Manen.†

Latent negative criticism: Steck.

This sketch of the history of New Testament criticism would be incomplete without at least a mere mention of the rise of two specific problems

* *Der Galaterbrief nach seiner Echtheit untersucht*, 1888.

† Van Manen, *De Handenlingen der Apostelen*, 1890; *De brief aan de Romeinen*, 1892.

that have developed also within a few years. These are the problem of the Apocalypse and the problem of the Acts.

Special questions: the Apocalypse.

The question regarding the Apocalypse was raised by Völter,* who set up the theory that the Apocalypse is made up of documents of different dates fused into one. This view did not meet with much favor. In 1886 Vischer† elaborated the view that the book of Revelation is the Christian recension of an original Jewish book. The Christian redactor seems to have added the first three chapters, besides interpolating the other parts of the book quite freely. The discussion thus became and for the present remains three-cornered as between the advocates of Vischer's view, that of Völter, and the adherents of the traditional view that the Revelation is the writing of John the Apostle.

The Acts.

The question regarding the Acts of the Apostles begins properly with Spitta's *Apostelgeschichte.*‡ Spitta teaches that the book of Acts consists of two sources—A and B—fused together. Dividing A into 40 sections and B into 32, the two sources are parallel in no less than 24 of these sections. A is distinguished by naturalness and trustworthiness; B follows the popular and corrupt traditions regarding the apostolic age and

* *Die Entstehung der Apokalypse*, 1882 ; 2d ed. 1885.

† *Die Offenbarung Johannis eine jüdische Apokalypse in Christlicher Bearbeitung ; mit einem Nachwort von Adolf Harnack*, 1886. Pt. iii. of *Texte und Untersuchungen* vol. ii.

‡ *Die Apostelgeschichte : ihre Quellen und deren geschichtlichen Werth*, 1891.

strings together a line of miracles, some of which "border on the absurd." To A belong in the main chapters i.–xii. and xv.; to B, chapters xiii.–xxviii., except xv. The recent origin of this view has not afforded time as yet for its thorough discussion.

As our survey of the history of the Higher Criticism in the New Testament has not led us to distinguish clearly the problems which have emerged in this field, it may constitute a most appropriate close to the sketch to simply enumerate these problems.

Problems in N. T. criticism.

1. The *Synoptic* problem. This is a question as to the mode of the origin of the Synoptic Gospels. It was occasioned by the observation of the resemblances and differences between the first three Gospels. It arose quite early in the history of criticism. The resemblances of the Synoptic Gospels are of such a nature as to preclude the view that they originated entirely independently of one another. As to what connection they have had in this matter, the views held may be summed up as (1) the hypothesis of a common oral tradition; (2) the hypothesis of one common written source; (3) the hypothesis of two written now not extant sources, and (4) the hypothesis of two written sources, of which one is the Gospel of Mark in nearly its present form.

2. The problem of the *Fourth Gospel.* This is also one of the earliest modern questions in the New Testament, and consists in the inquiry whether John the Apostle and son of Zebedee wrote the fourth Gospel. The views held are (1) That he did; (2) that the Gospel was the product of an

Alexandrian tendency about the first quarter of the second century; (3) that it was the product of a Gnostic tendency; (4) that it is a Christian work proceeding from the Johannine circle, but not the work of John himself.

3. The problem of the *Acts*. This question, as developed within the most recent years, has already been stated. For the sake of removing misunderstanding, however, it may be proper to add that doubts as to the historical value of the Acts were entertained by the Tübingen critics, and efforts have been made to ascertain a date for the origin of the book within the second century and to establish its dependence on Josephus.

4. The problem of the *Pauline Epistles*. Criticism in reality finds more than one question here. The preceding sketch has led us to touch on these questions more fully than on the others; it will only be necessary to state now the principal views held. These are (1) all the epistles extant under the name of Paul are genuine; (2) all are genuine except the pastoral epistles, (3) none are genuine except the cardinal epistles—Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, and perhaps Philippians and Thessalonians. (4) None are genuine.

5. The problem of *Hebrews*. This is the oldest question of criticism. Tradition ascribed the writing in the third century to Paul. Doubts were expressed as to the truthfulness of this ascription. The discussion subsided and was revived at the time of the Reformation, and with greater acuteness during the present century. The views held are: (1) the Pauline origin of the epistle (*a*) directly,

(*b*) through the mediation of an assistant—Luke, Timothy, Clement. (2) The authorship of a disciple or associate of Paul—Apollos, Barnabas, etc.

6. The *Petrine* problem. The simplest form of the question is, Did the Apostle Peter write either one of the epistles now under his name in the canon? The answers are: (1) He wrote neither; (2) he wrote the first, but not the second; (3) he wrote both. Thus far the fourth possible answer, *i. e.*, he wrote the second, but not the first, has not been given by any one. In the discussion of these answers much importance attaches to the dependence, real or imaginary, of the epistles of Peter on those of Paul. In the case of the second epistle, its relation to Jude is also an important factor.

7. The problem of *James.* The question is twofold: (1) Who is the James of the epistle? (2) Did he actually write the epistle?

8. The problem of *Jude.* The question is here also twofold: (1) Who is the Jude of the epistle? (2) Did he write the epistle?

9. The problem of the minor *Johannine Epistles.* That the First Epistle of John is by the author of the Fourth Gospel is generally agreed to. As to the second and third, the question is raised whether they are by the same author or by another John, sometimes known as "John the Presbyter."

10. The problem of the *Apocalypse.* The older question in this case was, Is the author of the book the same as the author of the Fourth Gospel? The more recent one, as raised by Völter and Vischer, has been given above.

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